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1. Introduction 
During his 2008 presidential election campaign, Barack Obama spent 364 million US dollars, 
or 48% of his total campaign expenditures, on the media. The bulk of the money (313 million 
US dollars) went to the broadcast media, i.e., to TV and radio. While the republican candidate 
John McCain did not have the same amount of money at his disposal, he nevertheless spent 
119 million US dollars on the media (and thereof at least 63 million on the broadcast media), 
which equals to 30% of his total campaign expenditures (Center for Responsive Politics 
2009).1 It is estimated that Obama spent more than 3 million dollars on a single 30 minute TV 
spot that aired on all major TV networks in the days leading up to the election (Rutenberg 
2008).  
The relevance of the mass media, and especially of TV, in the political process also becomes 
evident when looking at somewhat different spending figures: the bribes Montesinos, the 
Peruvian secret-police chief under then President Alberto Fujimori, paid to judges, politicians 
and the media. The bribes paid to television station owners were about one hundred times 
larger than the bribes paid to politicians or judges. The owners of the three largest TV stations 
received between 500’000 US dollars and 1.5 million US dollars a month, along with a 
multitude of other kickbacks, such as income from government advertising or assistance with 
lawsuits. In contrast, the owners of the largest newspapers received roughly 60’000 US 
dollars a month. Finally, TV was also responsible for overthrowing Fujimori’s regime. The 
only TV station not complicit with Montesinos, the small cable channel Channel N, aired a 
videotape showing Montesinos bribing a congressman (McMillan and Zoido 2004). These 
examples illustrate that television and the mass media in general are an important and 
independent political force. Several studies thus show that private ownership of the media, 
press freedom and low concentration in the media market are, for example, associated with 
better government accountability (Besley and Prat 2006), less corruption (Brunetti and Weder 
2003) or increased political rights and improved social and economic outcomes (Djankov et 
al. 2003). 
The media are also very relevant with regard to the demand side. Radio and TV are the 
technical inventions of the 20th century with the highest and quickest diffusion rates. Only 7 
years after the introduction of television, 75% of US households were in possession of a TV 
                                                 
1 The Campaign Media Analysis Group (2008) publishes somewhat different figures and estimates that the 
Obama campaign spent 236 US dollars and the McCain campaign 126 million US Dollars on TV ads only. 
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set. Radio diffused with a comparable speed (8 years to reach 75% of US households). 
Neither the fridge (23 years) nor the telephone (67 years) had a similar success (Bowden and 
Offer 1994). The importance of media is also reflected in the amount of time people spend 
absorbing it. In Germany, the average citizen consumes more than five hours of media per 
day, whereby TV viewing constitutes by far the most time-consuming media consumption 
activity (Grahn et al. 2003). In 2006, Europeans spent on average over three hours a day in 
front of the TV, and US Americans spent around five hours (IP Network 2007). Europeans 
spend on average between 30 and 50% of their leisure time watching TV and video (Winqvist 
2004). While much of the time watching TV is spent on entertainment programs, television is 
still the most important source of information for many people in many countries. 60% of 
respondents from the European Social Survey2 indicate that they spend more than half an hour 
a day on news and political programs on TV, while only about 30 and 20% do so for radio 
and newspapers, respectively. 
The analogy between the importance of media in the political and economic sphere and the 
omnipresence of media consumption in people’s everyday lives points to an interesting 
analytical starting point: the analysis of people’s time use is not only interesting per se, but 
also of considerable relevance for the understanding of the impact of media on the economy, 
on politics and on individual welfare. This dissertation, therefore, aims at studying media 
demand and, specifically, the effects of TV consumption on individual behavior and well-
being from an economist’s point of view. 
Such an analysis is especially interesting, because, quite in contrast to its ascribed importance 
in the political sphere and its predominance in people’s lives, TV receives at best a mixed 
appraisal in society (and in scholarly literature). While hardly anyone denies that TV viewing 
is a convenient form of entertainment and source of information, television has a quite 
negative image. The concerns raised can be divided into two categories. At a social level, 
worries have been articulated that TV boosts crime, endangers the proper functioning of 
democracy, lowers voter turnout and decreases social capital. At an individual level, it is 
doubted that TV serves a rational purpose. People supposedly watch too much TV or are even 
addicted to it. In fact, 40% of US adults and 70% of US teenagers admit that they watch too 
                                                 
2 The data is from the first two waves of the European Social Survey carried out between 2002 and 2007 in 27 
European countries (see Jowell et al. 2003; 2005). For a detailed description of the media consumption questions 
see chapter 2.4. 
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much TV according to their own view (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 2002). Some individuals 
totally abstain from watching TV because they know that otherwise they would not be able to 
control their television viewing behavior. Television has even been called a “plug-in drug” 
(Winn 1977). 
However, one should note that almost every new form of entertainment or media was initially 
subject to severe criticism – be it novels of the late 18th century, whose reading was 
considered “almost as disreputable […], as to be found betting at a cock-fight or a gaming 
table” (McHenry 1824, p. 1; cited in Orians 1937, p. 197), the Penny Papers of the 19th 
century whose sensation mongering coverage of court cases was accused of “corrupting […] 
social and moral habits” (Colored American 1840), the cinema, radio, and even the telephone, 
which was deemed in 1926 by the Knights of Columbus Adult Education Committee, to 
“make men lazy” and “break up family life and the old practice of visiting friends” (Fischer 
1992). Yet, television is probably unique with regard to the amount of scientific research that 
goes into it. In many fields of social sciences, be it sociology, psychology, political sciences 
and, media and communication sciences, researchers began investigating television’s 
suspected alleged negative – and positive – consequences immediately following its 
introduction into society. Only the economists were late to follow suit. While the subfield of 
media economics has existed for some decades, it was mainly concerned with the media and 
television as an industry and thus confined itself to economic analyses within this industry. 
Only recently have economists started to recognize the media in its role as an information 
provider and therefore to analyze its impact on individual behavior and well-being. 
There might be several explanations for this neglect. One reason is surely that information did 
not play any major role in economic theory until the 60s and 70s. Individual actors were 
assumed to be fully informed in standard economic theory, such as general equilibrium 
models (see, e.g., Arrow and Debreu 1954; Debreu 1959). While in the 60s some economists 
such as Stigler (1961; 1967) or Ozga (1960) recognized the importance of information or 
analyzed its value, they argued that standard results of economic models would still hold 
under imperfect information once information costs were taken into account. Information 
search costs were just regarded as transaction costs (see Stiglitz 2000; 2002). A major 
breakthrough was then realized with the recognition that information goods differed in several 
important aspects from normal commodities and featured aspects common to public goods 
(see Stiglitz 2000, p. 1448-1449; and chapter 2.2.1). Furthermore, the analysis of two of the 
most prominent information problems on markets, adverse selection (Akerlof 1970) and 
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moral hazard (Arrow 1963; 1968) showed that many of the major predictions of the standard 
models did not hold even when only small information costs were taken into account. 
However, in the early models, market participants were still passive, and only in the later 
screening and signaling models active information search was introduced (for a review see, 
e.g., Riley 2001). Still, how information acquisition actually takes place and what role 
information intermediaries, such as the mass media, play seems not to be a topic of general 
interest in the information economics literature. 
The picture is somewhat similar within the field of political economy and public choice. 
Downs (1957a; b), among others, already recognized the high importance of information for 
voters and the entire political process and also discussed the role of the mass media. Yet, his 
insights in that latter area were not really recognized or further developed by other scholars. 
While the idea of rational ignorance received some attention, Downs’ discussion of the role of 
professional data gatherers and publishers, as he calls the media, and of voters acquiring news 
“accidentally” through free sources as a side-effect of entertainment or purely of interest, has 
not attracted much research until recently.3 As Hosp (2005, p.36) notes, the term “media” 
does not even appear in the index of well-established textbooks in the field, such as those by 
Mueller (2003) or Persson and Tabellini (2000). Only since recently have studies appeared 
that recognize the role of the media on economic as well as political markets. This “new” 
media economic literature combining the insights from traditional, industrial economic 
oriented, media economics with political economy and institutional economics is, however, 
still in its early stages and leaves many interesting questions unanswered. Specifically, the 
demand side has not yet received much attention. 
Nevertheless, the question arises if it is still interesting and warranted to write an entire 
dissertation on television consumption. While economists might be a bit late in integrating the 
media – and television – into their framework, research on TV in other fields of social 
sciences is already plentiful. Furthermore, new technologies and new forms of media, such as 
the internet, are advancing and might replace television as the dominant source of 
entertainment and information. Nonetheless, there exist several reasons why an economic 
analysis of television consumption remains relevant. First, there are still many open questions 
regarding the suspected effects of television on individual behavior and well-being. One issue 
                                                 
3 Among the earlier exceptions are, e.g., Tollison et al. (1975) on the role of media attention on voter turnout or 
Crain and Goff (1986) on political advertising and televising legislatures. 
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that is very important to economists is the empirical identification of causal effects. Many 
empirical studies exist that show a correlation between media related variables and some 
outcome variable, for example, between individual television consumption and political 
knowledge or participation (see, e.g., Norris 2000). Many researchers then, implicitly or 
explicitly, assume some direction of causality: Either television, because of its meager 
political content, leads to decreased interest in politics, or those persons who are less 
interested in politics tend to watch more TV. While negative effects are often ascribed to 
television without proper empirical basis, economic studies try to challenge (or confirm) these 
conventional conclusions using stringent empirical methods. The empirical applications in 
this dissertation attempt to exemplify where the prospects and limits of such an approach lie. 
Second, and even more importantly, recent advances in economics make it possible to 
readdress (old) questions. The field of economics and psychology (or behavioral economics), 
which integrates psychological insights into economic theory and tries to advocate a more 
realistic model of human behavior than the standard economic model, leads to new analytical 
starting points and different conclusions. For example, the paradigm of revealed behavior is 
questioned. People sometimes commit systematic mistakes, which makes it impossible to 
infer utility from choice (see, e.g., Thaler 1992). It seems likely that TV watching is exactly a 
case where not all people are able to follow what is in their best interest. They might be 
tempted to watch more TV than they have planned on, or they would like to watch, both ex 
ante and ex post, which results in lower utility. Another development in economics now 
makes it possible to investigate this proposition empirically. A large literature shows that 
utility can be empirically approximated by measures of subjective well-being, or more 
concretely, reported life satisfaction (for reviews see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002a; b; Layard 
2005; Frey 2008). Such data make it possible to directly investigate the utility consequences 
of TV consumption. Last, large multinational datasets at the individual level that include 
measures of media consumption as well as subjective well-being have become available in 
recent years. This makes it possible to empirically investigate television’s impact on behavior 
and well-being on a large scale. These various recent developments allow for a new 
understanding of television consumption. Furthermore, the research hopes to provide new 
insights beyond the close applications presented in this dissertation. 
The goal of the dissertation is therefore to integrate the analysis of television consumption in 
a modern economic framework that goes beyond standard rational choice theory and to 
empirically investigate, within this framework, the effects of TV consumption on individual 
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well-being and behavior. The remainder of the dissertation is composed of three main parts 
and a concluding chapter. The first part (chapter 2) provides the conceptual and empirical 
basis while the second and third parts (chapters 3 and 4) present specific empirical 
applications investigating the impact of TV consumption on subjective well-being and on the 
behavior of voters and politicians, respectively. Finally, chapter 5 concludes. 
Specifically, chapter 2 integrates television consumption into an economic framework and 
lays out the economic literature related to media consumption. Of course, there also exists a 
broad and vast literature in other disciplines that is related to the analysis of TV consumption. 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a complete review of this 
literature, I discuss the relationship with other disciplines and present specific contributions 
important for the later empirical analyses. The next sections in chapter 2, then, make the first 
steps towards an empirical analysis of TV consumption. To empirically asses to importance of 
media consumption and its effects on well-being and behavior, media consumption first has to 
be measured. I therefore discuss and evaluate different measures and measurement 
techniques. Furthermore, using one of these measures – the self-reported time spent watching 
TV – I study the determinants of TV consumption at individual as well as at institutional 
levels. Last, the conceptual analysis is extended beyond the standard rational choice 
framework and two extensions most relevant for TV consumption are discussed: the role of 
self-control problems and of utility misprediction. In sum, chapter 2 provides the theoretical 
and empirical background for the remaining parts of the thesis, which examine the 
consequences of TV consumption. 
Chapter 3 of the thesis provides an empirical study of the relationship between television 
consumption and subjective well-being. The main hypothesis is based on the idea that, due to 
its immediate benefits at negligible immediate marginal costs, TV consumption can be more 
tempting than the pursuit of more engaging activities. As a consequence, individuals with 
incomplete control over, and foresight into, their own behavior watch more TV than they 
consider optimal for themselves, and their well-being is lower than what could be achieved. 
Data on subjective well-being or, more concretely, life satisfaction can now be used to 
investigate this proposition empirically. The results indicate that heavy TV viewers report 
lower life satisfaction, ceteris paribus. The question then arises in which direction causality 
goes: does watching TV really make people unhappy or do unhappy people just watch more 
TV? I propose several extensions of the basic analysis to investigate this issue. First, a path 
analysis highlights the different mechanisms through which TV consumption might lead to 
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lower subjective well-being. The empirical results indicate that long hours of TV watching are 
linked to higher material aspirations and anxiety. Second, the economic analysis in chapter 2 
suggests that time costs are the most relevant costs in the case of TV consumption and leads 
to the hypothesis that particular people with significant opportunity cost of time will hurt their 
own well-being. The empirical results reveal that heavy TV watching is indeed associated 
with significantly lower life satisfaction among the self-employed, busy professionals and 
people with flexible working hours but not among the unemployed and retirees with a large 
amount of free time and among people with fixed working hours. Third, television is likely to 
be more tempting when people have a large choice of TV channels and can expect a good 
match between offered programs and their own preferences. The empirical analysis shows 
that heavy TV viewers do not benefit when exposed to many TV channels but instead report 
lower life satisfaction. In sum, the findings suggest that an identifiable group of persons do 
not adequately take into account the costs and experience a self-control problem when it 
comes to TV viewing. 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation presents an empirical application of the impact of television on 
the behavior of voters and politicians. The basic idea is that TV consumption may have a 
specific impact because, due the importance of animated pictures on television, TV news 
differs from news in newspapers or other media in systematic ways. Person-related 
information is relatively more important than factual information and news is presented in a 
simpler style. TV might therefore attract a different audience than other traditional media. 
Specifically, people with lower interest in politics and with lower education might be attracted 
by TV’s simpler style and its combination of news and entertainment but still profit, 
intentionally or unintentionally, from their TV consumption. To mitigate causality problems 
the presumably exogenous variation of the diffusion of local TV in Switzerland at community 
level is investigated. The data reveal that the presence of local TV induces people with low 
education to consume more news which has a positive effect on their participation in 
elections. The scope of the analysis is then broadened by analyzing how parties and 
politicians react to the presence of local TV stations. It is hypothesized that the political actors 
might have incentives to change the focus of their election campaigns from issues of content 
to the promotion of people. Accordingly, the empirical results indicate that the number of 
candidates for Council of States elections increases when local TV is available. All effects are 
strong when local TV markets match well with sub-national jurisdictions or electoral districts 
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and are not statistically significant when local TV markets span over several jurisdictions, 
which lends additional support to a causal interpretation of the results. 
While the empirical applications all highlight different aspects of the causes and 
consequences of television consumption, they all show that a systematic economic analysis 
leads to interesting and relevant new insights. Hence, the last chapter draws conclusions for 
economic research on media consumption and for media policy. As the different parts of the 
dissertation show, television can have various intended and unintended beneficial and harmful 
effects on individuals as well as spill-over effects on society as a whole. This makes it 
notoriously difficult to deduct concrete policy recommendations from specific studies or 
empirical results. To avoid giving naïve policy recommendations, I discuss the challenges 
faced by the empirical studies presented in this dissertation as well as by the literature in 
general. Finally, the chapter also suggests directions for future research. 
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2. An Economic Analysis of Television Consumption: Rational Choice and 
Beyond 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This dissertation studies the effects of television consumption on behavior and well-being 
from an economist’s point of view. To do so, this part of thesis integrates TV consumption 
into an economic framework.  
Chapter 2.2 discusses several basic concepts related to an economic analysis of television 
consumption. First, information and media goods and media markets differ in several respects 
from “normal” goods and markets. As these specific characteristics are relevant for 
consumption decisions the chapter shortly summarizes them. Second, the chapter integrates 
TV consumption into a rational choice framework and, specifically, the household production 
approach. This approach stresses that households need both market goods and time to produce 
more basic commodities that enter their utility function. Hence, the approach emphasizes the 
role of opportunity costs of time for media consumption decisions. Third, the chapter presents 
the specific contributions of the media economics literature to the analysis of TV 
consumption. Where necessary and appropriate, I also discuss contributions from other social 
sciences such as media and communication studies, political sciences, psychology and 
sociology. However, it has to be emphasized that it is not the goal of this chapter to provide a 
complete literature review. The literature on media and media consumption in the different 
disciplines is so vast that it would be impossible to give enough credit to all the fields. The 
selection of literature discussed does also not intend to reflect some kind of objective 
importance or quality, but rather provides a basis for the empirical analyses in the remaining 
parts of the dissertation. 
The following three chapters make the first steps towards an empirical analysis of TV 
watching. I outline the different measures and measurement techniques of media consumption 
(chapter 2.3) and study individual (chapter 2.4) as well as institutional (chapter 2.5) 
determinants of TV watching. I exemplify the latter in an empirical application analyzing the 
effects of public broadcasting on TV consumption. The whole analysis in these three chapters 
is done within the rational choice framework outlined in chapter 2.2. Recent developments in 
economics, often summarized with the term economics and psychology or behavioral 
economics, however, acknowledge the limits of this standard economic approach and try to 
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integrate insights from psychology into the economic model of human behavior (for general 
discussions and reviews of the field see e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2001; Frey and Benz 2004; 
Pesendorfer 2006; Frey and Stutzer 2007; DellaVigna 2009). Chapter 2.6, therefore, goes 
beyond the rational choice approach. It emphasizes two aspects discussed in the economics 
and psychology literature that are relevant for television consumption: self-control problems 
and utility misprediction. Thus, section 2.6 lays the theoretical foundations for chapter 3 of 
the dissertation, the empirical analysis of the effects of TV consumption on subjective well-
being.  
In short, this part of the thesis mainly discusses the theoretical background and the 
determinants of TV consumption. Based on this analysis, the following parts of the thesis then 
study the effects of TV consumption. 
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2.2. Basic Concepts of the Economics of Television Consumption 
An economic analysis of television consumption can build on a broad and vast body of 
literature not only in economics, but also in related disciplines such as media and 
communication studies, sociology, psychology and political sciences. In economics, two 
subfields are of special relevance. First, the analysis of media consumption can be seen as an 
analysis in the tradition of the economic approach to human behavior. This rational choice 
approach has been successfully applied to many fields beyond narrow economics (see, e.g., 
Becker 1976; Stigler 1984; Frey 1995; Lazear 2000), and it can also be used to understand 
television consumption behavior. Second, there exists the specific field of media economics. 
While early literature in this field dealt mainly with industrial economic aspects of media 
markets, in recent years its scope has broadened towards a political economic and institutional 
economic analysis of the media. This field of research can therefore contribute a great deal to 
the understanding of TV consumption. Hence, section 2.2.2 discusses TV consumption as an 
individually rational calculus, while section 2.2.3 – selectively – lays out what the specific 
media economics literature can contribute to this analysis. Whenever appropriate, 
contributions from other social sciences are discussed as well. First however, before 
discussing television consumption in the light of these two economic fields, section 2.2.1 
briefly summarizes the specific features of information, media goods and media markets.  
2.2.1. Specific Features of Information, Media Goods and Media Markets 
Information and media goods exhibit some distinctive features that distinguish them from 
“normal” commodities. Likewise, media markets differ from normal product markets in 
several dimensions. As these specific characteristics influence the behavior of participants in 
media markets, including consumers, they are shortly outlined here. For more detailed 
descriptions of the characteristics and their implications see, e.g., Hamilton (2004) or Hosp 
(2005). 
First, the production of information goods is characterized by high fixed costs and low 
variable costs (e.g. Shapiro and Varian 1999, p. 3; Hamilton 2004, p. 9; Hosp 2005, p. 24). 
Another aspect important for the production of media goods is the many product dimensions 
characterizing media content leading to a much differentiated media product. News stories, 
for example, can vary in focus, length or style of presentation (Hamilton 2004, p. 9). This 
product differentiation in combination with the cost structure of high fixed costs and low 
variable costs can lead to so-called preference externalities among consumers. The larger a 
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group of consumers in a market who share specific preferences, the more suppliers will target 
that consumer group and the more likely these consumers will consume, e.g. by reading a 
newspaper (Hamilton 2004, p. 18-21). Empirical evidence shows that such preference 
externalities are important in newspaper, television, as well as radio markets (George and 
Waldfogel 2003; Waldfogel 2003; 2004). Similarly, larger and integrated markets lead to 
better product quality (Berry and Waldfogel 2003). 
Furthermore, information features aspects common to public goods, especially non-rivalry in 
consumption and to some extent also non-excludability. Even if exclusion is sometimes 
technically possible, it is mostly socially inefficient (Samuelson 1958, p. 335; 1964; Stiglitz 
2000, p. 1448; Hosp 2005, p. 21). These features have an impact on the (legal) definition and 
enforceability of property rights of information and media goods and lead media producers to 
search for opportunities of financing beyond that of consumer payments (Shapiro and Varian 
1999). Advertising is therefore the most widespread means of financing mass media (see the 
section on two-sided markets below). The lack of adequate direct financing by consumers and 
the resulting indirect financing through advertisers lead to different, maybe inferior, market 
outcomes than would result from information being a proper private good.  
External effects (positive and negative) of media consumption are related to the public good 
problem. Positive externalities are supposedly rather prevalent in the political sphere. 
Regularly informing oneself about politics not only benefits the individual, but the whole of 
society as well because a functioning democracy requires informed citizens. Similarly, the 
“rational ignorance” hypothesis by Downs (1957a) argues that individual citizens do not have 
sufficient incentive to inform themselves about politics to the degree necessary for a properly 
functioning democratic society, because the individual vote or participation in the democratic 
process is not decisive. Because consumers, thus, do not demand enough political 
information, an unregulated market therefore produces a lower amount of information than 
socially optimal (see, e.g., Sunstein 2000, p. 517). In the European media economic tradition, 
information and media goods are therefore often termed “merit goods” (see, e.g., Heinrich 
1994; Kiefer 2003). Negative externalities, on the other hand, are often ascribed to violent or 
sexually explicit media content, especially on TV or the internet, and with regard to children 
(for a further discussion see chapter 3.1). Both cases of positive and negative externalities 
often call for regulatory intervention. 
An additional specific feature of information and media goods relates to their designation as 
so-called "experience goods". In contrast to normal commodities, the quality of information 
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cannot be verified unless it is acquired. This leads to the increased importance of branding 
and reputation on media markets, as well as to consumers basing their quality expectations 
and consumption decisions significantly on their previous experience with media suppliers 
(e.g. Shapiro and Varian 1999 p. 5-6; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). 
Because mass media are essentially financed by advertising, media markets are two-sided 
markets: customers of media firms include both consumers as well as advertisers (e.g. Picard 
1989; Anderson and Grabszewicz 2006). Hence, “[w]hen news outlets sell 'eyeballs' to 
advertisers the question becomes, 'What content can attract readers or viewers rather than 
what value will consumers place on content?'” (Hamilton 2004, p. 29). This can result in 
different biases of the market outcome. Minority programs will be undersupplied although the 
minority may place a large value on that type of programming, and low-cost programs will 
dominate high-cost programs. In other words, the intensity of preferences of consumers will 
not be appropriately reflected in the market. Furthermore, the market structure can result in 
undersupply or oversupply of advertising (Anderson and Grabszewicz 2006). 
A last aspect refers to competition in media markets actually being a competition for the time 
and attention of consumer and not for their money (see, e.g., Shapiro and Varian 1999, p.6-8). 
Attention has even been named “the ultimate scarce resource” in information economies.4 
With regard to television consumption, it is interesting to note that consumers often do not 
pay complete attention, i.e., TV viewing is often a secondary activity accompanied by other 
tasks. Furthermore, (political) information acquisition may often be an unintended 
consequence of TV or other media consumption for entertainment as many programs bundle 
entertainment and information aspects. Some audience theories also argue that media 
consumption is passive and habitual, giving leeway to strong media effects and externalities 
(see Hosp 2005, p. 25-26). 
In sum, media goods and media markets differ from “normal” goods and markets in several 
distinctive ways. These specific characteristics have to be taken into account in the further 
economic analysis of television consumption in the following chapters. 
                                                 
4 For a review of the psychological literature on attention see Pashler (1998) and for an economic analysis of the 
attention problem from advertisers’ perspective see Anderson and de Palma (2008) and Falkinger (2008). 
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2.2.2. Television Consumption as an Individually Rational Calculus 
Media consumption choice can be analyzed within the framework of the economic approach 
to human behavior, also referred to as the rational choice approach. The basic idea behind this 
approach, which has most prominently been associated with the work of Gary Becker, is that 
economic theory can be useful in analyzing areas beyond narrow economics (see, e.g., Becker 
1976; Stigler 1984; Frey 1995; Lazear 2000). For example, the approach has successfully 
been applied to many aspects of consumer and household behavior (for an overview, see 
Lazear 2000).  
The household production approach 
Most relevant for the analysis of TV consumption are economic theories of non-working time 
use.5 The household production approach proposed by Becker (1965) and Michael and Becker 
(1973)6 argues that households combine market goods and time to produce basic commodities 
that enter the household’s utility function. Gronau (1977; 1980) refined Becker’s idea and 
introduced an explicit distinction between home production and leisure: “An intuitive 
distinction between work at home (i.e., home production time) and leisure (i.e., home 
consumption time) is that work at home (like work in the market) is something one would 
rather have somebody else do for one (if the cost was low enough), while it would be almost 
impossible to enjoy leisure through a surrogate. Thus, one regards work at home as time use 
that generates services which have a close substitute in the market, while leisure has only poor 
market substitutes” (Gronau 1977, p. 1104). 
Hence, the household production approach, both in Becker’s and in Gronau’s framework, 
emphasizes that not only money expenditures – the traditional focus of economic 
consumption theory – should be taken into account but that also time costs should be taken 
seriously in consumer economics. Time budgets constrain consumers’ as much as monetary 
                                                 
5 The importance of time constraints and opportunity costs of time has also been recognized in labor market 
economics, where analysis is done on how individuals allocate their time between labor market activities and 
leisure. However, the allocation of time between different leisure or household production activities is not 
included in these models. See Juster and Stafford (1991) for a comparison of traditional labor supply models and 
the household production approach. 
6 Forerunners of Becker are e.g. Reid (1934) and Mincer (1962). A similar consumption theory to the one 
proposed by Becker is outlined by Lancaster (1966). In his theory goods possess several “characteristics” that 
enter separately into a consumer’s utility function similar to Becker’s “commodities”.  
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budgets. With regard to TV consumption the time costs are probably even more important 
than the monetary costs, especially for marginal decisions. Once a household possesses a TV 
set and possibly a regular cable or satellite subscription, the marginal monetary cost for 
watching an additional hour of TV is basically zero.7 
While the household production approach attracted much criticism, both on theoretical 
grounds and with regard to its empirical applicability (e.g. Pollak and Wachter 1975; Quah 
1986), it nevertheless leads to some testable predictions that have found empirical support. 
The bulk of empirical research examines the effects of home production and its technology on 
labor supply or labor related fields, such as education or travel mode and time (see Gronau 
2006, p.1; for a review of the research field see Gronau 1986; 1997). The studies that 
explicitly apply household production models to media and news consumption are discussed 
below. 
A major drawback of the basic household production model is that it assumes constant returns 
to scale and the absence of joint production (Pollak and Wachter 1975). In Becker’s model, 
time enters an individual’s utility function only insofar as it is used to produce the basic 
commodities, i.e., time has no separate consumption value (and also no specific disutility is 
associated with any time use). In the case of TV consumption, this would mean that time is 
just an input into the production of, for example, information. There is no specific benefit, 
besides differences in money and time costs, associated with allocating time to a certain type 
of media as long as the output, e.g. the information acquired, is the same. Gronau, on the 
other hand, strictly separates between home production and leisure. A specific time span of 
TV watching would therefore have to be classified as leisure or as home production activity 
but could not be both at the same time. However, some more recent discussions of time use 
specifically include such “joint production” and allow for allotment of the same activity to 
both production and leisure (e.g. Graham and Green 1984). The concept is also referred to as 
“process benefits” (Juster 1985a) or “activity benefits” (Gørtz 2006). A similar model is also 
presented by DeSerpa (1971), who not only includes the commodities into the utility function 
but also directly includes the time. Individuals are assumed to be able to allocate more time 
than strictly necessary to the consumption of commodities and to directly benefit from such a 
                                                 
7 This is not true in the case of pay-per-view television. However, pay-per-view TV is, in most countries, not 
(yet) common. For the argument that pay-per-view TV would correct some market failures inherent in free, 
advertising based TV see Sunstein (2000, p. 514). 
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time use. Another extension relevant for TV consumption examines simultaneous time use 
(Williams and Donath 1994). Thereby, the focus is not on an activity having both a 
production and a consumption component, as in the discussion about joint production, but on 
the simultaneous performance of multiple activities. TV watching is one of the classical 
examples of secondary time use: for example, people often have a meal or perform some 
household chores when watching TV. Other models within the household production 
approach analyze the demand for variety (Gronau and Hamermesh 2008) or for synchronous 
leisure (Hallberg 2003; Jenkins 2005; see also Corneo 2005). More general discussions of 
time allocation decisions from an economic perspective are, e.g., provided by Hill and Juster 
(1985) or Juster and Stafford (1991). 
Models of media consumption 
While some prediction regarding TV consumption and its determinants can of course be 
obtained from these general economic models of time use and household production, there 
exist models more narrowly related to TV consumption. These models are specifically 
engaged with the demand for information and media goods. For example, Ekelund and 
Watson (1994) and Hosp (2005) directly adapt Becker’s model of household production to 
news and entertainment consumption from the media. In these models, individuals receive 
utility from consuming the commodities “news and entertainment” from various sources 
whereby news and entertainment are produced with a combination of goods purchased on the 
market and time. Households are constrained by their monetary income as well as by their 
time and can allocate their total available time either to labor (i.e., acquisition of monetary 
income) or to household production of news and entertainment. This model shows that the 
cost of the basic commodity “news and entertainment” is determined by the price of the 
market input (e.g. the price of a newspaper), the wage rate (i.e., the opportunity cost of time) 
and the time intensity and goods intensity of the commodity. This simplified model allows for 
analysis of how media consumption reacts to changes in those parameters. For example, the 
model conveys that rising wages (i.e., increasing opportunity costs of time) increase the cost 
of all media consumption activities.8 Yet, the relative price of time intensive types of media 
increases more than the relative price of goods intensive types of media and, hence, 
households will tend to substitute away from the former towards the latter. 
                                                 
8 For a discussion about the value of opportunity costs of time and if these costs should be set equal to the wage 
rate see e.g. Shaw (1992). 
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Ekelund and Watson (1994) argue, based on this model, that the decrease in newspaper 
readership over time can be explained by rising real wages and increasing labor participation 
rates which lead to households switching to less time intensive news service providers such as 
TV and radio. Television and radio consumption are argued to be less time intensive as they 
allow for secondary activities such as consuming a meal, driving or carrying out household 
chores. Hosp (2005) investigates, based on the same model, how differences in quality 
expectations regarding newspaper content, i.e., differences in productivity of time of 
newspapers, affect newspaper consumption time. The increase in productivity of time through 
higher quality leads to newspaper consumption becoming less time intensive and to the 
decrease of the relative price of newspaper consumption. Households are therefore expected 
to increase their newspaper consumption.9  
The model of media consumption based on Becker’s household production approach however 
neither includes joint production nor simultaneous time use, both which are important in the 
context of TV consumption. Although Ekelund and Watson (1994) argue that simultaneous 
time use is lower for newspaper consumption as compared with other media consumption 
activities, they do not explicitly model this aspect. Williams and Donath (1994) estimate an 
empirical household production model including primary and secondary activities and 
conclude that input hours of two simultaneous activities should be weighted with one-half for 
each activity. Hence, the authors share the conclusion that activities such as TV watching, 
which allow for the undertaking of another activity at the same time, feature (ceteris paribus) 
lower time costs. Similarly, a household production model that includes joint production or 
activity benefits will predict more time being allocated to TV watching than the usual model 
without such extra benefits (see, e.g., Gørtz 2006, p. 14).10 Comparative static predictions, 
                                                 
9 The decrease in relative price leads, of course, to a substitution as well as an income effect. It is theoretically 
not clear which of the two effects dominates, i.e. if newspaper consumption will increase or decrease due to the 
lower relative price. Yet, if there exist close substitutes to newspapers, such as radio, TV or internet, households 
will tend to substitute away from those media to newspapers, and newspaper consumption can be expected to 
rise (see Hosp 2005, p. 82). 
10 In a household production model without joint production, each household member will choose a level of 
home production activities where the marginal product of household production equals their wage rate. Including 
activity benefits in the model leads to a level of household production activities where the marginal product of 
household production equals the wage rate corrected for the part of individual housework activity perceived as 
leisure (Gørtz 2006, p. 14). The same argument applies for the allocation of time between different household 
production activities, e.g. between different media consumption activities. While the standard household 
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e.g. regarding the effect of changing opportunity costs of time, will nevertheless remain 
similar. However, it is difficult to predict the activity benefits of different media consumption 
activities, as they presumably depend on the households’ preferences. 
A more specific dynamic theory of media consumption than the application of the general 
household production model is provided by Mathewson (1972). Within his model, he directly 
includes the process in which knowledge accumulates through the expenditure of time and 
money on media consumption. Thus, media consumption, on the one hand, provides direct 
utility as the good “entertainment” and, on the other hand, indirect utility insofar as a higher 
stock of knowledge regarding the nature of other goods leads to better consumption decisions. 
This model leads to more specific predictions than the models summarized above. For 
example, increasing wage rates have two different effects on the demand for information. 
First, as above, opportunity costs of time are higher, which has a negative effect on the 
demand for information. Second, a larger potential income can be allocated over goods and, 
thus, more information is demanded in order to make well-informed consumption decisions. 
The net effect of increasing wage rates on media demand is therefore ambiguous. 
Related literature 
Most audience theories in communication studies are media centered in the sense that they 
examine the different effects media can have on the audience (see, e.g. Kitzinger 2004, p. 
170). Media consumption is thereby often assumed to be passive and habitual. The uses-and-
gratifications approach, however, takes a different perspective and is similar to the economic 
approach presented here. Uses and gratifications theory investigates from a psychological 
communication perspective the motivation and the behavior of the audience. Instead of 
analyzing what the media do to the public, it asks what the public does with the media (Rubin 
2002). A large number of studies investigate the different functions television can have. It is 
thereby assumed that individuals use the media in an active and goal directed manner to 
satisfy their needs and desires. A trade-off between different sources of gratification takes 
place and individuals spend their time and mental resources where they expect the most 
                                                                                                                                                        
production model predicts that household members should allocate their time such as the marginal product of the 
different activities is equal, the prediction does not hold anymore if the different media consumption activities 
feature different activity benefits. The problem is somehow circumvented if it is assumed that media 
consumption simultaneously produces entertainment and information and that the different media consumption 
activities differ in their productivity of time with regard to these two commodities. 
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benefit. Similar to the economic approach they maximize their utility given their preferences 
and restrictions (Jäckel 1992, p. 248). Furthermore, it is assumed that individual differences 
lead each viewer to use and react to media content in a different manner. The uses and 
gratifications approach is often criticized as being too individualistic and for not leading to 
any testable propositions (Jäckel 1992, p. 249). In economic terminology, the approach 
focuses rather on the influence of different preferences on media demand and much less on 
the effect of differences in restrictions. 
In sum, only a few studies place TV consumption (or media consumption in general) within 
an economic framework and try to empirically investigate its determinants from an economic 
perspective. Among the few exceptions are the above-mentioned studies by Ekelund and 
Watson (1994) and Hosp (2005), which focus on some specific influences, as well as an 
earlier study by Bryant and Gerner (1981) that investigates the relationship between socio-
economic characteristics and TV consumption. Yet, there exists a large body of literature in 
the field of media economics. Most studies usually do not focus on TV consumption as such. 
Nevertheless, much can be learned from this research field and it is therefore – shortly and 
selectively – summarized in the next section. 
2.2.3. Media Economics and Media Consumption 
Media economics, a research field at the crossroads of economics and communication studies, 
is a rather young field. In its beginnings, the field mainly focused on an industrial economic 
and business economic analysis of media markets and media firms. However, the period after 
the 90s has also seen an increase in research on media in the sense of the rational choice 
approach to human behavior, i.e., research in the form of an economic analysis of issues 
genuine to media and communication sciences.11 Hence, Hosp (2005), for example, 
distinguishes three phases or areas of economic research on the media: media economics as a 
sub-discipline of industrial economics, media economics as an extension of political 
economy, and institutional economic analysis of the media.12 Along these lines, this chapter 
                                                 
11 For a historical account of the field from a primarily industrial economics perspective, see e.g. Albarran 
(2004) or Picard (2006). 
12 Other authors structure the field differently. Albarran (2004) divides media economics into microeconomic 
analysis, macroeconomic analysis and studies related to political economy. Picard (2006) differentiates between 
a theoretical, an applied and a critical tradition in media economics as well as between industry and market 
studies, company studies and effect studies. 
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explores what these different fields of the media economics literature can contribute to an 
analysis of television consumption. Whenever necessary or appropriate, I also revert to related 
literature in other fields. I thereby focus primarily on the literature related to the demand side 
of media markets and discuss general literature on media consumption as well as studies 
specifically on TV consumption. General reviews of the media economics literature, from 
different angles and viewpoints, are, for example, provided in Hosp (2005) and Albarran 
(2004), or in the well-known media economics textbooks by Picard (1989), Heinrich (1994), 
Kiefer (2001), Albarran (2002) and Alexander (2004), among many others. 
Industrial economics of the media 
A significant portion of media economics literature occupies itself with the production of 
media content as well as the analysis of the functioning of media markets and media firms. 
Usually, media economics textbook just cover these aspects. Hence, they are reflected in the 
textbook definitions of what media economics is about. For example, according to Picard 
(1989, p. 7) media economics “is concerned with how the media operators meet the 
informational and entertainment wants and needs of audiences, advertisers and society with 
available resources”. Albarran (2004, p. 291) sees media economics involving “the 
application of economic theories, concepts, and principles to study the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic aspects of mass media companies and industries.” Thus, industrial economic 
analyses are usually media centered, and media consumers as such do not play a dominant 
role. Of course, questions about price setting, advertising, new technologies, concentration, 
quality and diversity – to name a few topics of the literature – are also relevant for media 
consumption. It is however not the dominant interest of most studies that rather focus on the 
supply side. Exceptions are, for example, analyses of questions about effects of preference 
externalities among consumers or substitution between different media types or studies that 
directly analyze – theoretically or empirically – the effects of some market characteristic on 
demand and consumer welfare. 
For instance, the study by Hosp (2005) mentioned in the previous section investigates the 
effects that the concentration on newspaper markets has on newspaper consumption in Swiss 
counties. Concentration and structure of media markets is a big issue in the media economics 
literature. Theoretically, it is not clear if more competition leads to better market outcomes 
and a better fulfillment of consumer preferences in two-sided media markets with high fixed 
costs and high product differentiation (see, e.g. Anderson and Coate 2005; George 2007). 
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Empirical studies, however, mostly focus on the supply side and try to evaluate the 
relationship between market concentration on some measure of media diversity or quality 
(see, e.g., McCombs 1988; Berry and Waldfogel 2001; George 2007). An exception is George 
(2007), who, besides supply side measures, also considers newspaper circulation. Circulation 
figures are however a very crude measure for newspaper consumption and Hosp (2005), thus, 
directly looks at newspaper reading time. He finds that reading time is lower in Swiss 
counties with higher concentration of newspaper markets and explains his finding with 
consumers having lower quality expectations and therefore spending less time on newspapers 
in more concentrated markets. 
Other studies occupied with the demand side analyze the effects of market integration, the 
expansion of new technologies and the substitution between different media types. For 
example, George and Waldfogel (2006) show that the expansion of national newspapers (in 
their example the New York Times) leads to lower readership of local newspapers among 
groups targeted by the Times. Gentzkow (2006) finds that the diffusion of TV is associated 
with lower newspaper reading and radio listening. The same author also shows that internet 
newspapers in the US are (weak) substitutes for traditional print papers (Gentzkow 2007). 
Similar results are provided by Filistrucchi (2005) for the Italian newspaper market. George 
(2006) finds that especially younger, more educated and more urban individuals are drawn 
away from traditional newspapers due to internet diffusion. The debate still seems to be open 
in the case of magazines. Negative as well as zero effects are found for magazines’ online 
content on magazine sales (Kaiser and Kongsted 2005; Kaiser 2006; Simon and Kadiyali 
2007). With regard to the relationship between internet and television, Waldfogel (2009) finds 
in a student sample some substitution between web TV viewing (from authorized and 
unauthorized sources) and conventional TV viewing but also a large increase in total TV 
viewing due to web availability of TV content. 
Political economics of the media 
Another branch of the media economics literature considers the media not only as an 
economic but also as a political force and analyzes its effects on political actors and political 
outcomes. Hence, the media are seen as an institution that constrain and influence individual 
behavior. While the role and importance of information in the political process was 
recognized early by modern political economists (e.g. Downs 1957), the role of mass media 
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has only recently started to receive attention.13 Theoretical and empirical work now evolves 
that highlights the importance of the media in filtering and distributing information to voters 
and therefore constraining government and well-organized interest groups in the pursuit of 
their own interests (e.g. Besley and Burgess 2002; Strömberg 2002; 2004a; b; Besley and Prat 
2006; Dyck et al. 2008a). High diffusion of mass media, independent media ownership, media 
freedom and low concentration in media markets are therefore shown to be associated with 
various beneficial social, political and economic outcomes, such as lower corruption (Brunetti 
and Weder 2003; Gentzkow et al. 2006), less epidemic hunger (Besley and Burgess 2002), 
less corporate governance violations (Dyck et al. 2008b), less poverty and higher primary 
school enrolment (Djankov et al. 2003).  
While there are also empirical studies that directly analyze how media and media institutions 
affect the behavior of politicians, voters and interest groups (see the discussion in chapter 4) 
media consumption is usually not part of these economic analyses. Hence, they contrast with 
a large number of studies in media and communication sciences that show relationships 
between media consumption and, for example, political knowledge and involvement. The 
latter studies are however problematic with regard to the identification of causal relationships 
as individuals endogenously choose the amount or kind of media consumption. For example, 
individuals who are better educated and more interested in politics will consume more media 
with sophisticated political content (see, e.g., Graber 2006). Economists therefore focus on 
the effects of supposedly exogenous variation in media institutions. There are, however, a few 
exceptions that also take some measure of media consumption into account. For example, 
Leeson (2008) finds that higher media freedom is associated with more media consumption 
and higher political knowledge. Interestingly, however, only a statistically significant 
relationship between media freedom and newspaper and radio news consumption, but not TV 
news consumption, is found (see also chapter 2.5). Prat and Strömberg (2005) analyze the 
introduction of commercial TV in Sweden and show that the previously uninformed are 
attracted by commercial television and begin watching its news. They also increase their 
                                                 
13 The role of the mass media in politics, and especially in elections, was recognized much earlier in political 
sciences (see, e.g., Norris 2000) and media sciences. At the crossroads of the two disciplines, the field of 
political communication studies evolved (for reviews from the two different perspectives see, e.g., Ansolabehere 
et al. 1991; Semetko 2004). Regarding the effects the media can have on consumers, i.e. the power of the media, 
scientific consensus seems to continually change from strong media effects to no media effects back to strong 
media effects (for a historical overview of media effects research see, e.g., Bryant and Thompson 2002). 
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political knowledge and participation. A somewhat different result is found by Gentzkow 
(2006). He shows that the introduction of TV in the US is associated with lower newspaper 
readership and lower voter turnout. 
Institutional economics of the media 
Another strand of the media economics literature is not so much concerned with the effects of 
the media on other actors but rather with how the incentives of actors within the media are 
shaped by internal and external institutional settings. With regard to internal institutions, 
studies, for example, examine how ownership structures, journalistic independence and 
standards and other internal rules affect the incentives of media owners and journalists (see, 
e.g. Djankov et al. 2003; Fengler and Russ-Mohl 2005; Baron 2006). A systematic theory of 
journalism that integrates these aspects seems, however, not to exist (see Hosp 2005, p. 50). 
With regard to external institutions, interesting questions seek to address how legal rules and 
regulations (e.g. ownership or content regulations, laws regarding the access to information or 
privacy standards) or political and economic conditions affect the work of media firms and 
journalists.14 The broader discussions about private or public ownership of the media, 
especially of broadcasting firms, fall partially into the realm of this institutional economic 
literature (see, e.g., Sunstein 2000; Kiefer 2001, and the discussion in chapter 2.5). The study 
by Prat and Strömberg (2005) presented above, thereby, also addresses the effects on media 
consumption. 
In all these discussions, media consumers only play a marginal role. An exception, at least to 
some extent, is the literature on media bias. This literature focuses on the institutional settings 
that affect the extent of which the media tell the truth or not, i.e., to what extent they bias their 
news. Supply side influences, such as the ideology and career concerns of media owners and 
journalist, political pressure or economic pressure from advertisers (e.g. Baron 2006; Reuter 
and Zitzewitz 2006), as well as demand side requests are analyzed. Regarding the latter it, is 
argued that consumers prefer to confirm their preexisting (ideological) beliefs. Therefore, 
more competition on media markets does not necessarily lead to less media bias (e.g. 
Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; 2007). A related strand of 
literature investigates the effects of media bias on consumers, especially on voters. While in 
the standard economic model, the media will not have systematic influence over rational 
                                                 
14 There is, of course, a large overlap here with industrial and political economic literature on the media 
mentioned above. 
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voters, there are also studies that show the media may influence voters even when they have 
rational expectations (e.g. Eichenberger and Serna 1996; Congleton 2001). 
There are other studies that touch upon the effects of institutions on media consumers. The 
study by Leeson (2008) mentioned above looks, among other aspects, at the effect of media 
freedom, i.e., of external legal and political institutional settings that affect media production, 
on media consumption. The geography of media markets also affects how and what the media 
reports on politics.15 There is more coverage of local political representatives when media 
markets geographically match well with electoral districts. Voters in districts with a poor 
match between media and political markets therefore know less about their representatives, 
and representatives in this same scenario also do less for their constituencies (Snyder and 
Strömberg 2008). Media consumption as such is however not included in the empirical 
analysis. Economic institutions not directly affecting the media can also have an effect on 
media consumption. Ekelund and Watson (1994) show that increased labor market 
participation, i.e., higher opportunity cost of consumers, goes along with less newspaper 
consumption and more TV consumption. A completely different aspect is highlighted by 
Benz and Stutzer (2004), who analyze the effect of political institutions on political 
knowledge. It is argued that demand for political information is higher and people consume 
more news media and thus know more about politics when they have a larger say in the 
political process, i.e., when direct democratic rights are more extensive. However, only the 
direct effect of political institutions on knowledge is tested without empirically looking at 
media consumption.  
                                                 
15 See also Bruns and Himmler (2008) who analyze the effect of the geographic distance between counties and 
media cities on media coverage and federal spending. 
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2.3. Measuring Media Consumption 
In order to appreciate the role and importance of television in people’s lives and to 
empirically analyze the causes and consequences of TV consumption it first has to be 
measured. A variety of measures and measurement methods exist to quantify media 
consumption or, specifically, TV consumption, which differ with regard to several aspects. A 
first aspect of differentiation refers to the specific facet of media consumption actually 
measured; a second aspect refers to the specific methodology or technique used for 
measurement. The two main facets of media consumption are money and time. Therefore, 
expenditure and especially time use measures are discussed together with other measures that 
capture certain aspects of media consumption. The discussion relates to the measurement of 
all three main media consumption activities (television, radio and newspaper consumption), 
and explicit differences between the three are specifically mentioned were applicable. 
2.3.1. Expenditures 
In many economic applications, consumption – be it total consumption or consumption of a 
specific good or a category of goods such as “food” – is equated with expenditures. Detailed 
expenditures are usually measured with representative interview surveys or diary studies. The 
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey, for example, is a combination of both. According to data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2009), in 2003 U.S. Americans spent about 720 US dollars on 
media, which roughly amounts to 3% of total consumption expenditures (26,455 dollars). 
Thereby, 234 dollars were spent on television (without video), 54 dollars on newspapers and 
47 dollars on consumer magazines.16 
While approximating consumption with expenditure data may be appropriate for many 
applications, in the case of media consumption, it grossly underestimates its importance. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, consumption can be seen as the output of home production, 
which needs two inputs, money and time. For (some types of) media consumption, the input 
of money is almost negligible compared to the input of time, i.e., a large part of costs are 
opportunity costs of time. Expenditure measures therefore only capture a (small) part of the 
relevant costs.17 
                                                 
16 Detailed data on other types of media, such as radio, is not available. 
17 Different types of media feature different relations between money and time input. See also the discussion in 
chapter 2.2.2 and 2.4.2. 
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Nevertheless, such expenditure measures are also used for economic welfare analysis (see, 
e.g., Goolsbee and Petrin 2004). Goolsbee and Klenow (2006), however, argue that for media 
consumption and other time intensive goods estimates of price elasticity from expenditure 
data are difficult. Calculations of welfare gains of new products are therefore underestimated 
to a large extent. The authors’ application to the internet shows that welfare estimates based 
on time use data are about ten times larger than standard estimates based only on 
expenditures.18 A critical point in the analysis is, however, that the authors value leisure time 
at the wage rate (or a constant fraction of it), which is criticized by many scholars (see, e.g., 
Shaw 1992; Shaw and Feather 1999; Jara-Diaz et al. 2008). Media consumption is 
furthermore an exception in that it is often accompanied by other tasks, like having a meal, 
which makes the monetization of time costs even more difficult as there exists no clear rule 
on how to divide the opportunity costs between the two activities.19 
2.3.2. Time Use 
An alternative to expenditure measures or to the monetization of time are direct measures of 
time use.20 There exist different techniques to measure time spent on the media, especially to 
measure time spent on watching television. I distinguish between and discuss three different 
types of techniques: electronic measurement, time use diaries, and survey questions. Not all 
techniques are equally suitable for all types of media. I discuss their limitations, advantages 
and disadvantages when describing the different techniques, while I add an overall evaluation 
and a comparison of the different methods the end of the section. An assessment of data 
quality and adequacy ultimately depends on the intended use of the data. Therefore, the 
discussion and evaluation of the measurement techniques always bears in mind that the data 
                                                 
18 See also Petrin (2002) who uses data on utilization to improve conventional estimates of consumer welfare. 
Aguiar and Hurst (2005) provide another compelling example that equating consumption and expenditures may 
lead to misleading conclusions. While food expenditures drop after retirement, quality of food consumption stays 
the same because retirees spend more time on shopping and food preparation. Concluding from expenditure data 
that people do not smooth consumption over the life cycle (i.e. do not save enough for retirement) may, 
therefore, be wrong. Furthermore, Okada and Hoch (2004) point out that people spend time and money 
differently. They are for example less risk-averse with regard to time than with regard to money expenditures. 
19 However, Williams and Donath (1994) estimate that time costs of two simultaneous activities should each be 
given a weight of one half. See also section 2.2.2. 
20 Of course, monetizing time, as briefly discussed above, relies also on these time use measures. 
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will be used in individual level multiple regression analysis with media consumption as an 
independent (and sometimes also as dependent) variable, and that the goal of these 
estimations is to asses marginal effects of media consumption on subjective well-being and 
behavior. 
Electronic measurement 
The most detailed data are obtained using electronic measurement devices. In the case of TV, 
these are the so-called people-meters. These devices register TV set status (i.e., if the TV is 
switched on and which channel is it tuned into) and the presence of viewers in front of the TV 
set. Households participating in the study are equipped with a special remote control upon 
which each household member must indicate the beginning and end of a viewing session by 
pushing a button (IP Network 2006, p. 25). Sometimes, an additional quality rating of viewed 
programs is included (see Gfk Switzerland 2009b). Data are primarily used for TV ratings and 
the determination of advertising rates. Therefore, samples correspond in most countries to 
nationally representative long-term panels. Demographic information important for 
advertisers, like age, sex and income, are recorded as well. Often, electronic measurement is 
accompanied by regular surveys capturing, for example, lifestyles or purchase behavior of 
viewers. In Europe, the first people-meter system was launched in 1981 in the UK, and in the 
US it was introduced in 1987. Today, such measurement systems are employed in most 
European countries (IP Network 2006, p. 26-27).  
Interestingly, electronic audience measurement for radio has a shorter history. It was first 
introduced in 2001 in Switzerland (Gfk Switzerland 2009a). In the US, the system was 
introduced in some local radio markets in 2008. The measurement device is a so-called 
portable people-meter, a wrist watch each panel member is wearing that records sounds and 
sends them to a server where they are matched with radio programs. Therefore, radio 
consumption from all sources (standard radio receivers, internet, mobile phones, etc.) is 
measured and out-of-home radio consumption, e.g. in a restaurant or a taxi, is included as 
well. Furthermore, active as well as passive radio consumption is recorded. The technique 
would theoretically also be suitable to measure TV consumption (Gfk Switzerland 2009a). 
There are also different techniques to electronically measure internet consumption (for a 
detailed overview see Bermejo 2007).  
Although not exactly the same technique is used in all countries, aggregate measures such as 
average TV watching times are often published and compared across countries (see, e.g., IP 
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Network 2006). Individual level data are, however, usually not available to independent 
researchers.  
Reliability and validity of people-meter systems and representativeness of samples are often 
hotly debated. They even become a political or legal issue, because large financial stakes 
depend on these audience measurements (see, e.g., Syfret 2006; Stelter 2008). These issues 
also arise because in some countries TV rating agencies are not independent from media 
owners, especially from public broadcasters (e.g. in Austria or Switzerland) (IP Network 
2006, p.28). Scientific studies on data quality or validity are however scarce.21 Some authors 
report problems associated with sampling and representativeness or with people, especially 
children, having difficulties to indicate via the remote when they are watching TV or not 
(Rubens 1989; Adams 1994). Lamas (2005), however, reports that internal coincidental 
surveys usually lead to satisfactory results regarding validity. In such surveys, sample 
members are called by telephone and asked if they are watching TV and which program they 
are watching. This information is then compared with the household’s people-meter 
information. Coincidental rates are usually between 86 and 95%. Hoogendoorn (2006) argues 
that reliability depends largely on sample size. The increase in sample size in recent years 
throughout many countries (IP Network 2006, p. 27) may therefore have benefited reliability. 
Time use diaries  
Arguably, the most popular measurement technique in time use research relies on so-called 
time use diaries. Study participants are asked to maintain a diary (on paper, online, by 
telephone or personal interview) in which they indicate for a 24 hours day all their activities, 
where they took place and if participants were alone or with someone else. In many studies, 
participants are also asked about secondary activities (“Did you do anything else at the same 
time?”) and occasionally even about tertiary media consumption (“Was the TV or radio on?”). 
Researchers then code the reported activities according to a preset scheme. Respondents are 
mostly required to fill out their diaries for one or two days, often a weekday and weekend 
day, or sometimes for whole week in order to obtain more precise time use estimates, 
including irregular tasks. Usually, participants are required to answer additional survey 
questions about demographics as well as living and working circumstances. However, in an 
effort to avoid overburdening of study participants, questionnaires are usually kept short. For 
                                                 
21 On the lack of care for research quality in the rating industry see Rubens (1989). 
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a more detailed description of usual time diary studies see, e.g., Robinson (1999) or 
Hamermesh et al. (2005).  
Hence, diary studies include all media consumption activities in and out of the house. By 
now, such time use studies are available for many countries and various years, although such 
studies mainly cover European or OECD countries. Studies in different countries often differ 
in their methodology and periods examined and are therefore not always comparable. Two 
recent initiatives, however, add to the cross-country and over-time comparability of such time 
use data. HETUS (Harmonised European Time Use Survey) is a European project. In order to 
enhance comparability, Eurostat publishes detailed guidelines for member states who intend 
to carry out time use surveys (see Eurostat 2004; 2009). By now, data from 15 European 
countries beginning in 1998 is available on the HETUS Homepage.22 Individual level data is, 
however, not publicly available; access is limited to certain summary statistics. The MTUS 
(Multinational Time Use Study) project has an even larger scope. Its goal is to harmonize 
existing time use data collected since the 60s into a single data set. As of this year, it entails 
60 data sets from 22 countries, and efforts to incorporate the HETUS and other new data sets 
are currently underway (see Fisher et al. 2009). 
Time use diary studies passed a series of validation exercises. Robinson (1985) reports a high 
correspondence between diary entries, experience sampling and random hour reports. In the 
case of experience sampling, study participants are paged at random points in time during the 
day and asked to write down what they are doing. This information is later compared with 
their diary entries. The correlation amounts to about 0.7 to 0.8, whereby the discrepancy 
between the two methods is largely ascribed to the beeper method being less valid as outdoor 
activities are underreported. In the random hour method, participants of a diary study are 
asked to describe a random hour of their day in precise detail. Correlation between the two 
methods is about 0.8. With respect to media consumption, radio listening seems to be 
underreported in the diary study. Correspondence between spouses’ diaries of time spent 
together is, with about 80 to 85%, also sufficiently high (Juster 1985b; 1986).23 
Reliability of diary studies seems also to be high. When respondents are asked by 
interviewers for reports of yesterday or tomorrow (i.e., the respondents are contacted twice) 
                                                 
22 https://www.testh2.scb.se/tus/tus/default.htm 
23 For a good short overview of validity and other measurement issues see also Juster and Stafford (1991) and 
Robinson and Godbey (1999, p. 74-77). 
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the two different types of diaries show a high correspondence (correlation of 0.85). High 
correspondence is also found between aggregate amounts of time spent on the different 
activities in different geographical samples within a country and with diary studies with 
somewhat diverse methodologies (Robinson 1985). 
The major drawback of diary studies are the strain they put on respondents and their high 
cost, and, as is the case with any survey technique, diary studies may be subject to various 
biases. Time use studies are quite demanding on respondents. Therefore a non-response bias 
might exist in the form of underrepresentation of busy people (and the overrepresentation of 
heavy TV viewers). However, this suspicion does not to stand up to empirical examination 
(Abraham et al. 2006), rather the opposite seems to be the case. Continuing participants in an 
American time diary study are those working more and watching less TV than those dropping 
out of the panel (Robinson and Godbey 1999, p. 62-63). Similarly, Abraham et al. (2008) 
report participants of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) completing more volunteer 
work than non-participants (and therefore they may be watching less TV). Another bias that 
might be relevant for the case of media and especially TV consumption refers to under- or 
over-reporting due to social desirability. Contrary to expectations, Bechtel et al. (1972) 
document that families rather over-report their television consumption in TV viewing diaries 
and survey questions compared to filmed behavior in front of the TV set. It has however to be 
noted that the sample size in that study was very small and that selection bias is probably very 
dominant, i.e., families that are very fond of TV are those that tend to participate in such 
intrusive studies.24 In any case, social desirability seems to be a rather small issue in diary 
surveys because the neutral setting of the diary only requires chronological reporting of 
individual activities (Robinson 1985, p. 40-41; Abraham et al. 2008, p. 4). Other potential 
biases and problems in diary studies, such as recall bias, capture of seldom performed tasks or 
of very short-period activities, are probably less of an issue with regard to media consumption 
(for a discussion of these issues see Robinson 1985). 
Surveys 
Another very common technique for capturing time spent on the media (and on other 
activities) is the use of normal survey questions, which is often referred to in time use 
                                                 
24 Families did not keep actual time use diaries about all their activities, but just indicated in a diary the hours 
they were watching TV. This might lead to a overestimation in the viewing diary (Robinson and Godbey 1999, 
p.75-76). 
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research as “stylized measurement”. Surveys are probably the most diverse tool. Survey 
questions can capture various aspects of media consumption. For example, they can relate to 
total consumption of a media type or they can relate to specific functions of media use, like 
entertainment, information or information about specific elections. In the European Social 
Survey (ESS), respondents are asked, for example: “On an average weekday, how much time, 
in total, do you spend watching television?” and “And again on an average weekday, how 
much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programs about politics and 
current affairs?“ The same questions are repeated for radio and newspaper consumption. 
Similarly, in the Swiss Election Studies (SELECTS), respondents are asked to provide the 
number of days in a week in which they watch the news on TV, listen to the news on the 
radio, and read the political section of the newspaper. In this case, frequency measures are 
applied rather than duration, as is the case with the ESS. In contrast, in the Eurobarometer 
Survey Series, media use questions often relate to more specific media functions: “How often 
did you watch any television programmes or television news about the European election 
campaign during the two or three weeks before the election?” (Eurobarometer 31a, see Reif 
and Melich 1993). Another difference with the above questions from the ESS and from 
Selects is the reference to a specific time period instead of asking about an average/usual 
weekday or week. Often, questions also refer to media consumption yesterday, or last week, 
in order to mitigate recall bias. However, according to Chang and Krosnick (2003) who 
compare the two question formats in the US National Election Studies (NES), the “typical 
week” questions yield higher predictive validity than the “past week” questions. For an 
excellent overview of media use questions formats and questions in international and national 
surveys see Newton (2002). 
Capturing media use with survey questions has many advantages. Positive aspects of survey 
questions are their ease of use, their cost effectiveness, the possibility to connect them to a 
wealth of demographic and other information at the individual level because they can be 
added to any general survey, as well as their comparability between media types and between 
countries (the latter mainly because some large international surveys include media use 
questions). However, many researchers worry about the validity and quality of this kind of 
time use data. Some researchers even conclude that “some form of diary instrument […] is the 
only valid measurement of time use, and less expensive substitutes are of substantially lower 
quality and have systematic biases of a major sort” (Juster and Stafford 1991, p. 482). Such 
statements, however, have to be qualified, because data requirements depend on their intended 
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use. Newer studies therefore offer a more distinguished treatment of data quality issues (see, 
e.g., Juster et al. 2003; Kan and Pudney 2008). A major concern relates to the observation that 
time use estimates elicited through survey questions are generally higher than time use 
estimates obtained through diaries. Activities add up to substantially more than 168 hours a 
week. One reason might be that respondents seem to think of the “average day” as the 
“average day they watch TV” (Robinson and Godbey 1999, p. 59-60). One could actually 
correct for this bias by asking two questions: “Thinking now of the typical week when you 
watch TV. On about how many days do you watch?” and “And thinking of the typical day in 
a week when you do watch TV. For about how many hours do you watch?” (see Newton 
2002, p.141).  
Another reason for the higher time estimates in surveys might be that people do not 
differentiate properly between primary and secondary activities, i.e., their reported TV 
watching time includes primary as well as (a part of) secondary TV consumption (Juster and 
Stafford 1991, p. 484; Robinson and Godbey 1999, p.59). However, when displaying interest 
in a certain activity like TV watching (and not in the distribution of total time use), it is not 
per se clear if only primary time use is the right reference figure. Just asking for average TV 
consumption might even be advantageous because the respondent is left to decide what he or 
she classifies as “TV watching” (for a similar argument see also Chang and Krosnick 2003, p. 
75). The drawback of this approach however might be that not all people share the same 
interpretation of “watching TV” and that inter-personal comparability might suffer.  
In any case, for multivariate analyses, like studying the relationship between TV consumption 
and subjective well-being, such biases are only an actual problem if they are systematic with 
regard to the dependent variable,25 i.e., if different groups of people are subject to these biases 
to a different extent. Some researchers conclude that time use estimates from diaries and from 
stylized questions show similar variation between different groups and that the latter, despite 
lower accuracy and reliability, therefore offer a suitable ordinal scaling of people’s time use 
(see Kan and Pudney 2008, p. 104-105). Others have found the gap between the two methods 
to systematically vary with respondents’ characteristics (e.g. Robinson 1985; Press and 
Townsley 1998). For the case of TV watching, Robinson and Godbey (1999, p.152) conclude 
                                                 
25 Other potential measurement errors that are not systematic, e.g. because respondents do not remember their 
media consumption correctly (Robinson and Godbey 1999, p. 59), are also not very problematic for multivariate 
analyses if the ratio of error variance to true variance is sufficiently low. These measurement errors may reduce 
statistical fit but will not lead to any systematically biased results. 
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that the two techniques lead to similar average results when diary measures include secondary 
and tertiary viewing. Kan and Pudney (2008) investigate the nature of the gap between the 
two techniques for the case of housework by using data from a single source. They conclude 
that, despite some systematic bias in stylized measurement, most of the measurement error is 
random and not systematic. The measurement error seems not to be very problematic when 
time use estimates are used as the dependent variable. Yet, when used as an independent 
variable, an attenuation bias might occur, i.e., coefficients might be biased towards zero. 
Other time use measurement techniques 
There exist a few other techniques to measure time use or, specifically, time spent on the 
media (see also Robinson and Godbey 1999, p. 61-63). They are however seldom used or 
focus on different goals. The above-mentioned experience sampling method (ESM) or beeper 
method is one of those techniques. Its focus is, however, mostly on affective states during 
activities and not on the duration of activities (for ESM and television consumption see 
Csikszentmihalyi and Kubey 1981; Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990). The day 
reconstruction method (DRM) of Kahneman et al. (2004a; b) also results in time use 
measures. It is basically equivalent to the diary method; its focus is, however, on subjective 
well-being, as well. 
Some observational studies do focus directly on time use. On-site spot observations are 
basically the low-tech equivalent of ESM, where the researcher directly observes the study 
subject at random points of time. In a few studies, participants are even observed 
continuously. Such studies are mainly suited for rural communities in developing countries 
(for a description and evaluation of the method see Nickols and Ayieko 1996). In the case of 
TV consumption, there exist early “observational” studies where families TV watching was 
filmed (Allen 1965; Bechtel et al. 1972). Samples are very small, however, and studies are 
mainly used to validate other measurement techniques. 
Summary and evaluation 
The above-discussed time use measurement techniques all have their advantages and 
disadvantages. An evaluation should therefore consider the intended use of the data.  
Table 1 summarizes several criteria that are important for time spent on the media and for the 
empirical applications in chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
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Table 1: Evaluation of Time Use Measurement Techniques 
 Electronic measurement Time use diaries Survey questions 
Suitable for all media 
types TV and radio only Yes Yes 
Out-of-home 
consumption included 
Radio: usually yes 
TV: usually no 
Yes Yes 
Definition of 
consumption / 
secondary consumption 
included 
Left up to the 
respondent 
Separation into 
primary and secondary 
consumption 
Left up to the 
respondent 
Functions / content of 
media consumption 
Programs watched 
available Not available 
Partly available, e.g. 
entertainment and 
information 
Measurement error / 
bias Low 
Low for regular 
activities / high for 
irregular activities 
High 
Cost Very high High Low 
Cross-country 
comparability Medium Medium to high High 
Linked with other 
individual level 
information 
Some demographic 
information 
Some demographic 
information Yes 
Data availability 
Available for several 
countries; individual 
level data not available 
Individual level data 
available for several 
countries 
Individual level data 
available for many 
countries 
 
While electronic measurement clearly leads to the most detailed and least biased results, it is 
only available for TV consumption and to some extent for radio consumption. This prohibits 
the comparison of all three major media consumption activities, TV, radio and newspaper. 
Other major drawbacks include the method’s high cost and the linkage of the data only to 
some demographic information at the individual level but not to behavioral or attitudinal 
variables, which would be needed for an analysis of the effects of media consumption on 
behavior and well-being. The latter point also applies to time use diaries. The commonly 
missing separation between different media consumption functions is a second disadvantage 
of the diary method. On the other hand, its advantages lie in the separation between primary 
and secondary activities and in its low measurement error and bias. The major advantages of 
measuring time spent on the media with stylized survey questions are their ease of use, low 
cost and, primarily, that the data are linked to a wealth of information on individuals’ 
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demographic and socio-economic position, on their attitudes, beliefs and stated behaviors, 
which leads to a much broader field of research. Such research is done at the cost of lower 
data quality. While it is often hoped that measurement errors are just random and cancel out 
over large samples, the possibility of systematic biases must be considered and should be 
discussed with regard to the specific applications of the data. 
Robinson and Godbey (1999, p. 152) conclude that, despite their clear methodological 
differences, the three measurement techniques lead to about the same average TV 
consumption in the case of US data assembled in the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties. Of 
course, such a comparison at the country level can only hint at correspondences and 
disparities between measurement techniques and can not at all provide an indication of 
potential biases at group or individual level. Nevertheless, Figure 1 compares the average 
television consumption per day, measured with different methods for the four countries 
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy.  
First, survey data from the European Social Survey is used. The survey asks respondents for 
their TV consumption on an average weekday and answers are coded in eight categories 
ranging from “no time at all” to “more than three hours”. I calculate average TV consumption 
using category means and weights correcting for oversampling and undersampling of 
different socio-economic groups. The problem with this calculation is the open-ended 
category “more than three hours”, because a minute value for this category must be assumed. 
The country averages are therefore calculated twice, once assuming 210 minutes and once 
assuming 270 minutes. However, the actual category mean could be different for different 
countries; it might, for example, be higher should more respondents choose this category. 
Therefore, I also show in Figure 1 the share of respondents choosing the top category. The 
second data source is the Harmonized European Time Use Survey (HETUS). I use country 
averages for different activities published on the HETUS homepage. The data distinguishes 
between TV consumption as primary and as secondary activity. The third country averages 
come from electronically measured data used by TV rating agencies. They are yearly 
published by IP Network. All data reflects the years 2000 to 2003.26 
 
                                                 
26 The ESS data were collected 2002/2003, the IP Network data relate to the year 2002, and the HETUS data 
correspond to 2000/2001 for the UK, to 2001/2002 for Germany and to 2002/2003 for Italy and Spain. 
Regarding the data sources see Jowell et al. (2003), HETUS (2008) and IP Network (2004). 
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Figure 1: Time Spent on TV Consumption: Comparison of Measurement Methods 
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 Survey (ESS); calculated from category means; for top category (“more than three hours”) 210 min assumed 
  
 Survey (ESS); calculated from category means; for top category (“more than three hours”) 270 min assumed 
  
 Diary (HETUS), main activity 
  
 Diary (HETUS), secondary activity 
  
 Electronic measurement (IP Network) 
  
 Survey (ESS); percentage of respondents watching more than 3 hours TV a day 
 
Data Sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), HETUS (2008), IP Network (2004). 
 
When looking at Figure 1, it is first of all striking that electronic measurement leads to 
considerably higher average TV consumption than the other methods. This is consistent with 
the observation of other authors comparing diary and people-meter data (see, e.g., Robinson 
and Godbey 1999, p. 59). Reasons for the large difference might be that heavy TV viewers 
are oversampled by the TV rating agencies or that (a part of) tertiary TV consumption is also 
captured (i.e., when the TV is on, but nobody is watching) despite requiring participants to 
indicate on the remote control when they are actively watching and when not. However, the 
ordering of countries according to their average TV consumption is the same using 
electronically measured data and diary data when primary and secondary viewing from the 
diary are taken into account. 
Survey data and diary data seem to closely correspond with each other when secondary TV 
consumption is low (Germany, UK). For the UK, where a large part of respondents chose the 
top category (almost 30%), the higher assumed minute amount for the top category 
corresponds better with the diary data. For Germany, which has a rather low share of 
respondents in the top category (about 17%), the choice of value hardly affects the results. 
The more interesting case, however, arises when secondary TV consumption as indicated in 
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the time use diaries is high, which is the case in Spain and especially in Italy. Stated average 
TV consumption from the ESS corresponds neither to primary nor to total primary plus 
secondary TV consumption from the diary but lies somewhere in between. This result 
indicates that respondents, when establishing the definition of “TV watching” themselves, 
include both primary consumption as well as some secondary consumption. 
Of course, as said before, such a comparison at the country level with data from different 
sources can only lead to speculation about the causes of the correspondences and differences 
between the different measurement techniques. Any further analysis would need individual 
level data, if possible from a single source. Nevertheless, the above figure shows that, 
although there are large differences between the methods when looking at levels of TV 
consumption, the ordering of countries is consistent and differences can be reasonably 
explained. Hence, when looking at marginal effects of TV consumption on some outcome 
variable, the choice of measurement method might possibly not affect results substantially. 
2.3.3. Other Measures 
There also exists a variety of other (broader and cruder) measures for capturing certain 
aspects of media consumption. The World Bank (several years), for example, publishes the 
number of newspapers per 1000 people, the percentage of households with a television set or 
the number of internet users and broadband subscribers per 1000 people in its World 
Development Indicators; or the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2008) reports the average 
circulation of newspapers per 1000 inhabitants. Data usually come from a variety of sources, 
be it from surveys or from market data. Such penetration or access rates are often used to 
compare media consumption (or rather media access) over a large sample of countries, 
including developing countries where more detailed data is not available. These kind of data, 
however, cannot be used to investigate any matters at the individual level. 
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2.4. Individual Determinants of Television Consumption 
2.4.1. The Amount of Time Spent on Television Consumption 
Data from the European Social Survey (ESS)27 offer a detailed look at the time spent 
watching TV. The data allow, on the one hand, separating the information function from the 
entertainment and other functions and, on the other hand, comparing the amount of time spent 
on television with the amount of time spent on other types of media, specifically on radio and 
on newspapers. Such comparison helps in appreciating the role of TV in people’s lives and to 
better understand the determinants of TV consumption. 
Respondents in the ESS are asked how much time, in total, they spend watching television, 
listening to the radio and reading the newspapers on an average weekday. They are also asked 
how much of the time they spend consuming each of the three types of media is devoted to 
news and programs about politics and current affairs. They can indicate their answer on an 8-
point scale ranging from “no time at all” to “more than 3 hours”.28  
The upper part of Figure 2 presents data on people’s time spent on the consumption of the 
three media types covering both entertainment and information for almost 90,000 respondents 
from 27 European countries from the first two waves of the European Social Survey carried 
out in 2002/2003 and 2004-2006.29 To render the analysis less complicated, the eight original 
time use categories have been combined into five categories ranging from “no time at all” to 
“more than 2.5 hours”. 
                                                 
27 For a general description of the ESS data see Jowell et al. (2003; 2005). The data are archived and distributed 
by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
28 For a discussion of the data quality see section 2.3.2. Only analyzing measures of time use and ignoring 
expenditures, captures, of course, not the full picture of media consumption. However, time costs are supposedly 
the largest part of the costs of TV consumption. Especially for marginal decisions, monetary expenditures tend to 
be insignificant. See also the discussion in section 2.2.2. 
29 The two waves cover the various European countries in a somewhat different way: Austria (wave 1-2), 
Belgium (wave 1-2), Switzerland (wave 1-2), Czech Republic (wave 1-2), Germany (wave 1-2), Denmark (wave 
1-2), Estonia (wave 2), Finland (wave 1-2), France (wave 1-2), UK (wave 1-2), Greece (wave 1-2), Hungary 
(wave 1-2), Ireland (wave 1-2), Israel (wave 1), Island (wave 2), Italy (wave 1), Luxembourg (wave 1-2), 
Netherlands (wave 1-2), Norway (wave 1-2), Poland (wave 1-2), Portugal (wave 1-2), Spain (wave 1-2), Sweden 
(wave 1-3), Slovenia (wave 1-2), Slovakia (wave 1-2), Turkey (wave 2), Ukraine (wave 2). Wave 1 was 
conducted in 2002/2003 and wave 2 in 2004-2006. 
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Figure 2: Media Use in 27 European Countries, 2002-2006 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Total Newspapers
Total Radio
Total TV
Percentage of respondents
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News TV
Percentage of respondents
No time at all Less than 0.5 hour 0.5 to 1.5 hours More than 1.5 to 2.5 hours More than 2.5 hours  
 
Data Source: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005). 
 
The statistics reveal that TV is by far the dominant medium. One-third of the respondents 
indicate that every day they spend more than two and a half hours in front of the TV set. More 
than 60% watch TV for more than one and a half hours per day. This represents a large share 
not only of the leisure time, but also of the total time available per day after subtracting time 
spent sleeping. In contrast, only 3% do not watch any TV at all. In comparison, listening to 
the radio is clearly less popular than watching television. While more than one-fourth of the 
respondents spend more than two and a half hours with this activity, surprisingly enough, 
more than 20% do not listen to the radio at all. Also, about a quarter of the respondents do not 
read newspapers at all. Most people (56%) spend less than half an hour reading newspapers 
and only a small fraction (6%) reads for more than one and a half hours a day. 
The lower part of Figure 2 presents data on the time devoted to acquiring news in the various 
media types. The picture looks different when concentrating on the information function of 
the different types of media than when looking at total media consumption. TV watching is 
still the most time consuming activity, but the differences between the three types of media 
are much smaller. About 10% of respondents watch news programs on TV for more than 1.5 
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hours a day. About 8% listen to the news on radio and 2% read in the papers for more than 1.5 
hours. More than one-third does not use radio and the newspapers for informational purpose, 
while almost 10% do not watch news on TV. 
The data suggest that TV consumption follows different principles than radio or newspaper 
consumption. Much of television viewing is done for entertainment purposes only, but this 
does not exclude the fact that the news offered on TV, especially the evening news, are an 
important source of information. Watching TV is an activity almost everyone undertakes, 
while a considerable share of the people do not listen to the radio or read newspapers.  
2.4.2. The Role of Opportunity Costs of Time 
To appreciate the differences in the consumption of the three media the differences in their 
cost-benefit structure should be taken into account. While marginal benefits of media 
consumption mostly depend on the quality of content and on how content matches individual 
preferences, marginal costs almost exclusively consist of opportunity costs of time. This is 
especially true for TV and radio, where marginal monetary costs are zero (except in the case 
of pay-per-view TV) and cognitive costs are low as well (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990). 
One just has to push a button. In the case of radio, even opportunity costs of time can be very 
low. One can easily listen to the radio while undertaking another activity, such as cooking, 
working, or driving a car. To a lesser extent, this is also true for TV. Some people do have 
their TV set running while undertaking other activities, such as eating or even conversing 
with friends. In contrast to radio, television requires not only oral but also visual attention. 
Studies show that about 70% of TV viewing time is exclusively devoted to TV, while the 
remaining 30% is accompanied by another activity (Robinson and Godbey 1999; Grahn et al. 
2003).30 Newspaper consumption, in contrast, has a different cost structure. Cognitive costs 
are much higher, and reading the newspaper requires full attention; it is more difficult to do 
other activities simultaneously. Only during time in which one is forced to do nothing, like 
commuting with public transportation or sitting in a doctor’s waiting room, can reading 
newspapers be considered a secondary activity. Hence, Ekelund and Watson (1994) explain 
the decline in newspaper consumption over time with increased opportunity costs of 
household production due to rising labor force participation. 
                                                 
30 These percentages cannot directly be compared with data presented in Figure 1 because television 
consumption as a primary activity can also be accompanied by another secondary activity. 
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However, recalling the above-discussed media consumption patterns, it seems to be difficult 
to simply explain the differences between the three media types through time opportunity 
costs. Thus, watching television is extremely time consuming in comparison with listening to 
the radio (which more easily allows for simultaneous undertaking of other activities), and 
should therefore be undertaken less – which is certainly not the case in reality. 
Differences in media consumption between persons 
To shed more light on the role of opportunity costs of time and other factors in explaining TV 
consumption, I analyze how these factors are related to TV, radio and newspaper 
consumption at the individual level. Again, the comparison of the three media types 
highlights and helps to understand the specific features of TV consumption. In a regression 
analysis, the different media and news consumption activities are explained by personal 
characteristics of the consumers controlling for country/wave and time fixed effects. 
Individual characteristics are used as proxy measures for individual opportunity costs of time, 
cognitive ability and preferences for entertainment and information. To render the 
presentation and interpretation of the results easier, I transform the different media use time 
categories into cardinal numbers representing the minute value of the mid-point of the 
respective category. For the top category (more than 3 hours) I assume 210 minutes. 
Respondents watch on average almost two hours TV daily (117 minutes; standard deviation 
65), listen 85 minutes to the radio (standard deviation 81), and read 32 minutes in the 
newspapers (standard deviation 36). Average TV consumption of news and political programs 
amounts to 45 minutes a day (standard deviation 39), radio news consumption to 30 minutes a 
day (standard deviation 43), and political newspaper consumption to 18 minutes a day 
(standard deviation 24).31 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates. However, similar results are obtained using ordered 
probit estimation and the original categorical information on media use (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix).
                                                 
31 These descriptive statistics depend, of course, on the assumed minute amount for the top category and, 
therefore, the absolute level cannot be interpreted in detail. However, they are useful for analyzing general 
differences between media types, between countries and between individuals. See also the discussion in section 
2.3. 
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The first three columns of Table 2 present the analysis of total television, radio and newspaper 
consumption (i.e., information and entertainment). Employment status, as a proxy for 
opportunity costs of time, is significantly related to watching TV. Respondents active in the 
labor market watch less TV than retired, unemployed or sick and disabled persons, or persons 
doing housework and looking after children. Coefficients are large (e.g. retired respondents 
spend on average almost half an hour more watching TV a day than respondents doing paid 
work) and statistically significant at the 99% level. The same pattern also applies for 
newspaper reading. Though coefficients are much smaller than in the case of TV (e.g. retirees 
read for five minutes more a day than employed persons), they must be interpreted in relation 
to average newspaper reading time, which is also much lower than average TV viewing time.  
The relationship between employment status and radio consumption looks more diverse than 
for the other types of media, presumably as a result of radio's status as a secondary activity 
during many tasks. Retired and working people listen more to the radio than all other groups. 
In many jobs it is possible to have the radio on while working.  
The coefficients for the number of working hours tell a similar story. The higher the numbers 
of working hours are, the less TV respondents watch and the more they listen to the radio. 
Coefficients are statistically significant but rather small. Ten more hours of working time only 
translate into one minute less TV or one minute more radio a day. Working hours are 
positively related to newspaper reading, which would run counter to intuition if working 
hours only reflected time availability. The coefficient is, however, very small. Newspapers 
and magazines can also be read during commutes and at the workplace for job purposes.  
Education is very strongly and significantly related to all media consumption activities. 
Respondents with a higher education read more newspapers and watch less TV (with the 
exception of people without primary education who watch less TV than the reference group). 
There is no linear relationship between radio consumption and education. At a low 
educational level, radio listening time increases with education but declines again for people 
having tertiary education.  
Respondents who have children at home consume less of all media types because their free 
time is probably very precious and scarce. People living with a partner spend more time 
watching TV and reading newspapers than people without a partner. The latter probably 
spend less time at home. 
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Concentrating on news consumption only, the same overall picture emerges. Most 
coefficients have the same sign and statistical significance but are slightly smaller. This shows 
that the above-discussed relationships apply to the entertainment as well as to the information 
function of media. However, some notable exceptions and additional relationships can be 
found. Respondents in education watch less entertainment TV but the same amount of news 
TV as respondents active in the labor market. Students certainly have on average high 
opportunity costs of time and therefore a low demand for (entertainment) TV. However, they 
seem to get rather high benefits from news consumption. Similarly, (high) education is a very 
strong predictor of (low) total TV consumption, while this is much less so for news TV 
consumption. While coefficients are still negative and statistically significant, they are much 
smaller. In comparison with an individual who has only a primary education, a person with 
tertiary education watches, in total, more than half an hour less TV a day but only 9 minutes 
less news TV. As expected, political interest, as an indicator for strong preferences for 
political information, is significantly positively related to all news consumption activities. 
Coefficients for total media consumption are, however, much smaller. 
The R-squared shows that between 6 and 16% of the variance in the different media 
consumption activities can be explained by the factors included in the regressions. 
Explanatory power is higher for TV and newspapers than for radio, and slightly higher for 
information than for total media consumption. While such a rather low R-squared is usual in 
individual level regression, it still reflects the fact that many other factors than the ones 
considered determine the amount of time people spend on the different media consumption 
activities. Clearly, consumption choice is also reliant upon an individual's personal interests 
and the content offered by TV, radio and newspapers – or in economic terms, people’s 
preferences and the match between their preferences and media supply. Here, these factors 
cannot be measured directly. 
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2.5. Institutional Determinants of Television Consumption 
The previous chapter has shown that differences in opportunity costs of time and in other 
personal characteristics may explain some of the variation in TV consumption between 
individuals. Individual choice, however, takes place in a certain institutional environment.32 
For example, the concentration of media markets, state ownership of media outlets, or 
regulatory interventions in the media market presumably determine media supply and affect 
the quality of media content as well as the expected benefit for consumers. Hence, such 
institutions play an important role in determining and constraining individual’s media 
consumption choice.33 In this chapter, the role of institutional settings for individual TV 
consumption choice is exemplified in an analysis of the effects of the prevalence and 
regulation of public broadcasters. The empirical results reveal that television consumption – 
both in total and with regard to news and information only – is lower when state ownership is 
higher, when public service broadcasters are less independent from government and when 
they largely depend on government finances. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2.5.1, I discuss the related 
literature and concrete research questions, in section 2.5.2, I present the data and empirical 
specification and in section 2.5.3, the empirical results. Section 2.5.4 concludes. 
2.5.1. Related Literature and Research Questions 
The effect of media market characteristics and media institutions on consumers seems not to 
be clear – neither with regard to theory (see, e.g., Anderson and Coate 2005; George 2007) 
nor with regard to empirical results. Based on US data, George (2007) shows that the variety 
of newspaper content increases and that per capita circulation of newspapers is not reduced 
with higher concentration in newspaper markets. Hosp (2005) presents a contrary finding. He 
shows that newspaper reading time in Swiss counties with higher concentration in the 
                                                 
32 Institutions can be broadly understood as law, formal and informal rules and procedures, social norms and 
traditions or organizations (North 1990). 
33 Furthermore, benefits of media consumption might also depend on political institutions. Benz and Stutzer 
(2004), for example, show that people in Swiss cantons with more extensive direct democratic rights are better 
informed than people in cantons with less of such rights. Similarly, people in EU countries where referendums 
on the introduction of the EURO took place are better informed about related issues than people in countries 
without a referendum. In sum, when people have a larger say in politics it pays off to acquire information. In the 
following, we focus, however, on differences in media institutions and not political institutions. 
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newspaper market is lower than in counties with a more diverse newspaper supply. The 
author relates this finding to lower quality expectations by the readers in concentrated 
markets.  
State involvement in media markets is yet another highly debated aspect of media institutions. 
Regulation of media markets – especially of television markets – and public ownership of 
broadcasters are prevalent in many countries. Intervention in media markets is usually 
justified by market failures and public good or merit good aspects of information (see, e.g., 
Sunstein 2000; Kiefer 2003; Hargreaves Heap 2005) and should therefore be beneficial for 
consumers. Theories in the realm of public choice and political economy, however, 
emphasize the negative aspects of this kind of state involvement. Independent and free media 
are regarded as crucial for the political, social and economic development of countries (see, 
e.g., Brunetti and Weder 2003; Djankov et al. 2003; Strömberg 2004b; Gentzkow 2006; 
Gentzkow et al. 2006). Specifically, Besley and Prat (2006) show in a theoretical model that 
independent media ownership reduces media capture by government. Moreover, public 
broadcasters might lack sufficient incentives to fulfill the public’s preferences because they 
are less subject to competition. Both aspects – political influence and lower incentive to 
consider the public’s preferences – will lead to lower quality expectations by consumers, who 
will in turn tend to switch to other kinds media that better reflect the consumer's preferences. 
Ultimately, whether public broadcasting is beneficial for consumers is an empirical 
question.34 
In a cross section of 13 countries, Leeson (2008), for example, finds that newspaper and radio 
news consumption are lower where media freedom is restricted. Interestingly, no 
corresponding statistically significant effect for TV news consumption is found. The results of 
Djankov et al. (2003) lead in the same direction, although the authors do not directly analyze 
media consumption. They show that state ownership of the press is negatively associated with 
various beneficial social and economic outcomes, while this is much less the case for state 
ownership of television. Thus, the question arises whether TV consumption merely follows 
different principles than the consumption of other media types does, or if general measures of 
media freedom and state ownership do not consistently capture the relevant aspect governing 
television markets and, therefore, the aspect affecting television consumption choice. Hence, 
                                                 
34 Consumer sovereignty might not be the only criteria when judging media institutions. This issue is discussed 
in section 2.5.4. 
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it might not be possible to empirically capture the effects of state involvement in TV markets 
when analyzing a large sample of heterogeneous countries where different forms of state 
ownership are lumped together.  
The following empirical analysis is therefore restricted to European countries where state 
ownership in the form of public broadcasting is eminent but where the extent or importance of 
public broadcasters varies. I analyze if relative TV consumption is lower (and relative 
newspaper and radio consumption higher) when state involvement in television markets is 
higher. Moreover, different aspects of state involvement can be distinguished. A first 
important aspect is the extent of state ownership of TV stations or the existence of so called 
public service broadcasters. I expect relative TV consumption to be lower when the share of 
public TV channels in a country is higher. Second, the independence of these public TV 
stations depends on the type of regulation and financing. While in some countries the 
regulatory authority lies directly within a ministry, in other countries a separate regulatory 
authority exists or public broadcasters are subject to self-regulation. Income of public 
broadcasters can be broadly separated into income from public sources (license fees, direct 
government subsidies) and income from private or commercial sources (advertising, 
sponsoring). An increased share of commercial income of a public TV station results in 
increased independence from politics and greater exposure to competition from private 
television. I therefore hypothesize that the relationship between the existence of public TV 
and television consumption is weaker when the regulatory bond between public broadcasters 
and government is looser and the share of commercial finance of public broadcasters is 
higher. 
2.5.2. Data and Empirical Specification 
Data on state ownership of television 
I use data compiled by Djankov et al. (2003) on state and private ownership of a country's five 
most important TV stations with local news content. TV stations are selected on the basis of 
market share of the audience and classified as either state or private owned.35 TV stations 
financed by government license fees and accountable to the government or a government 
                                                 
35 There is also a third category "other", which includes, for example, media outlets owned by political 
opposition parties. This category is irrelevant, however, for our sample of European countries. Only Slovenia has 
a TV station in this category with a market share of 1%. 
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appointed body, like the British BBC, (i.e., public service broadcasters) are classified as state 
owned. In our sample of mostly Western European countries, this is the dominant form of 
state ownership. Ownership data are for the year 1999.36 I combine this country level data 
with individual level data on media consumption from the first wave of the European Social 
Survey conducted in 2002/2003. The combination of the two data sources results in 
availability of data for 21 countries. Figure 3 presents the indicators for the share of state 
owned TV stations for these 21 countries. 
 
Figure 3: State Ownership of Television in 21 European Countries, 1999 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CH DK AT IE DE IT GB NL PL SI SE FI NO ES FR BE PT IL CZ HU GR
State ownership by share State ownership by count  
Data Source: Djankov et al. (2003). 
 
The light gray columns represent the share of the five top TV stations that are state owned, 
whereby the TV stations are weighted by their market share. The darker columns show, for 
comparison, the unweighted share of state owned TV stations. State ownership is highest in 
Switzerland. Government controls three of the five most important TV stations and weighted 
by market share, state ownership amounts to 89%. On the other side of the graph is Greece, 
where the government controls only one of the top five TV stations with a market share of 
just 8%. The fraction of state ownership by market share amounts on average to 0.51 with a 
standard deviation of 0.19. State ownership by share and state ownership by count differ to 
some extent in some countries. In Austria and Poland, for example, the government controls 
the more popular TV stations and state ownership by market share is higher than by simple 
                                                 
36 For further details on the methodology see Djankov et al. (2003). 
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count. In other countries, like the Czech Republic or Hungary, the opposite seems to be the 
case. In the following empirical analysis, I concentrate on state ownership by market share as 
it is the more precise measure.37 However, in a sensitivity analysis, results are checked using 
the data on state ownership by count. 
Data on regulation and financing of public broadcasters 
Public service broadcasters are financed and regulated differently in different countries. Data 
gathered by Svendsen (2002) account for such differences in regulation. Svendsen 
differentiates between subordination of public service broadcasters to a ministry, to a separate 
regulatory authority or to self-regulation. TV stations subject to self-regulation or a separate 
regulatory authority might be much less susceptible to government influence than TV stations 
regulated directly by a ministry and thus might be more credible and more able to attract 
viewers. On the other hand, it might be argued that a ministry is better able to account for 
public good aspects in information provision and is therefore better able to supply attractive 
news (but perhaps provides less attractive entertainment). In our sample of 21 countries, 8 
countries are regulated by a ministry, 8 are regulated by a separate regulatory authority and 5 
countries are subject to self-regulation.38 For one country, Slovenia, there is no data available. 
Similar arguments may be put forward with regard to the source of revenue of public 
broadcasters. I differentiate between public and commercial revenue, i.e., revenue from 
government grants or license fees and revenue from advertising and sponsoring. The data are 
calculated from information provided by Betzel (2003) and relate to the year 2002. There is 
no data available for Germany. Figure 4 presents the share of commercial income of the 
                                                 
37 It can of course be argued that this measure – state ownership by market share – is to some extent endogenous 
and already a equilibrium, i.e. the result of the interaction between (public and private) supply and demand 
(suspect to quality expectations of the public).  
38 Belgium is divided into a French and a Dutch speaking part, as both language groups have their own public 
service broadcasters that are regulated differently. For the UK, we use the regulation of the BBC for the whole 
country (ITV is regulated differently) and for Spain the regulation of national public service broadcasters 
(Catalan public service broadcasters are regulated differently). 
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public service broadcasters39 in the different countries. It ranges from 0 to 0.6. The mean is 
0.28 and the median 0.32. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Commercial Income of Public Broadcasters in 20 European Countries 
Data Source: Betzel (2003). 
 
Data on media consumption 
In the European Social Survey, respondents are asked how much time they spend watching 
television, listening to the radio, and reading the newspapers on an average weekday, in total, 
as well as solely on news or programs about politics and current affairs. They may indicate 
their answer in eight categories ranging from “no time at all” to “more than 3 hours”.40 To 
facilitate the analysis, the minute values of the category means are used. For the top category 
“more than 3 hours”, 3.5 hours are assumed. The choice of value hardly affects results. In a 
sensitivity analysis, I also present ordered probit regressions using the original categorical 
information.  
 
                                                 
39 For some countries, the data are not provided separately for public TV and public radio companies. In these 
cases, the data presented here relate to both public TV and public radio. For some countries, it was not evident in 
the data source if the data relates to public TV only or to both public TV and public radio.  
40 For a general discussion of the data quality see section 2.3. 
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Figure 5: Importance of Different News Media in 21 European Countries, 2002/2003 
 
Data Source: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003). 
Note: Average minutes a day are calculated from category means. For the top category (more than 3 
hours) 3.5 hours are assumed. 
 
Figure 5 shows the average minutes a day respondents spend on the media for informational 
purpose in the years 2002/2003 for each of the 21 countries. The countries are ordered 
according to the amount of total news media consumption (i.e., TV, radio and newspaper 
consumption added together). In Greece, Slovenia and Italy, total news consumption is the 
lowest. In Greece, respondents spend on average only a bit more than an hour on news media 
consumption, whereby three quarters of the time is spent on television (47 minutes). On the 
other hand, average news consumption is highest in Ireland (2.25 hours) and Norway (2 
hours). Other Northern European countries, like Denmark (1.9 hours) and Finland (1.6 hours), 
also exhibit a high level of media consumption. 
In most countries, TV is the most important source of information – evaluated on the basis of 
time spent on it – followed by radio and newspapers. However, the figure also reveals very 
different patterns of media use in the different countries. There are countries where one of the 
media types is more dominant than in other countries. In Greece and Italy, for example, 
newspapers are as important as radio, and in Ireland and Hungary radio is almost as important 
as TV. 
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Empirical specification 
Based on the data described above, an econometric media consumption function is specified. 
The time spent on media consumption MCi of individual i depends on the extent of state 
ownership of television stations StateTVj in country j, as well as on individual characteristics 
Xi and country-specific variables Yj. 
 
MCi = 0 + 1 StateTVj + 1 Xi + 2 Yj + i 
 
I look at both total media consumption and media consumption of news and political affairs. I 
analyze television, radio and newspaper consumption separately while controlling for the 
other two media consumption activities, respectively. The other individual control variables 
include socio-demographic characteristics that are used as indicators for preferences, 
opportunity costs of time and cognitive ability and presumably affect media consumption 
choice. These are political interest, working hours, household income (log), household size 
(square root), age, age squared, gender, marital status, children, employment status, 
education, citizenship and type of community respondents live in. All individual control 
variables are from the ESS as well. As state ownership of TV stations is available at the 
country level only, no country-fixed effects can be included within the regression. To 
nevertheless control for general differences between countries and their economic situations, 
GNI per capita adjusted for purchasing power, the unemployment rate and the size of the 
population are added to the regression. The data are from World Development Indicators 
(World Bank several years) and Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006). State ownership 
of TV stations in a country might reflect a more general attitude or a propensity towards state 
involvement in the economy, which might correlate with individual political involvement and, 
thus, news consumption. I therefore control for this propensity by including an index for state 
owned enterprises and government investments constructed by the Economic Freedom 
Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
A further specification contains the more detailed regulation data. Here, the effect of state 
ownership of TV stations on media consumption additionally depends on the type of 
regulation public service broadcasters are subjected to. Three regulatory regimes can be 
distinguished. Self-regulation forms the reference group, while dummy variables for 
regulation by a separate regulatory authority RegAuthj and regulation by a ministry RegMinj in 
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country j and their interaction with the share of state owned TV (StateTVj*RegAuthj, 
StateTVj*RegMinj) are added to the regression.  
 
MCi = 0 + 1 StateTVj + 2 RegAuthj + 3 RegMinj + 4 StateTVj*RegAuthj  
+ 5 StateTVj*RegMinj + 1 Xi + 2 Yj + i 
 
A third specification adds the share of commercial income of public service broadcasters 
ComIncj as well as its interaction with the share of state owned TV StateTVj*ComIncj. Control 
variables are the same as in the first specification. 
 
MCi = 0 + 1 StateTVj + 2 ComIncj + 3 StateTVj*ComIncj + 1 Xi + 2 Yj + i 
 
2.5.3. Results 
State ownership and absolute media consumption 
Table 3 presents the results of state ownership of TV stations by market share on total media 
consumption. The first column shows that respondents in countries with a higher share of 
state ownership watch statistically significantly less TV than in countries with lower state 
ownership (p0.01). The size of the coefficient is considerable (-55). State ownership of TV is 
not significantly associated with radio and newspaper consumption in a statistically 
significant manner (column 2 and 3). Coefficients are however positive, i.e., point in the 
expected direction. The different media consumption activities are positively related to each 
other. All coefficients are statistically significant (p0.01), however small in size. TV 
consumption is higher in countries with a higher GNI per capita, a larger population and a 
higher level of state owned enterprises and government investment. Radio consumption is 
negatively associated with GNI per capita. 
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Table 3: State Ownership of TV and Media Consumption 
Dependent variable: media use 
(minutes) 
Total TV Total radio Total newspapers 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  -55.01**  (-4.10)  26.71 (1.46)  11.27 (1.09) 
Total TV consumption     0.05** (3.53)  0.04** (3.86) 
Total radio consumption  0.03** (3.56)    0.03** (4.47) 
Total newspaper consumption  0.12** (5.08)  0.19** (5.19)    
GNI per capita (1000 int. $)  0.56* (2.60)  -1.17* (2.28)  0.17 (0.53) 
Unemployment rate  59.08 (1.19)  -60.97 (-0.85)  -40.79 (-1.05) 
Population (1 Mio.)  0.17(*) (1.92)  -0.00 (-0.00)  -0.08 (1.72) 
State owned enterprise index  3.73** (4.48)  0.93 (1.06)  -0.33 (-0.54) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  131.16** (11.21)  68.36** (3.06)  -18.28 (1.47) 
No. of observations 40,568 40,568 40,865 
R-squared 0.14 0.04 0.14 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic Freedom 
Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
Turning to the analysis of consumption of news and political content in the different types of 
media in Table 4, the same overall picture emerges. State ownership of TV is negatively 
related to TV consumption and coefficients are statistically significant (p0.05). Coefficients 
in the news radio and newspaper regressions are positive but not statistically significant. The 
size of the coefficient in the TV news regression, which is again substantial with -19, shows 
that news TV consumption is proportionally reduced to the same extent than total TV 
consumption when state ownership is higher. For example, a 50 percentage point higher share 
of state ownership (i.e., the difference between Hungary and Ireland or between Portugal and 
Switzerland) is associated with about 28 minutes less total TV watching per day (compared to 
a mean of almost 2 hours) and about 10 minutes less TV news watching (compared to a mean 
of about 45 minutes). 
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Table 4: State Ownership of TV and News Consumption 
Dependent variable: media use 
(minutes) 
News TV News radio News newspapers 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  -19.10* (-2.31)  16.71 (1.28)  4.52 (1.13) 
News TV consumption     0.17** (6.21)  0.10** (4.98) 
News radio consumption  0.12** (7.41)     0.07** (4.79) 
News newspaper consumption  0.25** (7.90)  0.26** (6.83)    
GNI per capita (1000 int. $)  0.68* (2.45)  -0.24 (-1.05)  0.13 (0.88) 
Unemployment rate  85.01(*) (1.91)  4.69 (0.13)  -15.99 (-0.84) 
Population (1 Mio.)  -0.07 (-1.04)  -0.05 (-1.09)  -0.05* (-2.33) 
State owned enterprise index  0.80* (2.53)  -0.78 (-0.85)  0.09 (0.27) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.33 (0.10)  -6.07 (-0.51)  -16.98** (2.96) 
No. of observations 40,285 40.285 40.285 
R-squared 0.19 0.10 0.20 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic Freedom 
Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
State Ownership and Relative Media Consumption 
Absolute media and news consumption might differ between countries due to various reasons. 
For example, people inform themselves more when they have a larger say in politics (Benz 
and Stutzer 2004). In order to exclude such factors not explicitly controlled for that possibly 
explain cross-country differences in the level of media consumption, I analyze whether state 
ownership of TV is associated with different media consumption patterns, i.e., I look at the 
relative importance of different media types. Table 5 presents the results for total media 
consumption, i.e., entertainment and information. 
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Table 5: State Ownership of TV and Relative Media Consumption 
Dependent variable: relative 
media use (share) 
Rel. TV Rel. radio Rel. newspapers 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  -0.23** (-4.84)  0.15** (4.00)  0.08(*) (1.83) 
GNI per capita (1000 int. $)  3e-3(*) (1.91)  -4e-3** (-2.90)  1e-3 (0.89) 
Unemployment rate  0.41 (1.45)  -0.26 (-1.34)  -0.16 (-0.90) 
Population (1 Mio.)  6e-4 (1.62)  -1e-4 (-0.35)  -4e-4* (-2.49) 
State owned enterprise index  0.01** (3.21)  -0.003 (-1.32)  -0.005**(-3.17) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.72** (8.70)  0.31** (5.12)  -0.04 (-0.78) 
No. of observations 40,398 40,398 40,393 
R-squared 0.10 0.05 0.12 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic Freedom 
Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
The dependent variable in the first column is total TV consumption divided by total media 
consumption (total TV plus total radio plus total newspaper consumption). In the second and 
third column, the dependent variables are total radio consumption and total newspaper 
consumption divided by total media consumption. The results show that relative TV 
consumption is much lower and relative radio and newspaper consumptions are much higher 
when state ownership of TV stations is higher. The coefficients for TV and radio are 
statistically significant at the 99% level and the coefficient for newspapers at the 90% level. 
For example, a 50 percentage point increase in the share of state ownership is associated with 
a 12 percentage point decrease in the share of TV consumption, an 8 percentage point 
increase in the share of radio consumption and a 4 percentage point increase in the share of 
newspaper consumption. 
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Table 6: State Ownership of TV and Relative News Consumption 
Dependent variable: relative 
media use (share) 
Rel. news TV Rel. news radio Rel. news newspapers 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  -0.26** (2.91)  0.19* (2.61)  0.07 (1.53) 
GNI per capita (1000 int. $)  3e-3 (1.41)  4e-3* (2.16)  2e-4 (0.13) 
Unemployment rate  0.63 (1.42)  -0.30 (-1.07)  -0.33 (-1.30) 
Population (1 Mio.)  3e-4 (0.46)  1e-6 (0.00)  2e-4 (-0.89) 
State owned enterprise index  0.01(*) (1.86)  -0.01(*) (-1.77)  -0.002 (-1.07) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.68** (5.32)  0.27** (3.07)  0.05 (0.86) 
No. of observations 38,726 38.726 38.726 
R-squared 0.10 0.03 0.09 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), World Development 
Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic Freedom 
Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
The results look very similar when concentrating on news consumption only (Table 6). 
Relative TV news consumption (i.e., TV news consumption divided by total news 
consumption on TV, on radio and in newspapers) is 13 percentage points lower, relative radio 
news consumption 10 percentage points higher and relative newspaper news consumption 4 
percentage points higher when state ownership of TV stations is 50 percentage points higher. 
However, the coefficient in the relative newspaper news regression is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels (t=1.53). In sum, the results on relative media consumption 
confirm the results on absolute media consumption. 
Regulation of Public Service Broadcasters 
Here, I examine whether the effect of state ownership of TV stations on TV consumption is 
related to the type of regulation these stations are subject to.  
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Table 7: State Ownership of TV, Regulatory Authority and TV Consumption 
Dependent variable: media use 
(minutes) 
TV consumption TV news consumption 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  45.23** (3.36)  24.25** (4.14) 
Self-regulation Reference group 
Separate regulatory authority  58.97** (6.10)  18.73** (3.97) 
Regulation by a ministry  62.72** (5.48)  48.93** (8.66) 
State ownership * reg. authority  -105.68** (-6.72)  -31.56** (-4.33) 
State ownership * reg. by ministry  -118.30** (-7.37)  -79.42** (-9.77) 
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Controls at country level Yes Yes 
Constant  0.68** (5.32)  -26.11* (-2.20) 
No. of observations 39,060 39,010 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. Controls at country level include GNI per capita, unemployment rate, size of population 
and a state owned enterprise index. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Source: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), Svendsen (2002), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic 
Freedom Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
 
The results in the first column of Table 7 reveal that state ownership of TV stations is only 
negatively associated with total television consumption if public service broadcasters are 
regulated by a separate authority or by a ministry. If public service broadcasters are subject to 
self-regulation, a higher share of state owned TV stations is even positively related to TV 
consumption. A 50 percentage point increase in the share of state owned TV stations is related 
to a 23 minute increase in TV viewing per day when public TV channels are subject to self-
regulation and to a 30 or 36 minute decrease in TV viewing per day when these channels are 
regulated by a separate authority or a ministry.41 
                                                 
41 The marginal effects of state ownership in the case of regulation by a separate authority or a ministry have to 
be calculated from the coefficients of the dummy variables and the interaction effects. The respective t-values 
are 6.9 and 6.7. Both marginal effects are therefore highly statistically significant (p<0.01). 
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Focusing on TV news consumption, similar results are obtained. They are shown in the 
second column of Table 7. A 50 percentage point increase of state ownership is associated 
with a 22 minute increase in TV news consumption if public service broadcasters are self-
regulated and a 28 minute decrease if a ministry regulates these TV channels (t=-7.5). If a 
separate authority regulates the public TV channels, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the share of state ownership and TV news consumption (t=1.5). 
Financing of Public Service Broadcasters 
The effect of state ownership of TV stations on TV consumption might depend not only on 
the type of regulation and control that public stations face, but also on the origin of their 
financing. Table 8 shows the results of the regressions, including the share of commercial 
income of public service broadcasters and its interaction with the share of state owned TV 
stations.  
 
Table 8: State Ownership of TV, Financing of TV Stations and TV Consumption 
Dependent variable: media use 
(minutes) 
TV consumption TV news consumption 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
Coefficient  
(t-value) 
State ownership of TV  -96.18** (-5.36)  -23.88(*) (-1.94) 
Share of commercial income  -83.38* (-2.44)  24.84 (0.86) 
State ownership * commercial income  182.41* (2.79)  -12.28 (-0.24) 
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Controls at country level Yes Yes 
Constant  188.98** (10.18)  5.14 (0.37) 
No. of observations 37,652 37,374 
R-squared 0.15 0.19 
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at country level. t-values in brackets. 
Individual controls include variables for political interest, household income (log), size of household 
(square root), sex, age, age squared, education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, 
area of living, and citizenship. A dummy variable for the highest income category and dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for political interest, household income, household size, sex, age, 
education, working hours, employment status, marital status, children, area of living and citizenship are 
included as well. Controls at country level include GNI per capita, unemployment rate, size of population 
and a state owned enterprise index. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Source: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003), Djankov et al. (2003), Betzel (2003), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank several years), Penn World tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006), Economic 
Freedom Network (Gwartney et al. 2007). 
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When public TV stations receive all their income from public sources (e.g. through license 
fees or government grants), state ownership is negatively associated with total TV 
consumption. A 50 percentage point increase in the share of state owned TV stations is then 
related to 48 minutes less TV watching per day. The effect is statistically significant (p0.01). 
As the share of commercial income increases, this relationship becomes smaller. At 30% of 
commercial income, an increase in the share of state owned TV stations by 50 percentage 
points is linked to a decrease in TV consumption of only 20 minutes. At 60% of commercial 
income (which is the maximum in our sample), the relationship is even positive, though not 
statistically significant. 
The picture appears different for TV news consumption. As shown before, state ownership is 
negatively related to TV news consumption. This relationship does not depend on the level of 
commercial income. Both, the coefficient for commercial income and the coefficient of the 
interaction effect are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In countries where 
public TV stations rely on a high share of commercial income, entertainment, but not 
information, on TV seems to be more attractive than in countries with a share of public 
income. Yet, there also seems to be no trade-off between entertainment and information when 
public TV stations have a higher share of commercial income. News and information on TV 
retain the same attractiveness. 
Robustness 
The results presented thus far are robust to various changes in specification. Table A2 in the 
appendix shows the result of these specifications for absolute total TV and absolute news TV 
consumption.  
All results42 are confirmed using ordered probit regressions and the original categorical 
information on television, radio and newspaper consumption.  
Using the share of state owned TV stations by count, i.e., the unweighted share of state owned 
TV stations among the five top TV stations in a country, instead of the share of state owned 
TV stations weighted by market share leads to very similar results as well. Coefficients are 
generally bigger, which is not surprising as the variation of state ownership by count is 
smaller than the variation of state ownership by share. An increase in state ownership by 
                                                 
42 Relative media consumption cannot be calculated using the original categorical information. Therefore, those 
results cannot be checked with ordered probit regressions. 
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count of 20 percentage points, which again reflects the difference between Hungary and 
Ireland or between Portugal and Switzerland, is associated with about 18 minutes less total 
TV consumption and about 7 minutes less TV news consumption. This is similar to the 
reduction of 28 and 10 minutes when analyzing the effect of state ownership by market share.  
State ownership of TV stations might be correlated with other TV and media supply 
characteristics in a country that systematically influence media consumption. I control for 
such issues by adding the number of TV channels received by 70% of the population. Again, 
the results are robust to the added control variable. In column (D), I additionally include the 
number of radio channels available and the number of daily newspaper titles in a country. 
Again, the results remain very similar. The only change occurs with relative news TV 
consumption, where the statistical significance drops slightly below conventional levels 
(p=0.11) (regression not shown in Table A2). This reduction in statistical significance can be 
explained by the reduced number of observations due to the availability of additional control 
variables for 17 countries only. 
Furthermore, I review whether the results are not driven by one specific country. I therefore 
repeat all regressions, always omitting the observations of one country (results not shown in 
Table A2). Generally, the results remain similar and statistically significant at conventional 
levels. However, omitting the observations from Switzerland (the country with the highest 
share of state ownership and the lowest average TV consumption) reduces the size of the 
coefficients, especially for news TV consumption. The coefficient drops from -19 in the 
baseline regression to -8, but remains statistically significant (p0.05). In the case of relative 
news TV consumption, statistical significance drops slightly (p0.1). Omitting observations 
from Greece or Slovenia – countries with on average high TV consumptions and low state 
ownership of TV stations – leads to similar coefficients, but in the case of absolute news TV 
consumption, it leads to a slight drop in statistical significance (p0.1). In the case of relative 
news TV consumption, omitting observations from Greece leads to a level of statistical 
significance slightly below conventional levels (t=-1.61). Yet, in sum, the empirical results 
are robust to the various changes in empirical specifications. 
Direction of causality 
So far, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that state ownership and tight control of 
TV stations lead to a less attractive TV offering – either because public service broadcasters 
are less subject to competition and therefore must cater less to the public’s tastes or because 
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political influence leads the public to trust TV less (see Connolly and Hargreaves Heap 2007) 
– and to less TV consumption. The cross-sectional results, however, do not allow for a 
definitive assessment of a causal relationship. For example, an omitted variable bias might 
occur, or reverse causation might be possible. The extent of state ownership of television or of 
public service broadcasting is not completely exogenous and might even depend on media 
consumption. In countries where no attractive private TV supply exists and TV consumption 
is low, political pressure for public service broadcasting might be higher. It must be noted that 
I control for some variables which might drive such a relationship. In smaller countries, for 
example, availability of private (national) news of good quality might be too costly, thus 
leading to increased political demand for public service broadcasting. Size of population is 
controlled, however, in all regressions. Furthermore, public service broadcasters have existed 
for many decades in many countries. The empirical results would then suggest that public 
service broadcasters are not highly successful in attracting a higher audience. 
It may also be argued that the quality of news on public channels is so much higher that, in 
order to obtain the desired level of news information, people can spend less time watching 
public news than news offered by private stations, i.e., the productivity of news consumption 
is higher in the case of public TV. In this case, I would expect that people would tend to turn 
to other information media in countries where the costs of information on TV are higher, i.e., 
in countries with little state involvement in TV markets. The empirical results, however, do 
not confirm such a relative price effect. Rather, the partial correlation between state 
ownership of television and the consumption of newspaper and radio follows in the opposite 
direction (but is not statistically significant). 
2.5.4. Conclusion 
Media consumption, and especially television consumption, varies to a large extent between 
countries. Different media institutions in different countries can explain some part of this 
variation. Specifically, the role that state ownership and the regulation of public service 
broadcasters plays is analyzed here. I show that a higher share of state ownership of television 
stations and tighter regulation of public service broadcasters are associated with lower TV 
consumption, both in total and with regard to information and news only. While these 
empirical relationships are consistent with the view that tightly regulated public television 
attracts less viewers than private television, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not 
allow for a definite assessment of the direction of causality. 
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In any case, whether the (only) goal of public service broadcasters should be to attract higher 
audiences is debatable. In many countries, public service broadcasters are commissioned for 
many different tasks, e.g. to support national productions or to provide minorities a media 
platform. Furthermore, consumer sovereignty might not be the only appropriate criteria when 
judging a country’s media institutions. Because of the external effects of information 
consumption, especially of information in the political context, other features, such as citizen 
exposure to diverse points of view, are important as well (see, e.g., Sunstein 2000; Sunstein 
2007). The goal of this chapter is, however, not to judge a country’s media institutions but to 
integrate media consumption into a rational choice framework and to illustrate how individual 
and institutional characteristics influence media consumption. This analysis provides the basis 
for the following chapters that analyze the effects of television consumption on well-being 
and behavior. 
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2.6. Rational Television Consumption? 
So far, television consumption has been analyzed on the basis of standard economic theory. 
Standard theory assumes that individuals make choices in order to maximize their utility in a 
time-consistent manner that uses all information available to them. The amount of TV 
watching is therefore the result of the interaction between individual preferences and 
restrictions, the latter shaped mainly by individual opportunity costs and institutional settings. 
Accordingly, TV consumption differences between persons and between countries have been 
associated with differences in preferences, opportunity costs of time, and institutional settings 
that affect the quality of programs and the match between offered programs and individual 
tastes. 
In standard neoclassical economics, the question of why people watch so much TV can 
therefore be answered quite easily. Individuals are assumed to engage in this completely 
voluntary activity because they enjoy it. They derive utility from it and therefore undertake it; 
this is a clear case of revealed preference. TV offers information, entertainment, and 
relaxation almost for free. The extensive choice of programs offered by cable and satellite 
providers caters to a large variety of tastes. Moreover, the cognitive and physical costs of TV 
viewing are low (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990: 173). One just has to press a button. In 
contrast to going to the cinema, the theater or any other outdoor activity, television 
consumption does not require one to dress appropriately before leaving the house, purchase a 
ticket or reserve a seat in advance. Unlike other leisure activities, TV viewing does not require 
coordination with other persons. One can sit alone in front of the TV, while other leisure 
activities, such as tennis or golf, require a partner with similar time availability and similar 
preferences. In short, TV viewing offers high immediate marginal benefits at low immediate 
marginal costs.  
Theories and evidence in the field of psychology and economics (see e.g. Frey and Stutzer 
2007) challenge the conclusion that TV consumption is completely rational. This literature 
reports a large number of different deviations – also referred to as anomalies – from standard 
theory. Two of those deviations from utility maximizing consumption choice result from time 
inconsistent preferences or self-control problems of people and from people mispredicting 
future utility. According to these theories, it is precisely the favorable characteristics of 
television described above that may cause people to fall prey to excessive TV watching. One 
important reason is that many of the negative consequences resulting from TV viewing are 
not experienced immediately. The effects of lack of sleep, for instance, only arise the next 
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day, and the consequences of not spending time with family and friends or not studying for an 
exam take much longer to appear. The trade-off between immediate rewards and future costs 
often poses a problem. Lack of willpower or self-control problems induce people to abandon 
their plans or they overlook future negative consequences of their behavior. For example, they 
watch another episode of their favorite soap instead of going to bed early, seeing friends, or 
finishing some work. 
There exists a large body of literature in psychology on self control and self regulation failure. 
Hence, in the following, I discuss what can be learned about television consumption directly 
from psychological literature before reverting to the economic literature that has integrated 
these psychological concerns within the economic framework. The picture of television 
consumption would, however, not be complete without referring to the recent economic 
literature on utility misprediction, which takes place in section 2.6.3. The chapter concludes 
with a presentation of the literature and the empirical evidence which directly refers to TV 
watching as a potential irrational act. 
2.6.1. Self-Control in the Psychological Literature 
In psychological literature, problems of self-control have long been recognized (see e.g. 
Ainslie 1975). Today, theories of self-control are closely connected with theories of self-
regulation or self-regulation failure. While some authors even use the two terms 
interchangeably, McCullough and Willoughby (2009, p. 71) define self-regulation “as the 
process by which a system uses information about its present state to change that state”. On 
the other hand, the term “self-control [is reserved] for situations in which people engage in 
behaviors designed to counteract or override a prepotent response (e.g., a behavioral 
tendency, an emotion, or a motivation), such as assaulting someone who has angered them, 
resting after a hard day at work instead of painting the kitchen, or playing hooky instead of 
going to school”. The relationship between the two concepts is therefore as follows: “Not all 
psychological states that are self-regulated involve self-control […]; however, self-control 
may rely on mechanisms that are also involved in self-regulation per se” (McCullough and 
Willoughby 2009, p. 72). Hence, self-control is “the deliberate, conscious, effortful subset of 
self-regulation” (Baumeister et al. 2007b, p. 351). The psychological understanding of self-
control is closely connected to the trade-off between short-term and long-term utility that 
economists emphasize (see below). McCullough and Willoughby (2009, p. 72) write “when 
people exert self-control, they modify their response tendencies in a fashion that involves 
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suppressing one goal so as to pursue another one that is judged to have greater long-term 
utility”. Hence, in the case of television, self-control may be needed to resist the temptation of 
its immediate reward (entertainment, relaxation) and to pursue instead activities with 
immediate costs but higher long-term utility. 
The detailed theory of self-control emphasizes (among others) two main aspects of self-
control: self-control as a personality trait and self-control as a limited resource. 
Self-control as a personality trait 
One strand of the psychological literature focuses on self-control as a more or less stable 
personality trait acquired in early childhood (see, e.g., Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990, p. 94-
108; McCabe et al. 2004; Baumeister et al. 2007a). Much research has gone into theoretically 
and empirically identifying the correlations between self-control and other personality traits 
or characteristics, such as the “Big Five” personality traits43 (Tangney et al. 2004; Jensen-
Campbell et al. 2007), religiosity (McCullough and Willoughby 2009), or political ideology 
(Tittle et al. 2008) and in analyzing the relationship between self-control and a wealth of 
outcome variables, such as school outcomes (Mischel et al. 1988), criminal behavior 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990; Hirschi 2004), or interpersonal success (Tangney et al. 2004). 
This strand of research also suggests implicitly or explicitly that individual self-control is 
correlated among different behavioral areas (see Schmeichel and Zell 2007, p. 744). 
Self-control as a limited resource 
The limited resource or limited strength model of self-regulation was most prominently 
introduced into the literature by Baumeister and co-authors (Baumeister et al. 1994; 
Baumeister and Heatherton 1996; Muraven et al. 1998; Baumeister et al. 2007b). Their main 
argument is that self-control depends on a kind of limited resource, and that effortful exertion 
of self-control and of other tasks involving self-regulatory effort depletes this resource 
causing a decrease in performance during subsequent tasks – similar to a muscle becoming 
tired after exercise. The state of diminished resource after exerting self-control is referred to 
as ego-depletion. The limited resource model has been confirmed in many experiments and 
under various conditions and has even found biological support. Gailliot et al. (2007) show 
that self-control tasks use up glucose and that ego-depletion is reduced when study 
                                                 
43 The five traits are extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness (see, e.g., 
McCrae and Costa 1999). 
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participants consume a glucose drink. A further interesting observation is that active choice, 
i.e., selection among alternatives, leads to ego-depletion and subsequent impairment of self-
control as well (Vohs et al. 2008). 
The muscle analogy goes even further. Various studies suggest that repeated exercise can 
increase self-regulatory strength (for a review see Baumeister et al. 2006). In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that, in a study by Oaten and Cheng (2006), repeated physical exercise 
increases subsequent self-control in and out of the lab. One of the several ways this is shown 
is that participants report studying more and watching less television.  
Hence, this body of literature emphasizes the context-dependency of self-control problems. It 
is, for example, much harder to resist the temptation of TV’s immediate gratification after a 
hard day at work or school, when trying to quit smoking or lose weight, or when engaged in 
an emotionally strenuous relationship. Additionally, the vast choices of cable and satellite TV 
might not only increase difficultly in controlling one’s TV watching due to the constant 
availability of suitable programming, but they might also deplete self-regulatory strength on 
the basis of forcing viewers to choose among the increased options available. 
While the two views on self-control discussed here – self-control as a personality trait and 
self-control as limited resource – emphasize different aspects, they do not run contrary to one 
another. Although acts of self-control use up a limited resource, this strength resource can be 
seen as a relevant aspect of personality (for a related discussion see Baumeister et al. 2006). 
2.6.2. Economic Literature on Self-Control 
Already Adam Smith considered self-control or “self-command” to be an essential human 
characteristic and wrote in his Theory of Moral Sentiments:  
“The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason and understanding, 
by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, and of 
foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them: and secondly, 
self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure 
present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future 
time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues 
that which is most useful to the individual.” (Smith 1759, IV.I.17) 
He also recognised that temptation can interfere with one’s goals and that self-control is 
needed to nevertheless act according to one’s long-term interests:  
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“The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of 
proper benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect knowledge 
of those rules will not alone enable him to act in this manner: his own passions are very apt 
to mislead him; sometimes to drive him and sometimes to seduce him to violate all the 
rules which he himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves of. The most perfect 
knowledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect self-command, will not always enable 
him to do his duty.” (Smith 1759, VI.III.1) 
Contemporary economists have taken up the ideas and insight of psychologists presented 
above in different ways.44 Most applied work builds on models representing self-control 
problems in the form of time-inconsistent preferences, i.e., models of quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting.45 While standard theory explains intertemporal choice with discounted utility 
models (Samuelson 1937), where a constant discount rate  is applied between any two 
periods,46 experimental evidence runs contrary to discounted utility models by suggesting that 
people care more for the present than they do for any future period (for reviews of 
experiments on intertemporal choice see Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Frederick et al. 2002). 
Building on models proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Elster (1979), quasi-
hyperbolic discounting models propose a low discount factor (i.e., a discount factor decreased 
by ,   (0,1)) between the present moment and some time in the near future and a constant 
discount factor  thereafter (e.g. Laibson 1997; O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999b). These models 
capture the two main aspects of self-control problems, myopia and procrastination. People 
with myopic vision focus on consuming in the present moment and lack discernment or a 
long-term perspective in their thinking and planning. Such people undermine their well-being 
over time. In this respect, goods offering immediate benefits at negligible immediate marginal 
costs are generally tempting. Procrastination, on the other hand, emphasizes the delaying of 
activities with immediate costs more than one would have liked to, especially when having 
evaluated them beforehand and despite the activity's future benefits. In the case of TV 
consumption, myopia is the more relevant aspect, although one could argue that some people 
                                                 
44 For a historical account of intertemporal choice in economic thinking see Frederick et al. (2002). 
45 Other approaches include two self-models with a planer and a doer (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Fudenberg 
and Levine 2006) or axiomatic models that analyze preferences over choice sets (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer 2001; 
2005; Dekel et al. 2009). 
46 It can be argued that discounting per see, even in a time-consistent manner, is already irrational as it does not 
maximize utility over the whole period (see Frederick 2003, p. 89-90). 
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procrastinate because TV tempts them into not realizing their planned amount of, for 
example, studying or working. 
The main -model has been extended in several directions. For example, consumers can be 
completely, partly or not at all aware of their future self-control problems (O'Donoghue and 
Rabin 1999b; 2003), the combination of self-control problems and addictive goods is studied 
(O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999a; 2002), or the role of choice (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2001), 
self-commitment (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002) or incentives (O'Donoghue and Rabin 2005) 
is explored. 
Empirical evidence of self-control problems in non-experimental field settings has mainly 
been presented for financial decisions. Savings and borrowing decisions (e.g. Angeletos 2001; 
Skiba and Tobacman 2008; Laibson et al. 2009), the participation in retirement plans (or the 
role of defaults for these kind of decision) (e.g. Choi et al. 2004), or the amount of credit card 
dept (e.g. Shui and Ausubel 2004; Meier and Sprenger 2008) are major themes. Labor market 
decisions have also received some attention (see Fang and Silverman 2004 on labor supply; or 
DellaVigna and Paserman 2005 on job search). Specific consumption decisions have been 
studied to a lesser degree. Exceptions are, for example, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) 
on health club visits or Cutler (2003), Shapiro (2005) and Stutzer (2007) on food consumption 
and obesity. An excellent account of the recent empirical and theoretical literature on time 
inconsistent preferences is provided by Frederick et al. (2002) and DellaVigna (2009).47 
However, one important question remains regarding the application of economic models of 
self-control problems to TV consumption. The economic models implicitly or explicitly 
assume the same individual  across all behavioral domains. This means that an individual 
will possess a certain amount of self-control problems in different areas or with regard to 
different consumption decisions with similar cost benefit structures. For example, individuals 
that watch TV excessively also tend to smoke or overeat. Some psychological evidence 
discussed above, however, suggests that withstanding one temptation (e.g. smoking) will lead 
to poorer regulation of another desire for immediate gratification (e.g. watching TV) (see also 
Stutzer and Frey 2007, p. 8-9).48 This issue becomes important when trying to empirically 
                                                 
47 Recently, theories of self-control have also found neurological and neuroeconomic support (see, e.g., McClure 
et al. 2004; Knoch and Fehr 2007). 
48 See also Mc Ilwraith (1998) who reports that self-labeled TV addicts eat more junk food but drink less alcohol 
than the comparison group. There is no relationship between smoking and self-reported TV addiction. 
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identify people with low or high self-control with regard to their TV consumption. The first 
view would make it possible to use a generic measurement of self-control, such as the one 
proposed by Ameriks et al. (2007), while the second view would ask for a measurement 
specific to TV watching. 
2.6.3. Utility Misprediction 
Another important aspect for television consumption choice is the prediction – or 
misprediction – of the future costs and benefits of one’s actions. Standard theory assumes that 
people are able and willing to correctly forecast their future utility. There might be random 
forecasting errors, but no systematic ones. Experimental and empirical evidence however 
shows that there are systematic mistakes with regard to the prediction of future utility. For 
example, people systematically underestimate their adaptation to higher material standards 
and therefore overestimate their future utility from goods and activities with extrinsic, as 
compared to intrinsic, attributes or they do not foresee that their tastes change over time (for 
an overview of causes and consequences of misprediction see Loewenstein et al. 2003; 
Stutzer and Frey 2007; Frey and Stutzer 2008). With respect to TV consumption, two aspects 
are especially relevant. First, there is some evidence that people trade off TV consumption 
with social contacts and relationships (Bruni and Stanca 2008). If people underestimate the 
extent of utility they derive from such relational goods (i.e., goods with intrinsic attributes), 
they might watch more TV than optimal and damage their own well-being in the long run. 
Second, substantial research documents that the beliefs and preferences of heavy TV viewers 
change due to constant exposure to beautiful and wealthy TV personalities. For example, TV 
viewing is associated with higher materialism (e.g. Burroughs et al. 2002; Kasser 2002) and 
lower financial satisfaction (Layard 2005, p. 88-90; Bruni and Stanca 2006). Disregarding 
these consequences and costs leads to more consumption than optimal. 
In sum, the tendency of individuals to watch more TV than they plan or than they consider 
optimal ex-ante and ex-post due to self-control problems might be aggravated when people 
mispredict future costs because they underestimate the benefit of social relations or neglect 
changes in preferences and tastes. Chapter 3.4 of the dissertation explores the extent to which 
these explanations can account for a negative relationship between TV consumption and 
subjective well-being. 
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2.6.4. Existing Evidence 
This section presents existing evidence that sheds light on whether TV consumption is 
rational or irrational in an economics sense.  
Economists are either silent on this topic or just assume that TV might be a prominent 
example for time-inconsistent behavior. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin use TV as an 
illustration to explain the main ideas in one of their theoretical papers on self-control: 
“[P]eople have self-control problems in the form of a present bias: our short-term inclinations 
of what to do – watching TV rather than studying – often don’t accord with our own 
assessment of what is in our long-term best interests – studying rather than watching TV. The 
point is not that watching TV is necessarily a worse way to spend one’s time than studying 
game theory. Rather, the point is that there is a meaningful sense in which people may wish 
they would study rather than watch TV, and yet they watch TV” (O'Donoghue and Rabin 
2005, p. 2). However, the authors do not provide any empirical evidence that (some) people 
really watch more TV than is in their long-term interest. 
Some psychologists have gone into this issue by analyzing if and why TV can be habit-
forming or even addictive. According to their research, the more one sits in front of the TV 
screen, the lower is one’s concentration, one becomes more passive and, because the mental 
challenge decreases, the activity is increasingly evaluated to be less enjoyable and less 
worthwhile. Stress is reduced during TV viewing, but not afterwards. Many people therefore 
continue to sit in front of the TV set, even when the activity is no longer considered to be 
pleasurable (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990; 2002). Over the long run, fantasy is 
diminished, raising dependence on external stimuli (Kubey 1996). As is the case with other 
addictions (e.g. drugs, see Becker and Murphy 1988), this reduces the marginal utility of a 
given input, in the case of TV of a given hour of viewing.  
However, empirical research about television’s addictive features is scarce. McIlwraith and 
coauthors study self-labeled TV addicts and find that they are more neurotic, introverted, and 
easily bored than the comparison group and use television more often as distraction from 
unpleasant thoughts and bad moods (McIlwraith et al. 1991; McIlwraith 1998). Yet, whether 
watching TV can really be addictive in a medical or psychological sense is open to discussion. 
Finn (1992) does not find an analogy between drug dependence and TV dependence. Smith 
(1986) also finds no evidence for such a dependence. While a very small number of 
participants think they are addicted to TV, they do not exhibit the classical symptoms of being 
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dependent on noxious substances, such as drugs. In contrast, using the criteria of the 
diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders of the American Psychiatric Association 
(DSM-IV), which are used in the diagnosis of substance dependence, Kubey (1996) concludes 
that, according to these criteria, many individuals can theoretically be considered to be 
dependent on TV consumption. However, Kubey does not test his assumption empirically. 
Horvath (2004) constructs a special measurement scale for television addiction based on 
exactly those criteria and concludes that, according to this scale, the amount of television 
viewing is positively associated with television dependence. 
Even if TV watching were to be considered an addiction, according to standard economic 
theory, the consumption choice does not necessarily have to be irrational or suboptimal. In the 
model of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988), addicts maximize their current and 
future utility under stable preferences. Yet, the more recent work on time-inconsistent 
preferences cited above questions exactly this rationality assumption in the case of addictive 
goods. 
Additionally, there is some (anecdotal) evidence that individuals may have self-control 
problems regarding TV consumption. 40% of US adults and 70% of US teenagers admit that 
they watch too much TV (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 2002). Some individuals totally 
abstain from watching TV because they know that they would not otherwise be able to control 
their television viewing behavior. They cancel their subscription for cable TV in order not to 
“zap” too much, lock their TV set away in a cupboard or place an uncomfortable chair in front 
of it. Such self-control mechanisms are not necessary for time consistent individuals. To 
lower the utility, or raise the cost, of an undesired alternative would be irrelevant and 
unnecessary. 
In sum, television consumption features many characteristics – in economic terms high 
immediate marginal rewards at low immediate marginal costs but high future costs – that may 
render it tempting. Hence, self-control is needed to resist this temptation; and if people have 
problems controlling themselves they may watch more TV than they consider beneficial for 
themselves. Ultimately, whether individuals act in their own best interest and are rational in 
an economic sense or not is an empirical question. In the next part of this thesis, this issue is 
explored by analyzing the relationship between TV consumption and subjective well-being. 
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3. Television Consumption and Subjective Well-Being 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As was shown in the previous part of this thesis, TV watching is a very time-consuming 
activity, carried out by most people in the majority of countries. Analyzing the effects of 
television consumption on subjective well-being is therefore not only interesting, but also of 
considerable relevance. The case for important effects of TV on well-being can be made on 
two levels. First, at the individual level, it can be suspected that people watch more TV than is 
in their long-term interest because they are subject to self-control problems and mispredict the 
future consequences of their consumption choice, as has been argued in chapter 2.6. Second, 
at the level of society it can be argued that TV consumption has negative external effects 
independent of individual television watching choice being rational or not. Such externalities 
ultimately lead to lower average well-being.  
Much research has already gone into this second field. There is, for example, a large literature 
in the social sciences on the negative effects of TV viewing on society, in particular its effect 
on promoting violence (see e.g. Gunter 1994; Martin and Smith 1997; Johnson et al. 2002; 
Sparks and Sparks 2002). Another aspect, namely the negative effect of the expansion of 
television over time on social capital, is studied by Putnam (1995; 2000). He argues that, 
while TV (and more generally electronic entertainment technology) enables individual tastes 
to be satisfied more fully, it occurs at the cost of positive social externalities associated with 
types of entertainment where people get together with other people, as happens with bowling. 
However, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship. Yet, support for Putnam’s thesis 
comes from a recent paper by Olken (2008). He studies the – plausibly exogenous – 
differences in TV signal reception in Indonesian villages due to topographical reasons and 
finds that better signal reception is associated with more TV consumption and substantially 
lower levels of participation in local social and political activities. There are also a few studies 
attempting to isolate causality by analyzing the natural experiment of the introduction of TV. 
A certain Canadian city was unable to receive any TV signals up until 1973 due to its location 
in a steep valley. Otherwise, it was similar to two cities in the vicinity used as control cases. A 
study by Williams (1986) suggests that the introduction of TV crowded out other activities, in 
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particular those outside the home, such as sports’ activities and visiting clubs.49 Another study 
by Hennigan et al. (1982), based on a natural experiment, takes a look at the advent of TV in 
the United States which, due to technical reasons, took place at different times in different 
places. Petty crime, but not violent crime, increased. Looking at the same time period in the 
US, Gentzkow (2006) finds that the advent of TV reduced voter turnout.50 
However interesting this second channel from television consumption on well-being may be, 
this part of the thesis concentrates on the first channel: Do people directly hurt their own well-
being because they watch too much TV according to their own evaluation? Or do people just 
watch as much TV as they do because it provides them with considerable utility as would be 
advocated by standard economic theory? As has been put forward in chapter 2.6, the case for 
mistakes in TV consumption choice can be formulated within a systematic framework: 
Individuals may be subject to a self-control problem, mainly induced by the fact that watching 
TV offers immediate benefits (e.g. entertainment and relaxation) at very low immediate 
marginal costs. Many costs (e.g. not enough sleep, underinvestment in social contacts, 
education or career) are only experienced in the future. Individuals with time-inconsistent 
preferences are therefore unable to adhere to the amount of TV viewing they planned or 
which, in retrospect, they would consider optimal for themselves. This tendency is aggravated 
when people mispredict future costs because they underestimate utility from socializing and 
neglect changes in preferences due to TV consumption. Extensive TV viewing is therefore, 
                                                 
49 Other interesting results of this study are that TV reduced the reading abilities and creative thinking of 
children and fostered more aggressive behavior and stereotyped ideas about gender roles. TV also reduced the 
problem solving capacities of adults. These results might be relevant for effects of TV on well-being on 
individual as well as on social level. 
50 Further, however theoretical, support for externalities of TV comes from Corneo (2005). He analyzes the 
possible external effects associated with the individual allocation of work and leisure time. The positive 
correlation between time spent working and time spent watching TV in 11 OECD-countries is explained by the 
existence of multiple equilibria. Individual utility maximization produces two different but stable equilibria. In 
one set of countries, there are more intensive social contacts, and people work less and watch less TV. In another 
set of countries, people work more. As a consequence, social contacts are difficult to coordinate, and people 
therefore watch more TV, which requires no such coordination. Due to these external effects, individually 
rational behavior may lead to higher TV consumption than would be Pareto efficient. Equilibria can be inversely 
Pareto ranked by their amount of television viewing. 
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according to this view, the result of mispredicting utility and a self-control problem, leading 
to a lower level of individual utility than what could be achieved. 
It is very difficult to discriminate between a theory of optimal TV watching and a theory of 
over-consumption based on observed behavior. How is it possible to assess from the outside 
whether, for example, three or four hours TV viewing a day are too much and are actually 
regretted by the consumer? There is also no conclusive information about optimal 
consumption behavior in TV viewers’ reaction to price changes. Whether or not people 
consistently allocate their time and income, they will react to relative price changes in the 
consumption of TV watching in the direction predicted by standard economics. A person's 
observed behavior indicates that he/she is subject to self-control problems only if that person 
adheres to external commitment devices that limit the future choice sets. Yet, there exists only 
anecdotal and no systematic evidence for the use of such self-commitment devices (e.g. 
people put an uncomfortable chair in front of their TV or cancel their cable subscription in 
order not to watch too much TV or even get rid of their TV set). 
We pursue a completely different approach and propose data on subjective well-being to 
study whether people make systematic mistakes in their choice of time devoted to TV 
watching. Reported subjective well-being or life satisfaction can serve as a proxy for 
experienced utility as suggested by happiness research. Based on this methodology, it is in 
principle possible to study whether higher TV consumption lowers an individual’s utility or 
well-being as suggested by the pessimistic view about people’s TV watching. In our analysis, 
we explore to what extent standard information on individual TV consumption and subjective 
well-being can inform the debate. 
The empirical analysis studies data from the first two waves of the European Social Survey. 
This is an exceptionally rich data set that provides information for almost 90,000 people from 
27 different countries for 2002 to 2006. The baseline econometric estimate lends support to 
the hypothesis of over-consumption: excessive TV viewers, on average, report lower life 
satisfaction. This negative correlation holds even after controlling for a large number of 
covariates of individual well-being. 
A negative correlation between TV consumption and subjective well-being could, however, 
well be the result of reverse causation. It is quite plausible that unhappy people watch more 
TV than happy people. It is in fact interesting in its own right to understand whether people 
resort to TV watching when they are unhappy. If TV viewing serves as a substitute act (e.g. 
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for human relationships or more active forms of leisure for the lonely and bored) and involves 
negative long-term consequences for well-being, the negative correlation might even be the 
result of a self-enforcing vicious circle. These causality issues can neither be resolved with an 
extensive set of control variables in a multiple regression analysis nor with panel data.51 
Instead one would want to study large scale changes in people’s opportunities to watch TV 
that are set from outside. We are not aware that suitable data, such as a natural experiment, 
exist. Instead three other aspects of the interrelation between TV consumption and subjective 
well-being are studied: (i) whether TV viewing affects people’s preferences and beliefs, (ii) 
whether the utility costs of extensive TV consumption depend on the opportunity cost of time 
and (iii) whether a more attractive offering in the form of more TV channels leads to a higher 
utility loss because self-control problems are aggravated. 
With regard to the first aspect, we study in a path analysis whether people who watch more 
TV report to a greater extent preferences and beliefs that are negatively correlated with 
subjectively perceived well-being. The results indicate that watching TV is positively related 
to people’s material aspirations, as well as to anxiety levels, and negatively related to their 
financial satisfaction and trust in others, as well as the perceived relative frequency of social 
activities. 
Second, it is explored whether mainly people with significant opportunity costs of time regret 
the amount of time they spend watching TV. The problem is hypothesized to primarily affect 
people with flexible working hours, who can freely transmit time between leisure and work. 
In contrast, people with low opportunity costs of time, such as retired or unemployed people, 
or individuals with fixed working hours, are little burdened by their lack of willpower, and 
therefore experience no significant utility loss, even if they spend many hours in front of a 
TV. In fact, we find that particularly individuals with severe time constraints, who watch TV 
for many hours, report lower life satisfaction. For people with low opportunity cost of time, 
we measure no negative effect on reported satisfaction with life from watching TV. 
While more choice potentially raises individual welfare (if people are able to rationally 
maximize utility, as is assumed in the traditional economic framework), with regard to the last 
aspect, it is hypothesized that people with severe self-control problems suffer a utility loss 
when having more TV channels to choose from. The positive effect from a potentially better 
                                                 
51 The estimation of an individual fixed effects model based on panel data filters out the precise time-invariant 
self-control problem we would be interested in. 
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match between TV programs and individual preferences is more than offset by the loss of 
well-being resulting from over-consumption. We indeed find a statistically significant 
negative interaction term between (residual) TV viewing and the number of TV channels, and 
calculate a negative marginal effect for additional TV channels on the well-being of heavy 
viewers. This is consistent with the hypothesis of limited self-control. 
Hence, this part of the thesis shows that for a major human activity in modern life – television 
consumption – individual behavior cannot be fully understood if consumer sovereignty is 
simply taken for granted. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that TV viewing is an 
activity over which individuals have systematically incomplete foresight and control. The 
utility gained is lower than what it could be.  
Chapter 3.2 reviews the existing literature on TV and subjective well-being, including the few 
studies undertaken in economics, and develops the basic testing strategy. The following 
chapter 3.3 presents the basic econometric estimates. The next three chapters deal with the 
possibility of reverse causation and address the role of changes in preferences and beliefs, of 
opportunity costs of time, and of number of TV channels. Chapter 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2. Literature and Testing Strategy  
3.2.1. Literature on Television Consumption and Subjective Well-being 
There already exist some studies looking at the utility provided by TV consumption, which 
can be assessed in several ways.52 The first approach captures the short run or instant affects 
by measuring activity enjoyment ratings. In the context of time use studies, individuals are 
asked to rate TV viewing compared to other leisure time activities. In the United States, in 
1985, with a rating of 7.8 on a scale from 0 to 10, TV consumption proved to be valued 
somewhat higher than the average enjoyment of 7 derived from other activities. Nevertheless, 
it ranks lower than most other activities undertaken in leisure time (Robinson and Godbey 
1999: 243). On the index of positive affect of 900 Texan women constructed by Kahneman 
and co-workers (2004b) using the day reconstruction method (DRM), TV ranks with 4.2 (on a 
scale from 0 to 6) roughly in the middle of all activities. With 2.2 hours per week, it is one of 
the most time consuming activities of these women. With the experience sampling method, 
participants are randomly asked how they feel at a particular moment in time, using a beeper 
or a hand-held computer. On an affect scale, composed of cheerfulness, friendliness, 
happiness, and sociability, TV viewing is located in the lower part of the scale and can hardly 
be distinguished from reading, working, hobbies and idling. Eating, social contacts, sports and 
sex, on the other hand, are clearly higher ranked. Nevertheless, individuals have little 
inclination to do anything else (Kubey and Csikszentmihalyi 1990). These short-run 
evaluations capture the momentary affect, but the total utility derived by individuals, 
including opportunity costs, is difficult to evaluate with these measures.  
Some studies analyze more general satisfaction with TV, independent of a particular moment 
of watching it. In a survey undertaken in 1975 in the United States, TV consumption was 
given an average rating of 5.9 points on an enjoyment scale ranging from 0 to 10. It ranks 
considerably behind most other leisure time activities and below the average of 6.8 of all rated 
activities. In 1995, TV viewing with 4.8 points ranked even lower when compared to all other 
leisure time pursuits. Surprisingly enough, women even rated it below cleaning and men 
below cooking (Robinson and Godbey 1999, p. 243, p. 250). But such surveys are faced with 
the problem that watching TV is associated with a low (“couch potato”) image. For that 
                                                 
52 For a review of general concepts and measurements of utility and subjective well-being, see, e.g., Frey and 
Luechinger (2007). 
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reason, the answers given may reflect what is taken to be socially desirable. It should be noted 
that surveys on general life satisfaction (as used in our study) are not affected by this bias. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that short-term and long-term evaluations of TV 
watching tend to diverge, or as Robinson and Godbey (1999, p. 299) put it: “We may not 
enjoy television in general, but the programs we saw last night were pretty good.” 
Several studies relate TV viewing to general subjective well-being. In a study of roughly 
3,000 Americans in 1979 (Morgan 1984), people watching a lot of TV considered their life to 
be more “lousy” on an index consisting of the aspects lonely, boring, depressing, unsatisfying, 
uneventful and unhappy, and less “great” on an index consisting of the aspects interesting, 
active, meaningful, fun, fulfilling, stimulating and exciting, compared with people watching 
less TV. This relationship remains statistically significant when controlling for socio-
demographic characteristics. There is, however, no such relationship between TV 
consumption and a “calm” life, composed of the dimensions happy, comfortable, pleasant, 
good, secure and peaceful. Using a small sub-sample from the General Social Survey in 1975, 
a discriminant analysis reveals that non-viewers (that is, according to the definition of the 
authors, people watching less than half an hour a day) are less satisfied with family life and 
are in general more happy than viewers (Tankard and Harris 1980). In a random survey of 
1,000 West Germans, there is also a negative correlation between the duration of TV viewing 
and general life satisfaction, controlling for size of household, education and age. The authors 
(Espe and Seiwert 1987) postulate a causal influence of dissatisfaction with life on TV 
consumption, but offer no corresponding evidence. In another study for Germany, based on 
the German Socio-Economic Panel, a curvilinear relationship between the number of hours 
spent watching TV and life satisfaction is found (Jegen and Frey 2004). Moderate TV 
consumption is related to higher life satisfaction than no consumption or extensive 
consumption. Based on panel information, short-term individual variation in TV consumption 
is not correlated with overall life satisfaction in an economically relevant manner.  
Economic research on happiness (see the surveys in Frey and Stutzer 2002a; b) emphasizes 
that evaluations are relative. Subjective well-being depends on one’s relative income 
compared to the reference group and on the difference between actual and aspired income 
(Frank 1999; Easterlin 2001; Stutzer 2004). TV brings other people’s lives into one’s own 
home, so that one’s reference group may extend far beyond the immediate neighborhood. 
Moreover, what is shown on TV as “reality” is far from representative; rich people and luxury 
tend to be overrepresented (Lichter et al. 1994). Based on this idea, Layard (2005) studies the 
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relationship between TV consumption, perceived relative income and happiness by using data 
from the US General Social Survey. His multiple regression estimates suggest that TV 
viewing has a negative effect on subjective well-being, partly due to a direct effect and partly 
due to an indirect effect through subjectively perceived relative income. Similar results are 
found by Bruni and Stanca (2006) who argue that TV viewing raises income aspirations 
leading to lower life satisfaction. A recent cross-sectional study (Shrum et al. 2003) is also in 
line with these results. Using a sample of 321 Americans, a statistically significant negative 
relationship between TV consumption and life satisfaction is found. This is mainly due to the 
positive correlation between TV consumption and materialism, which is in turn negatively 
related to life satisfaction (see also Kasser 2002). However, the authors only use age and a 
scale for “socially desired responding” as controls and causality is unclear. A similar negative 
correlation is found in an earlier study (Sirgy et al. 1998), comparing the situation in the 
United States and Canada, Australia, Turkey and China. The extent of TV viewing is 
positively linked with materialism and negatively linked with life satisfaction in the USA, but 
much less so in the other countries. Another study analyzing a moderating variable between 
TV consumption and life satisfaction finds that watching TV crowds out relational activities 
and therefore decreases life satisfaction (Bruni and Stanca 2008). 
While a handful of studies exist that analyze the relationship between TV consumption and 
subjective well-being, the causality issue has not received much attention (with the exception 
of the few economic studies that highlight some specific aspect of the relationship between 
TV and well-being). The general notion of irrationality or self-control problems in connection 
with TV consumption has not been systematically studied in connection with subjective well-
being. In the following, we therefore attempt to provide a broad empirical account of the 
relationship between television consumption and life satisfaction based on a systematic 
economic framework that is presented below. 
3.2.2. Basic Hypothesis and Testing Strategy 
Self-control and time inconsistency 
Standard economics assumes that people have no self-control problems, and that they are able 
to make decisions based on their long-term preferences. Hence, consuming goods and 
pursuing activities that some people consider an addiction, or at least a bad habit, such as 
smoking cigarettes, watching a high amount of TV, or constantly eating fast food, are 
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considered a rational act. Contrary to this view, many people judge their own and other 
people’s consumption behavior as irrational, in the sense that they think they would be better 
off if they consumed less of some goods. Goods offering immediate benefits at negligible 
immediate marginal costs are generally tempting. As has been shown in chapter 2.6.1, the 
psychological literature offers a large body of evidence of low self-control (for an overview 
see e.g. Baumeister and Heatherton 1996). In economics, such inconsistent time preferences 
are most prominently formulated in models of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting (see, e.g., 
Laibson 1997). A low discount factor (i.e., a discount factor decreased by ,   (0,1)) is 
applied between the present moment and some time in the near future and a constant discount 
factor  thereafter (for a review, see Frederick et al. 2002 and section 2.6.2). Self-control 
problems might be aggravated when people do not correctly predict the future consequences 
of their decisions (see section 2.6.3).  
Decision utility versus experienced utility 
Based on revealed preference, it is however difficult to discriminate between the view of TV 
consumers as rational actors and the view of consumers facing self-control problems or 
mispredicting future utility.53 Therefore, two extensions of the traditional emphasis on ex ante 
evaluation and observed decision are pursued. In the first extension, the standard economic 
concept of decision utility is complemented by the concept of experienced utility (Kahneman 
et al. 1997). The latter refers to an individual’s evaluation of actual experiences in terms of 
positive and negative affects or in terms of satisfaction. This distinction between decision and 
experienced utility makes it possible that the ordering of experiences systematically diverges 
from the ordering of options derived from observed behavior. The second extension is closely 
related to the first, and emphasizes ex post evaluations as a valuable source of information 
about the possibility of bounded rationality in people’s decision-making. How do people fare 
after they have made decisions? If temptation interferes with people’s decision making or if 
people do not completely foresee the consequences of their actions, there might well be a gap 
between what individuals do and what they like. 
                                                 
53 We are aware that there are specific situations in which the standard economic model rules out certain types of 
behavior and mere observation of a certain action rejects the standard economic model. There are some studies 
successfully pursuing this approach. Two important examples that document the kind of behavior where the 
standard model does not apply are DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), who examine gym attendance under 
different contracts, and Skiba and Tobacman (2008), who show that certain types of payday loans would always 
be rejected by time-consistent individuals. 
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This poses the question of how the (normative) standard is ascertained, and whether 
seemingly irrational behavior should be judged welfare reducing because it violates certain 
time consistency criteria. While there is an extended debate on this issue (see, e.g., Bernheim 
and Rangel 2005; Read 2006) we use people’s own evaluation as a standard. This standard is 
operationalized in terms of individuals’ judgments of their overall subjective well-being, 
rather than how they evaluate options when faced with a particular decision. 
Basic hypothesis: watching too much TV 
Hence, it is hypothesized that TV consumption is such a case where people are subject to self-
control problems and where decision utility and experience utility might diverge. Immediate 
marginal costs of watching TV are extremely low and many costs only arise in the future 
which makes it tempting for people to watch more TV than they planned to or consider 
optimal ex post. For people facing similar restrictions, heavy TV viewing therefore indicates 
impeded self-control and misprediction of future costs rather than a taste for TV. 
Accordingly, heavy TV consumption is expected to result in lower experienced utility. This 
hypothesis has, of course, to be understood ceteris paribus. Individual utility depends on a 
large number of other factors, which have to be taken into account in order to identify the 
specific effect of TV on utility. In the empirical analysis, experienced utility is proxied by life 
satisfaction, and the effects are partial, controlling for major socio-demographic factors 
normally included in a happiness equation (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002a; b). 
Testing strategy 
The conceptual framework of decision utility and experienced utility is summarized in a 
graphical analysis of a simple two-period model and extended to illustrate the empirical 
testing strategy. We highlight the case where people have time-inconsistent preferences. The 
analysis would however lead to similar implications for the case of utility misprediction, i.e., 
for a general underestimation of future costs.  
Hence, an individual decides on the consumption of x, here the amount of time devoted to TV 
viewing, based on the enjoyment of x, i.e., utility u(x) in period 1, and the future costs c(x) in 
period 2, discounted by a factor . This reflects that benefits are experienced instantaneously, 
with zero immediate costs. The costs resulting from TV consumption are largely experienced 
in the future (see chapter 2.6). In this choice situation, with TV viewing offering instant 
benefits at negligible immediate marginal costs, time inconsistency may arise. At the outset, a 
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consumer (i.e., in period 0) plans to spend x* minutes watching TV, equalizing marginal 
benefits and marginal future costs, i.e., u’(x)=*c’(x) representing the first order condition. 
However, when faced with the actual decision about TV consumption and the temptation of 
immediate gratification, future costs are only partly taken into account by individuals with 
time-inconsistent preferences (here by a factor   (0,1)) and the consumption plan is revised 
so as to equalize u’(x)=**c’(x). People who lack the self-control to maintain their original 
plans end up consuming xc, i.e., more than they consider optimal for themselves in the long-
run, and experience an individual welfare loss, while people without self-control problems 
stick to the planned consumption level x*. 
Figure 6 illustrates this situation for a specific set of preferences. It shows x*, the planned 
consumption, and xc, the actual consumption level chosen by an individual with a self-control 
problem, i.e., by an individual with 0<1. The triangle ABC indicates the individual welfare 
loss due to over-consumption. Total experienced utility over the two periods is lower than 
what it could be if x* were consumed. 
 
Figure 6: The Loss of Experienced Utility with Time Inconsistent Preferences 
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Based on people’s reported judgment of their overall satisfaction with life, it is now, in 
principle, possible to directly capture the welfare loss. For otherwise similar people, the 
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subjective well-being of heavy TV viewers can be compared with the subjective well-being of 
moderate viewers, and the difference can be attributed to systematic errors in consumption 
due to a lack of willpower. This basic relationship is estimated in chapter 3.3.  
However, with this approach it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between TV 
consumption and subjective well-being. An omitted variable bias could occur because 
unobserved individual differences, like being an introvert, might well be related to lower 
subjective well-being and higher TV consumption, regardless of any self-control problem. 
Reverse causation is possible: unhappy people might spend more time watching TV. Finally, 
preference heterogeneity with regard to TV viewing might be directly related to people’s 
reports of their subjective well-being. 
We argue that these empirical challenges can be overcome in a refined approach studying 
differences in the restrictions television consumers face. We outline two cases: a) where lower 
opportunity costs of time lead to a lower welfare loss due to overconsumption for consumers 
with time inconsistent preferences; and b) where an extended opportunity set, here the number 
of available TV channels, decreases the experienced utility of consumers with a severe self-
control problem.54 
Figure 7 offers a graphical analysis that illustrates the first case. Two different levels of 
marginal costs of television consumption are shown: c1’(x) and c2’(x). An individual with 
time-inconsistent preferences and high opportunity costs of time c1’(x) would like to 
consume, both ex ante and ex post, the amount of TV x1* but ends up consuming x1c due to 
the self-control problem, i.e., 0<1. As in Figure 6, her welfare loss due to the 
overconsumption is represented by area ABC. For a time-inconsistent individual with low 
time opportunity costs c2’(x), both the optimal level x2* and the actually chosen level x1c of 
TV consumption are much higher. However, the loss in experienced utility due to the 
overconsumption (area DEF) is much lower than with high opportunity costs of time (in the 
case of the specific costs and preferences shown in Figure 7). 
 
                                                 
54 This analysis is related to the one by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), who show in a theoretical model that 
more choice among tasks with immediate costs and future benefits can lead to more severe procrastination, and 
that a person might procrastinate more when pursuing important goals rather than unimportant ones. Our 
analysis is much simpler and emphasizes the case in which a more attractive alternative with immediate benefits 
and future costs might lead to more severe myopic behavior. 
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Figure 7: The Loss of Experienced Utility with Time Inconsistent Preferences for Individuals 
with different Opportunity Costs of Time 
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In chapter 3.5, we compare the relationship between TV viewing and life satisfaction for 
people with different time opportunity costs controlling for other major determinants of 
subjective well-being. A large negative effect of TV consumption on life satisfaction for 
individuals with high opportunity costs of time compared to a small or no negative effect for 
individuals with low opportunity costs of time can then be attributed to self-control problems. 
In such a case, reverse causation is much less plausible than in the case of just looking at the 
basic relationship between TV consumption and subjective well-being. There is no obvious 
explanation for why unhappy people with high opportunity costs would revert to TV watching 
while unhappy people with low opportunity costs would not. 
Figure 8 illustrates the second idea to identify self-control problems with television viewing. 
An expansion of the choice set, i.e., a higher number of TV channels, is represented by an 
increase in the marginal utility of TV consumption from u1’(x) to u2’(x). An individual with 
time-consistent preferences increases TV consumption from x1* to x2* and experienced utility 
is increased by the area ADG. For an individual with time-inconsistent preferences, there are 
two effects on experienced utility resulting from the shift in marginal utility. First, 
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experienced utility from the initial amount of TV viewing is increased, as more TV channels 
are assumed to mean more variety and better preference satisfaction. In other words, 
consumer surplus is increased, reflected by the area BHG.55 Second, the increased 
attractiveness of TV viewing leads to a revision of consumption plans. At this stage, an 
expansion of the opportunity set might reduce overall experienced utility. As people with a 
self-control problem undervalue future costs when faced with the decision of turning their TV 
on or off, they increase consumption more than would be optimal. Again, they realize a level 
of experienced utility that is below what they could experience if they could optimally choose 
TV consumption. The reduction in experienced utility due to a further increase in 
consumption amounts to the area CHEF. Whether more opportunities make people with a 
self-control problem worse off overall depends on the relative size of the two effects on 
people’s experienced utility. In Figure 8, for the particular combination of marginal utility, 
marginal costs and , CHEF is larger than BHG.  
 
Figure 8: Gains and Losses in Experienced Utility due to a More Attractive Technology 
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55 Area BHG consists of two parts: ADG is the increase in actual consumer surplus and ABHD is part of the 
former welfare loss that is now offset. 
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In chapter 3.6, we use the possibility of a negative net effect as a testing strategy to identify 
self-control problems in TV consumption. It is hypothesized that the experienced utility of 
people with a severe self-control problem in TV viewing is reduced when they have access to 
a larger number of TV channels. We are aware that this is a conservative test and that the 
threshold is set high to reject the rationality hypothesis. Even if nobody loses from an 
increased opportunity set, there might still be over-consumption. However, the over-
consumption cannot be detected, either by revealed behavior or by studying reported 
subjective well-being. 
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3.3. Basic Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1. Data and Empirical Specification 
In order to empirically address the basic hypothesis of TV over-consumption, we use the 
same data as in chapter 2 (the first two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS)56). The 
ESS was carried out in 27 European countries in 2002/2003 and 2004-2006. In each country, 
a range of 600 to 3,000 people were interviewed in each wave. For 688 observations, data for 
life satisfaction or TV viewing are missing, resulting in a sample of 89,208 observations. 
In addition to life satisfaction and television viewing time, the ESS includes a large number of 
socio-demographic characteristics. Control variables to be used are logarithmic household 
income (adjusted for comparative price57), household size (square root), gender, age, age 
squared, marital status, children, employment status, education, working hours, working hours 
squared, citizenship and area of living. For descriptive statistics see Table A3 in the 
Appendix. 
The dependent variable life satisfaction is the response to the question: “All things 
considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays?” Answers are given on 
an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (“extremely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”) 
(Figure 9). The average life satisfaction amounts to 6.9 (standard deviation 2.3).  
 
Figure 9: Reported Life Satisfaction in 27 European Countries 2002-2006 
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Data source: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005). 
                                                 
56 For a description of the data see Jowell et al. (2003; 2005). 
57 Data on comparative price levels are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 
several years). 
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This average varies considerably between countries, and ranges from 4.3 in the Ukraine up to 
8.5 in Iceland (Figure 10). It is sometimes doubted that such life satisfaction data are 
comparable between nations, as the answers might partly reflect cultural differences. To 
control for such unobserved differences, we include country/wave-fixed effects in the 
regression analysis. 
 
Figure 10: Average Reported Life Satisfaction in 27 European Countries 2002-2006 
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Note: Average reported life satisfaction on a scale from 0 (“extremely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“extremely 
satisfied”). 
Data source: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005). 
 
Television consumption is also captured by one single question: “On an average weekday, 
how much time do you spend watching television?” Answers are given in 8 categories, 
ranging from “no time at all” to “more than three hours”. For descriptive statistics see chapter 
2.4 as well as Table A3 in the Appendix, and for a critical evaluation of the data see chapter 
2.3. 
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Based on the data described, a microeconomic happiness function is specified. The life 
satisfactioni of individual i depends on his or her television consumption TVi and on personal 
characteristics Xi, as well as on country specific effects Dj in country j58 and year fixed effects 
Yt: 
 
Life satisfactioni = 0 + 1 TVi + 1 Xi + 2 Dj + 3 Yt + i 
 
As the extent of television consumption is captured in a categorical variable with an open-
ended category for those spending a lot of time watching TV, TV consumption cannot be 
included as a continuous variable. Instead, we include dummy variables in the regression 
equation. Those who watch less than half an hour of television a day form the reference 
group. In order to simplify the analysis, the 6 original categories for people who watch more 
than half an hour of TV a day are combined into 3 categories with the highest category 
including people who watch more than 2.5 hours TV a day. 
3.3.2. Estimation Results 
Table 9 reports the partial correlation between TV consumption and reported life satisfaction. 
The first specification applies an ordinary least squares estimator. In view of the categorical 
nature of the dependent variable, a second specification is added, estimating an ordered 
probit. The similarities in the relative size and statistical significance of the coefficients 
indicate that the least squares estimator delivers – with some exceptions – a satisfactory 
overall approximation. As the least squares results are easier to interpret, we discuss primarily 
these results and mention the differences to the ordered probit estimation where applicable. 
People who watch less than half an hour of TV a day are more satisfied with their life, ceteris 
paribus, than people who choose any other level of TV consumption. For those watching TV 
for anything between half an hour and 2.5 hours, average reported life satisfaction is about 
0.05 points lower than in the reference group of people watching for less than half an hour. 
The estimated effect is even larger for people watching for more than 2.5 hours a day. On 
average, they report a 0.14 points lower life satisfaction than people in the reference group. 
The coefficient for the highest TV viewing category is statistically significantly different from 
                                                 
58 Countries covered in both waves of the ESS are treated as separate entities; i.e. country/wave dummies are 
included into the regression. The empirical results are however robust to the inclusion of country dummies. 
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zero at the 99% level. The coefficients for 0.5 to 2.5 hours are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels in the OLS regression. They are however significant at the 99% level in 
the ordered probit regression. The general finding is thus consistent with the basic hypothesis 
that extensive TV watching makes people worse off because it indicates over-consumption 
due to a self-control problem and misprediction of future costs. 
 
Table 9: Television Consumption and Life Satisfaction 
Dependent variable: OLS Orderd probit 
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value Coefficient z-value 
TV consumption      
No TV at all -0.065  -1.33 -0.002  -0.07 
Less than 0.5 hour TV Reference group 
0.5 to 1.5 hours TV -0.049  -1.54 -0.044 ** -2.77 
More than 1.5 to 2.5 hours TV -0.040  -1.26 -0.049 ** -3.04 
More than 2.5 hours TV -0.137 ** -4.21 -0.081 ** -4.95 
Individual/household characteristics      
ln (household income, PPP) 0.347 ** 30.49 0.156 ** 27.35 
Working hours 0.002  1.39 0.001  1.47 
Working hours, squared -0.00005 ** -3.31 -0.00002 ** -2.85 
Age -0.071 ** -25.53 -0.035 ** -24.94 
Age, squared 0.0007 ** 25.34 0.0003 ** 24.93 
Male Reference group 
Female 0.106 ** 7.03 0.065 ** 8.60 
Foreigner Reference group 
Citizen of country 0.298 ** 8.23 0.147 ** 8.09 
No children at home Reference group 
Children living at home -0.156 ** -7.37 -0.087 ** -8.24 
Marital status  
Married, with partner Reference group 
Married, without partner -0.766 ** -6.68 -0.361 ** -6.28 
Separated, with partner -0.472 ** -3.80 -0.238 * -3.85 
Separated, without partner -0.906 ** -14.37 -0.438 ** -13.94 
Divorced, with partner -0.291 ** -5.22 -0.142 ** -5.09 
Divorced, without partner -0.650 ** -19.62 -0.314 ** -18.95 
Widowed, with partner -0.334 ** -3.00 -0.131 * -2.33 
Widowed, without partner -0.558 ** -18.52 -0.276 ** -18.27 
Single, with partner -0.277 ** -8.38 -0.145 ** -8.73 
Single, without partner -0.539 ** -20.82 -0.283 ** -21.85 
 
 
 
  Table to be continued 
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Continuation of Table 9      
Education      
Not completed primary education -0.382 ** -9.81 -0.178 ** -9.18 
Primary or first stage of basic education Reference group 
Lower secondary or second stage of 
basic education 
0.062 * 2.47 0.027 * 2.14 
Upper secondary education 0.170 ** 6.85 0.062 ** 4.99 
Post secondary, non-tertiary education 0.306 ** 8.37 0.125 ** 6.85 
First stage of tertiary education 0.319 ** 10.88 0.120 ** 8.17 
Second stage of tertiary education 0.369 ** 9.09 0.132 ** 6.51 
Employment status  
Paid work, employed Reference group 
Paid work, self-employed 0.044  1.55 0.026 (*) 1.83 
Unemployed, looking for a job -1.193 ** -29.95 -0.511 ** -25.68 
Unemployed, not looking for a job -0.811 ** -14.58 -0.343 ** -12.36 
In education 0.299 ** 8.82 0.149 ** 8.79 
Permanently sick or disabled -1.102 ** -22.17 -0.477 ** -19.25 
Retired -0.050 (*) -1.83 -0.008  -0.55 
Community or military service 0.149  1.04 0.089  1.23 
Housework, looking after children -0.014  -0.55 0.023 (*) 1.71 
Area of living  
Big city Reference group 
Suburbs -0.037  -1.44 -0.013  -1.02 
Town, small city 0.033  1.61 0.023 * 2.24 
Country village 0.145 ** 6.88 0.078 ** 7.39 
Farm, home in countryside 0.205 ** 5.99 0.114 ** 6.64 
Country/wave-fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Constant 6.566 ** 38.30    
Observations 89,208 89,208 
R-squared / Pseudo R-squared 0.21 0.05 
Notes: Variable for household size (square root) and dummy variable for the highest income category are not 
shown. Dummy variables indicating missing observations for income, household size, working hours, age, sex, 
citizenship, children, marital status, education, employment status and area of living are not shown as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005), World Development Indicators 
(World Bank several years). 
 
The partial correlation between TV consumption and life satisfaction is estimated for the 
whole population and is thus representative of an average effect of TV viewing across people. 
It is most likely that some groups of people suffer higher disutility from extensive TV 
consumption than others. In chapter 3.5, we formulate ex ante hypotheses (in contrast to ex 
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post rationalization) about people who are expected to lose the most if they watch TV 
extensively. 
The partial correlation cannot easily be explained as spurious, simply reflecting some specific 
individual characteristics of people who spend a lot of time in front of the TV. A large set of 
socio-demographic characteristics that relate systematically to reported life satisfaction and, 
possibly, to TV consumption as well is taken into consideration. These characteristics include, 
e.g., respondents’ age, sex, nationality, marital status, household income, level of education, 
and employment status. Several literature surveys discuss the correlation of these variables 
with reported life satisfaction (see, e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002b). Specifically for the ESS, the 
determinants of life satisfaction are investigated in Lelkes (2006). 
Partial correlations of other factors with life satisfaction allow for the assessment of the size 
of the effect of TV consumption in relative terms. For example, the difference in life 
satisfaction between those watching more than 2.5 hours and those watching less than half an 
hour (0.14) is about one-third of the difference in life satisfaction between people who have 
never been married and are without a partner and married people (0.54). The difference is 
almost as high as the one between people having upper secondary education and those who 
simply completed primary school or the first stage of basic education (0.17). Finally, the 
difference is about one-eighth of the life satisfaction differential between unemployed people 
looking for a job and people in paid work (1.19). 
3.3.3. Causality Issues 
So far, the negative partial correlation between TV consumption and subjective well-being 
has been interpreted in terms of over-consumption leading to a lower utility level. However, 
the partial correlation could well be the result of reverse causation. It is quite plausible that 
unhappy people watch more TV than happy ones. The problem can be attenuated by 
controlling for as many situational factors as possible in the regression equation. However, it 
cannot be resolved, neither with an extensive set of control variables in a multiple regression 
analysis nor with panel data.59 Ideally, one would need information about exogenous changes 
in the opportunities for TV consumption, e.g. due to satellite TV being shut down or due to 
                                                 
59 Panel data allow for the control of unobserved time-invariant individual specific factors that affect reported 
subjective well-being, as well as the explanatory variable of interest. This is not helpful in our analysis, because 
the entire theory is based on some people suffering from an unobserved time-invariant self-control problem. 
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TV being introduced in a new place as a result of technical innovation. We are not aware of 
any such event that could be connected to survey data on reported subjective well-being.  
We propose a different approach for further analysis of the effect of TV consumption on 
subjective well-being and for shedding light on the issue of causality. First, we provide 
evidence that relates extensive TV consumption to systematically different preferences and 
beliefs. This would support the view that there are long-term costs of TV consumption that 
are very difficult to foresee. Second, we formulate and test additional hypotheses exploiting 
the heterogeneity in the expected effect of TV over-consumption for groups of people with 
different opportunity costs of time. Third, we test whether people with a severe self-control 
problem suffer more if they have more choice and a more attractive TV offer, i.e., if they have 
more TV channels available.  
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3.4. TV Viewing and Differences in Preferences and Beliefs 
This section presents a first extension of the basic analysis on the statistical relationship 
between TV viewing and life satisfaction. A path analysis is conducted to get an idea of the 
different ways that TV consumption can affect life satisfaction. 
3.4.1. Utility Misprediction and TV Consumption 
When people make decisions about watching TV, they are expected (and assumed to be able) 
to assess and to adequately take into consideration for themselves the long-term costs of TV 
viewing. As has been discussed in chapter 2.6.3, recent research on the prediction of future 
utility challenges these assumption underlying the revealed behavior approach (for a survey 
see Wilson and Gilbert 2003). People systematically underestimate that their preferences 
change due to processes of adaptation (Loewenstein et al. 2003). Moreover, misprediction of 
utility is asymmetric, whereby the positive effects of a high material standard of living are 
overestimated and the positive effects of activities with strong intrinsic attributes, like 
socializing, are underestimated (Frey and Stutzer 2008). These aspects of mispredicting utility 
are directly relevant for TV consumption choice. People are expected to watch too much TV 
if they underestimate the future costs of TV viewing due to neglecting social contacts and 
rising material aspirations. We are aware that it is not possible to discriminate between 
limited self-control with perfect and with imperfect projection of future beliefs in the current 
empirical framework. However, we are convinced that it is important to take misprediction of 
utility into account when refining the analysis of TV consumption. 
Previous research has looked at the differences in beliefs and preferences between heavy and 
light TV viewers, induced by the fact that life portrayed on TV differs systematically from 
real life. Television programs contain much more violence and chaotic relationships and show 
many more affluent people and more luxury than exist in real life (e.g. Lichter et al. 1994). 
People who spend a lot of time watching TV therefore tend to overestimate crime rates, show 
more anxiety (Gerbner et al. 2002) as well as less trust in others (e.g. Gerbner et al. 1980; 
Signorielli et al. 1995). They overestimate the affluence of others (O'Guinn and Shrum 1997), 
report higher material aspirations (e.g. Richins 1987; Sirgy et al. 1998; Shrum et al. 2005; 
Bruni and Stanca 2006) and rate their own relative income lower, which is related to lower 
subjective well-being (Layard 2005). 
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3.4.2. Empirical Analysis 
Data and Specification 
We perform a path analysis to shed some light on the long-term consequences of TV 
consumption and how they correlate with subjective well-being. An analysis is made as to 
whether people who watch more TV report lower financial satisfaction (keeping household 
income constant) and tend to believe that it is important to be rich, whether they feel less safe 
or trust others less and whether they think that they participate less in social activities.  
We thereby use the same data set, the European Social Survey, as in chapter 3.3. Financial 
satisfaction is captured with the question “[…] how do you feel about your household’s 
income nowadays?” Answers are given on a scale from 1 (“living comfortably on present 
income”) to 4 (“very difficult on present income”), which we revert for the empirical analysis. 
Respondents indicate on a scale from 1 to 6 how important it is for them to be rich. They are 
asked how safe they feel walking in the local area after dark. Answers range from 1 (“very 
safe”) to 4 (“very unsafe”), and, again, we revert this scale in order to let higher values reflect 
a better feeling of safety. The answers to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” serve as a 
proxy for trust. Answers range on an 11-point scale from 0 (“you can’t be too careful”) to 10 
(“most people can be trusted”). Finally, respondents are asked: “Compared to other people of 
your age, how often would you say that you take part in social activities?” Answers range 
from 1 (“much less than most”) to 5 (“much more than most”). 
Based on this data, we estimate a path model with intervening variables. First, the effect of 
TV viewing on preferences and beliefs Mi is estimated separately for each of the analyzed 
preferences and beliefs. We again control for personal characteristics Xi, as well as for 
country/wave specific effects Dj and year fixed effects Yt. 
 
Mi = 0 + 1 TVi + 2 Xi + 3 Dj + 4 Yt + i 
 
Then, these intervening variables are included into the original life satisfaction regression 
presented in chapter 3.3, both separately and all five variables together. 
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Life satisfactioni = 0 + 1’ TVi +  Mi + 1 Xi + 2 Dj + 3 Yt + i 
 
If TV watching makes people unhappy because it changes, at least to some extent, their 
preferences and beliefs, then we should find a) that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between TV watching and the respective preference or belief (Mi), b) that there is 
a statistical relationship between the preference or belief and life satisfaction and c) that the 
direct relationship between watching TV and life satisfaction gets smaller when the variable 
measuring the preference or belief is included into the life satisfaction regression. This means 
that 1’ in the above specification should be statistically significantly smaller than 1 in the 
baseline regression.60 
Results 
Table 10 presents the ordinary least square estimates61 of the partial correlations between TV 
viewing and the different measures capturing people’s beliefs and preferences. The 
coefficients of the control variables are not explicitly shown. In all five estimations, the 
coefficients for watching more than 2.5 hours TV show the expected signs and are statistically 
significant at the 99% level: heavy TV viewers report lower satisfaction with their financial 
situation, place more importance on affluence, feel less safe, trust other people less and think 
that they are involved in less social activities than their peers. The effects are sizeable and (in 
relation to the respective scale of the dependent variable) are the largest for “importance of 
being rich” and “feeling of safety”. For intermediate levels of TV consumption, there are also 
positive effects on the importance of being rich and negative effects on the feeling of safety 
(statistically significant at the 95% to 99% level). There is no statistically significant 
correlation between intermediate levels of TV consumption and financial satisfaction and 
trust. The effects of intermediate levels of TV consumption on perceived relative frequency of 
social activities are even positive, however only statistically significant at the 90% level. 
                                                 
60 The analysis corresponds to the mediator model used often in social psychology, see e.g. Baron und Kenny 
(1986), MacKinnon et al. (2002). 
61 In view of the categorical nature of the dependent variables, ordered probit estimates would be more accurate. 
However, the results of such estimates differ very little from the OLS estimates. As the latter are easier to 
interpret, they are presented here.  
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Table 10: Effects of Television Consumption on Preferences and Beliefs 
Dependent variable: Financial satisfaction 
Importance to 
be rich 
Feeling of 
safety 
Trust in 
people 
Social 
activities 
 Coefficient (t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
No TV at all -0.023 
(-1.39) 
-0.117
(3.80)
** 0.018
(1.01)
 -0.037 
(-0.68) 
-0.108
(-4.93)
**
Less than 0.5 hour TV Reference group 
0.5 to 1.5 hours TV 0.013 
(1.21) 
0.044
(2.20)
* -0.041
(-3.54)
** -0.008 
(-0.23) 
0.024
(1.68)
(*)
More than 1.5 to 2.5 
hours TV 
0.008 
(0.77) 
0.116
(5.73)
** -0.059
(-5.12)
** -0.018 
(-0.50) 
0.026
(1.77)
(*)
More than 2.5 hours TV -0.030 
(-2.69) 
** 0.148
(7.23)
** -0.085
(-7.25)
** -0.145 
(-4.01) 
** -0.051
(-3.45)
**
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Country/wave-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes
Observations 84,687 81,652 88,264 88,879  87,461  
R-squared 0.38 0.13 0.19 0.17  0.08  
Notes: (1) Ordinary least squares estimations, t-values in brackets. 
(2) Dependent variables: Financial satisfaction on scale from 0 to 3, importance to be rich on scale from 0 to 5, 
feeling of safety on scale from 0 to 3, trust in people on scale from 0 to 10, perceived relative frequency of social 
activities on scale from 0 to 4.  
(3) Individual controls include variables for working hours, working hours squared, household income (log), 
age, age squared, gender, citizenship, marital status, children, education, employment status, area of living and 
household size (square root), and a dummy variable for the highest income category. Dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for income, household size, working hours, age, sex, citizenship, children, 
marital status, education, employment status, and area of living are included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005),World Development Indicators 
(World Bank several years). 
 
In the next step, an analysis is made of whether those preferences and beliefs influenced by 
TV affect reported life satisfaction. Accordingly, we include the five variables in the life 
satisfaction-television equation. For simplicity, we present least squares estimates and include 
the intervening variables cardinally.62  
 
                                                 
62 The respective estimates with the intervening variables included ordinally do not differ qualitatively from 
those presented here. 
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Table 11: TV Consumption and Life Satisfaction: Preferences and Beliefs 
Dependent variable: 
Life satisfaction 
 
excl. 
channels 
incl. 
all 
channels
incl. 
financial 
satisfaction 
incl. 
importance 
to be rich 
incl. 
feeling of 
safety 
incl. 
trust in 
people 
incl. 
social 
activities 
No TV at all -0.065 
(-1.33) 
 -0.025
(-0.54)
-0.049
(-1.04)
-0.068
(-1.39)
-0.068 
(-1.40) 
 -0.058 
(-1.21) 
-0.030
(-0.62)
Less than 0.5 hour TV Reference group 
0.5 to 1.5 hours TV -0.049 
(-1.54) 
 -0.056
(-1.87)
(*) -0.062
(-1.99)
(*) -0.049
(-1.53)
 -0.037 
(-1.18) 
 -0.048 
(-1.53) 
 -0.056
(-1.80)
(*)
More than 1.5 to 2.5 
hours TV 
-0.040 
(-1.26) 
 -0.038
(-1.24)
 -0.049
(-1.57)
 -0.038
(-1.18)
 -0.023 
(-0.71) 
 -0.038 
(-1.20) 
 -0.049
(-1.54)
 
More than 2.5 hours 
TV 
-0.137 
(-4.21) 
** -0.070
(-2.27)
* -0.119
(-3.76)
** -0.133
(-4.10)
** -0.111 
(-3.44) 
** -0.114 
(-3.57) 
** -0.121
(-3.77)
** 
Intervening variables:           
Financial satisfaction  0.662
(67.52)
** 0.743
(74.72)
**       
Importance to be rich  -0.036
(-6.61)
**  -0.035
(-5.99)
**      
Feeling of safety  0.192
(21.34)
**   0.309 
(33.21) 
**    
Trust in people  0.125
(42.89)
**     0.160 
(53.60) 
**  
Social Activities  0.248
(34.22)
**       0.323
(43.01)
** 
Individual controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Country/wave fixed 
effects 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year-fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Observations 89,208 
R2 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.23 
t-test Sobel: more than 2.5 hours TV  -2.69 ** -4.73 ** -7.09 ** -4.00 ** -3.44 ** 
Notes: (1) Ordinary least squares estimations, t-values in brackets. 
(2) Intervening variables: financial satisfaction on scale from 0 to 3, importance to be rich on scale from 0 to 5, feeling of 
safety on scale from 0 to 3, trust in people on scale from 0 to 10, perceived relative frequency of social activities on scale 
from 0 to 4.  
(3) Individual controls include variables for working hours, working hours squared, household income (log), age, age 
squared, gender, citizenship, marital status, children, education, employment status, area of living and household size 
(square root), and a dummy variable for the highest income category. Dummy variables indicating missing observations 
for financial satisfaction, importance to be rich, feeling of safety, trust in people, social activities, income, household size, 
working hours, age, sex, citizenship, children, marital status, education, employment status, and area of living are 
included as well. 
(4) Sobel’s t-test for the difference in coefficients with and without intervening variable has been calculated for 
regressions without observations with missing values for the respective intervening variable, i.e., for regressions with the 
same number of observations as in Table 10. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005),World Development Indicators (World 
Bank several years). 
   101
The first column in Table 11 presents the results without including any intervening variable 
(corresponding to the results in Table 9). In the second column, all five intervening variables 
are included in the regression. All partial correlations with life satisfaction have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant at the 99% level. The coefficient for people watching 
more than 2.5 hours TV is halved and drops from –0.14 in the regression without any 
intervening variable in column 1 to –0.07. Including the intervening variables one by one into 
the regression equations (columns 3 to 7 in Table 11) shows that the indirect effect of TV 
consumption on life satisfaction is smallest for ‘importance to be rich’ and is of about the 
same size for the other four variables (looking at the differences in coefficients for more than 
2.5 hours TV viewing). According to the Sobel’s test,63 differences in coefficients between 
regression with and without intervening variables are all statistically significant for the 
category of heavy TV consumption. 
The results of the path analysis show that the negative relationship between TV consumption 
and life satisfaction can partially be explained by differences in beliefs and preferences of 
people watching more TV. This finding corroborates the hypothesis that there are long-term 
consequences – or negative internalities – of TV consumption. If these consequences are not 
completely foreseen, people overestimate the utility from TV consumption and end up at a 
lower utility level. We are aware that the path analysis does not exclude reverse causation. 
However, it supports a richer picture of psychological processes involved in people’s demand 
for TV consumption that might help in understanding any systematic errors in TV 
consumption choice. 
                                                 
63 The Sobel’s test shows the statistical significance of the indirect path from an explanatory variable (TV 
consumption) over the intervening variable to the dependent variable (life satisfaction). For OLS, the multiplied 
coefficients of this path correspond to the difference in coefficients of the explanatory variable in the regressions 
with and without intervening variable (MacKinnon et al. 1995; MacKinnon et al. 2002). 
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3.5. Opportunity Costs of Time and the Effect of Watching TV on Life Satisfaction 
So far, it has been assumed that self-control problems in TV consumption affect everybody 
alike. Additional tests of the hypothesis that self-control problems in TV consumption reduce 
people’s utility are possible if different types of individuals can be identified who suffer to a 
different extent from over-consumption. We emphasize that in particular individuals with 
high opportunity costs of time can use time more profitably when not watching TV. This 
includes, for instance, the self-employed (e.g. craftsmen, lawyers, architects or artists) or 
persons in high positions (e.g. managers, top bureaucrats or politicians), who can freely 
transfer time from leisure to work. For this group of individuals, the self-control problem of 
watching too much TV generates considerable costs. Their utility is lower due to their 
inability to fully control themselves. In contrast, individuals with low opportunity costs of 
time suffer little, if any, disutility when they fail to watch the amount of TV they would 
consider optimal for themselves. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that TV consumption 
significantly lowers the life satisfaction of individuals with high opportunity costs of time, 
while it has a smaller negative effect on the life satisfaction of individuals with low 
opportunity costs of time (see Figure 7 in chapter 3.2). 
Data 
Opportunity costs of time cannot be measured directly in our data. Therefore, we use different 
indicators to distinguish between individuals with high and low opportunity costs of time. 
(i) People who can freely transfer time between work and leisure tend to have higher 
(monetary) opportunity costs of time compared to people with fixed working hours. Hence, 
respondents are assigned to the two groups according to the flexibility of their working hours. 
Answers to the question “[P]lease say how much the management at your work allows you to 
be flexible in your working hours?” are given on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (“I have no 
influence”) to 10 (“I have complete control”). Respondents who indicate a value between 0 
and 5 constitute the group with low opportunity costs of time, while those who give an answer 
between 6 and 10 form the other group. Only individuals who are employed (at least part 
time) are included in these sub-samples. As this question is only available for the first wave of 
the ESS the number of observations is reduced to 6,793 for the group with high opportunity 
costs of time and 7,042 for the group with low opportunity costs of time. 
(ii) As a second indicator, we use employment status and profession. Retirees and the 
unemployed tend to have a large amount of free time and therefore form the group with low 
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opportunity costs of time. On the other hand, working people, especially those who are self-
employed and those in high positions and professions (legislators, senior officials, managers 
and professionals according to ISCO-88 classification) are assigned to the group with high 
opportunity costs of time. The group with high opportunity costs of time includes 12,696 
respondents and the group with low opportunity costs of time 21,013 respondents. 
Table A3 in the Appendix reports summary statistics for the different groups, as well as for 
the whole population. The groups divided according to flexibility of working hours do not 
differ much in most socio-demographic characteristics. The group with high opportunity costs 
of time watches a bit less TV (e.g. 20% of respondents watch more than 2.5 hours TV a day 
compared to 26% in the other group) and has a somewhat higher income, as well as a higher 
level of education. People in this group report, on average, half a point higher life satisfaction 
(7.47 compared to 6.95) than people in the other group. The groups divided according to 
employment status and profession differ more with regard to their socio-demographic 
characteristics. The group with high opportunity costs of time includes more young people 
and more males and individuals in this group watch considerably less TV (e.g. only 19% of 
respondents watch more than 2.5 hours TV a day compared to 49% in the other group) and 
have a much better education. 
Empirical results 
Table 12 reports the results of linear regression estimates for the different groups according to 
the different criteria. In order not to overload the table, the regression coefficients for the 
control variables are not explicitly shown. They are very similar to those presented in Table 9. 
Columns 1 and 2 show the estimation results for sub-samples with high and low opportunity 
costs of time according to flexibility of working hours. Individuals in the group with high 
opportunity costs of time, who watch more television than the reference group, report lower 
life satisfaction ceteris paribus. The effects are quite considerable. The subjective well-being 
of viewers who watch half an hour and more television a day is between 0.35 and 0.43 points 
lower than that of light viewers spending less than half an hour watching television a day. The 
effects are statistically significant at the 99% level. The magnitude of the coefficients 
corresponds to about two-thirds of the difference in life satisfaction between people who are 
divorced and without a partner and married people (0.65), and amounts in the highest 
category to over one-third of the effect of unemployment (-1.19) (both estimates are taken 
from the full sample). In contrast, for people with low opportunity costs of time, the 
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coefficients of all television viewing categories are smaller (between -0.09 and -0.15) and not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 12: TV Consumption and Life Satisfaction: Opportunity Costs of Time 
Dependent variable: 
Life satisfaction 
 
Flexibility of working hours as 
distinction criteria 
Employment status / profession as 
distinction criteria 
Group with high 
opportunity costs 
of time 
Group with low 
opportunity costs 
of time 
Group with high 
opportunity costs 
of time 
Group with low 
opportunity costs 
of time 
No TV at all -0.435 
(-2.89) 
** 0.103
(0.59)
 -0.094
(-0.95)
 -0.148
(-1.13)
 
Less than 0.5 hours TV Reference group 
0.5 to 1.5 hours TV -0.350 
(-3.84) 
** -0.085
(-0.81)
 -0.085
(-1.40)
 0.019
(0.19)
 
More than 1.5 to 2.5 
hours TV 
-0.357 
(-3.83) 
** -0.042
(-0.39)
 -0.187
(-2.94)
** 0.098
(1.00)
 
More than 2.5 hours TV -0.425 
(-4.28) 
** -0.147
(-1.35)
 -0.315
(-4.59)
** -0.009
(-0.09)
 
Individual controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country/wave-fixed 
effects Yes 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year-Fixed effects No  No  Yes  Yes  
Constant 6.196 
(9.94) 
** 4.894
(7.83)
** 7.152
(15.42)
** 7.274
(15.65)
** 
Observations 6.739 7,042 12,696 21,013 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.25 
Notes: (1) Ordinary least squares estimations, t-values in brackets. 
(2) Group 1 contains respondents with flexibility of working hours of 6 and higher on a scale from 0 to 10 and 
group 2 contains respondents with flexibility of working hours of 5 and lower. In both groups, respondents’ 
employment status is “paid work, employed” and nothing else. Group 3 contains the self-employed, as well as 
managers, senior officials, legislators, professionals (according to ISCO-88 classification) with employment 
status “paid work” (employed or self-employed) and nothing else, and group 4 contains retirees and the 
unemployed with no other employment status. 
(3) Individual controls include variables for working hours, working hours squared, household income (log), age, 
age squared, gender, citizenship, marital status, children, education, employment status, area of living and 
household size (square root), and a dummy variable for the highest income category. Dummy variables 
indicating missing observations for income, household size, working hours, age, sex, citizenship, children, 
marital status, education, employment status, and area of living are included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005),World Development Indicators 
(World Bank several years). 
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A similar picture emerges when comparing the self-employed, managers, senior officials, 
legislators and professionals with retirees and unemployed persons (columns 3 and 4 in Table 
12). Coefficients in the high opportunity costs of time sub-sample are considerable in size. 
The average life satisfaction of people watching more than 1.5 hours TV a day is between 
0.19 and 0.32 points lower compared to people who watch less than half an hour a day. These 
effects are statistically significant at the 99% level. In contrast, for the group with low 
opportunity costs of time, no correlation between television consumption and reported life 
satisfaction is visible. The coefficients are not statistically significant and very small. The 
coefficient for watching 0.5 to 1.5 hours TV is not statistically significant in either group. 
Hence, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that (some) people have a self-control 
problem when it comes to TV watching, and this self-control problem considerably reduces 
the subjective well-being of people with high opportunity costs of time but not (to the same 
extent) of people with low opportunity costs of time. Of course, one could still ask whether 
the negative correlation for people with high opportunity costs of time is a causal relationship 
and, if so, in which direction the causality goes. However, it is difficult to understand why 
dissatisfied people, who have high opportunity costs of time, would resort to TV viewing, 
while dissatisfied people with low opportunity costs of time would not. 
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3.6. TV Channels, Self-Control and Subjective Well-Being 
This chapter presents a third extension of the basic relationship between TV consumption and 
subjective well-being. It studies whether the effect of having a larger number of TV channels 
available, i.e., a larger choice set, raises people’s subjective well-being, as standard economic 
theory would predict, or if it rather increases temptation to watch more TV than optimal and 
therefore even reduces utility of some individuals.  
3.6.1. Hypothesis and Testing Strategy 
The expansion and diversification of media supply, due to VCR, cable or satellite has, in 
many countries, gone hand in hand with increased TV viewing time (see the collected studies 
in Becker and Schoenbach 1989). Spending more time in front of the TV set is consistent with 
rational consumers who optimally choose their viewing time, as well as with TV viewers who 
are subject to a self-control problem (see Figure 8 in chapter 3.2). A study on the introduction 
of cable TV in Israel, comparing neighborhoods with a difference-in-difference approach, 
complements the picture by people’s evaluation of their consumption choice (Weimann 
1996). It is found that, with cable TV, there is a significant increase in the percentage of 
viewers agreeing to the statements “I often watch more television than I intend to” (28% 
before the introduction of cable and 41% one year later) and “watching television is often a 
waste of time” (24% before the introduction of cable and 36% one year later). The expanded 
choice set due to technological advance seems to have led to an increase in the number of 
people watching more TV than planned, or more than they think is good for them.64 
While more choice potentially raises individual welfare (if people are able to rationally 
maximize utility, as is assumed in the traditional economic framework), it is hypothesized 
here that people with severe self-control problems suffer a utility loss. The positive effect 
from a potentially better match between TV programs and individual preferences is more than 
offset by the loss of well-being resulting from over-consumption (see Figure 8 in chapter 3.2). 
The hypothesis is tested, based on recent data from the European Social Survey, World 
Values Survey and Television Key Facts from IP Network. In the first step, consumers who 
                                                 
64 Asking people directly whether they think that they watch too much TV could, of course, lead to answers that 
are motivated by social desirability. It should be noted that surveys on general life satisfaction (as used in our 
study) are plausibly not affected by such a bias that is systematically correlated with some specific consumption 
behavior. 
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might have a self-control problem are identified as those people with a large positive residual 
in a regression explaining the amount of TV viewing according to individual socio-
demographic characteristics (referred to as “heavy viewers”). In the second step, the effect of 
a larger choice of TV channels on subjective well-being is estimated for heavy TV viewers 
compared to moderate TV viewers. Based on more than 125,000 individual observations from 
76 country samples, we find a statistically significant negative interaction term between 
(residual) TV viewing and the number of TV channels, and calculate a negative marginal 
effect for additional TV channels on the well-being of heavy viewers. This is consistent with 
the hypothesis of limited self-control.  
We briefly discuss and empirically address two alternative explanations for the observed 
statistical findings. First, we take into account that the measure for the number of TV 
channels might not be representative for heavy TV viewers and that the degree of 
representativeness might vary systematically across countries. Second, the average negative 
marginal effect might also reflect some negative net effect from increased market competition 
that benefits some people while penalizing others, irrespective of heavy TV viewers suffering 
a self-control problem. In particular, competition between channels is expected to benefit 
consumers who are valuable to advertisers, i.e., young adult viewers and female viewers. In 
our robustness analyses, we do not find evidence for the two alternative hypotheses. First, the 
negative marginal effect for additional TV channels holds for a sample adjusted to the 
differences in diffusion of terrestrial, cable and satellite TV across countries and over time. 
Second, heavy TV viewers amongst young adults and women do not experience an increase, 
but a reduction in the amount of well-being, similar to that found in the full sample. 
3.6.2. Empirical Analysis 
Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the individual level data from the first two waves of the 
European Social Survey (ESS) already used above and supplemented by data from the third 
and forth waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) in order to get a larger number of country 
samples. They are connected with data on the number of TV channels at the country level 
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collected by IP Network.65 Data from the ESS is for 21 European countries in 2002/200366 
and 25 European countries in 2004-200667. With the WVS, data on the number of TV 
channels is available for 28 countries in the years 1995-199768 and 2 countries in the years 
2000/2001.69 Countries common to more than one survey or wave are treated as separate 
entities, as they are observed in different years. In each country, between about 600 and 3,000 
individuals were interviewed per wave, supplying us with a total sample of 127,949 
observations.70 
The three key variables in our analysis are TV consumption, reported satisfaction with life 
and the number of TV channels available in a country. 
In the ESS, television consumption is, as above, captured by the question “On an average 
weekday, how much time do you spend watching television?”, with answers falling into 8 
categories, ranging from “no time at all” to “more than 3 hours”. In the WVS, the question is 
“How much time do you usually spend watching television on an average weekday?”, with 
answers coded into 4 categories, ranging from “do not watch television or do not have access 
to TV” to “more than 3 hours”. For each category, the mid-point value of the time interval is 
calculated. For the top category, “more than 3 hours”, 3.5 hours is chosen. Average TV 
viewing time in the sample is 2.0 hours (standard deviation 1.1). There is, however, 
                                                 
65 For the ESS data, see Jowell et al. (2003; 2005). The data are archived and distributed by the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Services (NSD). For the WVS data see European Values Study Group and World Values 
Survey Association (2006) and for the IP Network data see IP Network (several years). 
66 The countries included are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
67 The countries included are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. 
68 The countries included are Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Hungary, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, USA and Venezuela. 
69 The two countries are South Africa and Spain. 
70 Of the 131,189 people originally surveyed in the countries included in the analysis, 2,336 did not answer the 
question regarding their amount of TV consumption and 993 did not answer the question about their life 
satisfaction. 
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substantial variation between countries. TV consumption is lowest in Mexico (with 1.1 hours) 
in wave 3 of the WVS and highest in Macedonia (with 2.7 hours) in wave 3 of the WVS. 
Individual life satisfaction is again measured by the question: “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays / these days?” Answers are given on an 
11-point scale ranging from 0 (“extremely dissatisfied”) to 10 (“extremely satisfied”) in the 
ESS, and on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (“dissatisfied”) to 10 (“satisfied”) in the WVS. 
To make the two scales comparable, the lowest two categories in the ESS, 0 and 1, are 
combined into one category. Average life satisfaction in the sample amounts to 6.7 (standard 
deviation 2.4), ranging from a low of 4.0 in the Ukraine in wave 3 of the WVS to a high of 
8.5 in Denmark in wave 2 of the ESS.  
In addition, both surveys include a large number of socio-demographic characteristics, which 
can be used as control variables in the life satisfaction regressions. In order to have the 
variables comparable across the two surveys, they are slightly differently coded than in the 
previous chapters (see below). 
Statistical data on the number of television channels is available at the country level, 
published by IP Network in the form of the number of channels available to 70% of 
households. We take data that relates to the year the individuals were surveyed or the closest 
year available. The number of TV channels available to 70% of the population amounts, on 
average, to 10.3 channels (standard deviation 12.6) and ranges from 1 in India and Romania 
to 62 in the United States. The median is 4.5 channels (see Table A4 and Table A5 in the 
Appendix). TV services are offered by terrestrial, cable and satellite providers. In the 
robustness analysis, we take into account that, due to the differences in the diffusion of these 
technologies, the measure for the number of channels might not be representative for the 
groups crucial to our empirical test. 
Empirical strategy and results 
We proceed in two steps to test for possible self-control problems in TV viewing. In the first 
step, individual TV viewing time is regressed on respondents’ socio-demographic 
characteristics for each of the 76 country samples separately, and the residual TV viewing 
time, not explained by these individual characteristics, is calculated. Heavy viewers, i.e., 
respondents who watch more TV than predicted by their individual characteristics, and who 
therefore have large residuals, are suspected to be those with a possible self-control problem 
when it comes to television viewing. Having many tempting TV channels tends to aggravate 
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heavy viewers’ self-control problem, leading to a higher utility loss than having less TV 
channels. Of course, heavy viewers could just be those with a high preference for TV 
consumption. In this case, more TV channels would raise their utility level, as it increases the 
probability that there is a program that matches their preferences. It should at least not reduce 
their utility level, because they could just ignore the additional channels. (In the robustness 
analysis below, we will test for differential consequences of competition between TV 
channels on different groups of heavy TV viewers.) The individual characteristics we use to 
explain TV viewing time are household income, age, gender, nationality, employment status, 
education, marital status, type or size of place of living and, additionally for the ESS, 
household size and working hours.71 Between 3 and 32% of the variation in TV viewing time 
is explained by these individual characteristics.72 Residual TV viewing time ranges from -3.41 
to 3.21 hours (see Table A4 in the Appendix). In order to make the residuals comparable 
across countries, they are converted into deciles for each country.  
In the second step, we test how additional TV channels affect the individual welfare of 
unpredictably heavy TV viewers. If the latter have a self-control problem, they are expected 
to experience lower individual well-being with additional channels. In our test, reported life 
satisfaction is used as an approximation to individual welfare. 
Two microeconometric life satisfaction functions are specified. In the first one, the life 
satisfaction LSi of individual i depends on (the decile of) his or her residual television 
consumption ResidTVi, (as an indicator of a possible self-control problem regarding TV 
consumption), on the interaction between this indicator and the number of TV channels Nj73 
                                                 
71 It must be noted that some of these variables could be systematically related to having a self-control problem. 
It could, for example, be hypothesized that people with low self-control face a higher probability of becoming 
unemployed. Controlling for employment status might therefore not be appropriate. However, only controlling 
for the exogenous factors age and gender in the first step does not change the general results of the subsequent 
empirical analysis. 
72 The regressions are very similar to the one presented in Table 2 of chapter 2.4. 
73 We include the number of TV channels in its logarithmic form into the regression. This reflects that the 
marginal importance of an additional channel decreases with an increasing number of channels. While this 
specification results in the best statistical fit, linear or quadratic specifications lead to similar results. The 
constitutive term of the interaction effect, the number of TV channels, is not included into the regression in order 
to be able to include country/wave-fixed effects. Nevertheless, there should be no bias as it is controlled for the 
number of TV channels through the country/wave dummies. See also the second specification, where number of 
TV channels is included separately. 
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available in country j, on personal characteristics Xi, as well as on country/wave specific 
effects Dj and year fixed effects Yt: 
 
LSi = 0 + 1 ResidTVi + 2 (ResidTVi * log(Nj)) + 1 Xi + 2 Dj + 3 Yt + i 
 
The control variables used are income, age, gender, whether born in the country of residence 
or not, employment status, education, and marital status. The variables are not coded in 
exactly the same way in both surveys, but similar enough to make them comparable.  
Column (A) in Table 13 shows the regression results for the first specification. The 
interaction effect between residual TV viewing and the logarithm of the number of channels 
available has a negative sign, is large (-0.014) and statistically significant at the 99% level. 
The higher a person’s residual TV consumption is, the smaller the marginal effect of an 
additional channel on his or her life satisfaction. Yet, according to this specification, whether 
more TV channels in fact have a negative effect on the life satisfaction of heavy TV viewers 
is not assessable. The marginal effect of the number of TV channels on life satisfaction could 
merely be smaller for people with high residuals than for people with low residuals, but not 
negative. However, it can already be said that people who watch much more TV than 
predicted, based on their individual characteristics, seem to benefit the least from additional 
TV channels. If unpredictably high TV consumption indeed reflects personal tastes, then this 
result might already come as a surprise. 
 
Table 13: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction 
Dependent variable: (A) (B) 
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Television      
Decile of residual TV viewing (5th decile=0) -0.014 ** -4.30 -0.013 ** -4.15 
log (number of TV channels, mean adjusted)   -0.038  -0.60 
Decile of residual TV viewing * log (number 
of TV channels) 
-0.015 ** -3.99 -0.015 ** -3.93 
Individual/household characteristics      
Income deciles 0.112 ** 13.04 0.105 ** 8.69 
Age -0.081 ** -17.38 -0.087 ** -18.34 
Age, squared 0.001 ** 17.55 0.001 ** 18.47 
Table to be continued
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Continuation of Table 13 
Male Reference group 
Female 0.083 ** 4.78 0.028  0.093 
Not born in country of residence Reference group 
Born in country of residence 0.218 ** 6.18 0.359 ** 7.35 
Marital status  
Married Reference group 
Divorced -0.620 ** -15.47 -0.628 ** -12.93 
Separated -0.882 ** -14.68 -0.846 ** -11.26 
Widowed -0.580 ** -16.12 -0.626 ** -16.39 
Not married, living with partner -0.313 ** -7.85 -0.248 ** -5.02 
Not married, living without partner -0.528 ** -19.20 -0.485 ** -15.00 
Education      
No formal or incomplete primary education -0.458 ** -5.05 -0.336 ** -2.83 
Complete basic or primary education Reference group 
Upper or post secondary, non-tertiary 
education 
0.161 ** 5.77 0.075  1.27 
Tertiary education 0.294 ** 7.64 0.289 ** 4.84 
Employment status      
Paid work, employed      
Paid work, self-employed 0.078 (*) 1.91 0.284 ** 3.31 
Unemployed -0.898 ** -15.08 -0.861 ** -11.21 
Retired -0.033  -1.00 -0.087 * -2.26 
In education 0.263 ** 6.22 0.256 ** 5.39 
Housework, looking after children 0.046  1.30 0.234 ** 3.25 
Doing other work -0.544 ** -8.51 -0.575 ** -7.81 
Country characteristics      
GNI per capita (PPP), log   1.221 ** 6.69 
Average TV viewing time in country (min)   -0.010 ** -5.06 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Country/wave fixed effects Yes   No  
Constant 6.922 ** 56.46 -1.828  -0.94 
Observations 127, 949 127, 949 
R-squared 0.25 0.20 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
 (2) Dummy variables indicating missing observations for income, age, gender, country of birth, marital status, 
education, and employment status are not shown. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005), World Values Survey Wave 3 & 4 
(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), IP Network (several years), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank several years). 
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In order to calculate the marginal effect according to the level of residual TV viewing, we 
specify a second extended life satisfaction function. In addition to the variables in the first 
equation, the number of TV channels available in a country is included in the regression. As 
this information is at a country/wave level, country/wave specific fixed effects can no longer 
be controlled for. Instead, we add the control variables gross national income (adjusted for 
comparative price level) in its logarithmic form log(GNIj), as well as average TV viewing 
time AvgTVj in a country.74 This leaves us with the following second specification: 
 
LSi =  0 + 1 ResidTVi + 2 log(Nj) + 3 (ResidTVi * log(Nj)) + 1 Xi + 2 log(GNIj)  
+ 3 AvgTVj + 4 Yt + i 
 
Column (B) in Table 13 shows the results for this specification. The interaction term between 
residual TV viewing and the number of TV channels is robust and again has the same size and 
statistical significance as in the previous specification. For further interpretation of the 
coefficients, mean adjustment of the number of TV channels and residual TV viewing time 
must be taken into account. The coefficient of the constitutive term number of TV channels 
(natural logarithm) is therefore estimated for TV consumers with an average residual (the 
ones in the 5th decile). It captures the marginal effect on life satisfaction if TV viewers have 
more channels to choose from. It is estimated to be negative (-0.04) but not statistically 
significant. From the latter coefficient and the interaction term, the marginal effects of the 
number of TV channels on life satisfaction can now be calculated for different levels of 
residual TV viewing. The calculations are presented in Figure 11a) together with the 90% and 
95%-confidence interval.75 
For people in the first decile of residual TV viewing time, i.e., those watching much less than 
predicted, having a higher number of TV channels to choose from has no impact on their life 
satisfaction. The marginal effect is close to zero. For people with above average residual TV 
viewing time, the marginal effect becomes negative and approaches statistical significance. 
Respondents viewing much more TV than predicted (10th decile) report ceteris paribus a 0.12 
                                                 
74 Data for GNI are from the World Development Indicators (several years), and data for average TV viewing 
time are from IP Network (several years). 
75 For a discussion on the interpretation and presentation of interaction models see Brambor et al. (2006). 
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point lower life satisfaction (t-value=1.64) when, for example, living in a country with 10 TV 
channels compared to living in a country with only 3 TV channels. This effect is sizeable; it 
corresponds, for example, to one-fifth of the difference in life satisfaction between married 
and divorced people (-0.62).  
 
Figure 11: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction 
a) Linear specification of residual TV viewing 
 
b) Specification based on categories of residual TV viewing 
 
 
We also estimate a more flexible specification (not shown in Table 13), allowing the marginal 
effect of additional TV channels to vary freely for each decile of residual TV consumption. 
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Figure 11b) presents the results of the more flexible specification, which includes dummy 
variables for each decile of residual TV consumption. The calculated marginal effects of 
additional TV channels on life satisfaction show a similar pattern and magnitude to the more 
rigid specification.  
Thus, heavy TV viewers not only seem to benefit less from additional TV channels, but also 
to experience a reduced level of life satisfaction. This finding is not consistent with a universe 
of sovereign TV consumers benefiting from a larger choice set. Rather, the finding suggests 
heterogeneity in self-control and is consistent with the view that part of observed individual 
TV consumption is due to a lack of willpower when exposed to the temptation of satisfying 
immediate pleasure. Referring to our graphical analysis in chapter 3.2, on average around 
10% of the respondents (taking the 90% significance level as a cutoff point) do not experience 
a net benefit from an increase in the number of TV channels, i.e., area CHEF is larger than 
BHG. 
3.6.3. Robustness 
In our robustness analysis, we address two alternative explanations for the observed patterns 
in the correlation between TV viewing and life satisfaction in relation to the number of TV 
channels. The first alternative questions the representativeness of the measure on the number 
of TV channels for the group of heavy viewers. A spurious negative correlation for the 
interaction term could emerge if the following scenario were to occur: in countries with few 
TV channels, on average, only the rich and happy can afford satellite TV, have more channels 
than normal and therefore also watch more TV. In contrast, in countries where almost 
everyone has cable or satellite TV, people who watch a lot of TV tend to be unhappy, lonely 
or unemployed. Across countries, heavy TV viewers would seem less satisfied with more 
channels. Another alternative explanation suggests that TV markets with many channels 
rather than a few channels differ in other respects than just program variety. A concern about 
the documented relationship between TV channels and life satisfaction is therefore that it 
actually reflects some differences between media markets rather than suboptimal decisions by 
some individuals. 
Measures of the number of TV channels 
Our measure for the number of TV channels, i.e., the number of TV channels received by 
70% of the population as published by IP Network, is arbitrary to some extent. All the same, 
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it probably provides a good approximation of the average choice of TV programs in a 
country. Moreover, it is exogenous to individual choice, which fits the design of our empirical 
test. However, it does not take into account the variance of the number of TV channels within 
a country.  
This aspect disturbs our testing strategy if (i) the number of TV channels at the individual 
level is correlated with individual TV viewing time and life satisfaction within a country and 
(ii) this correlation is systematically different between countries with a low aggregate number 
of TV channels and countries with a high aggregate number. In the scenario mentioned above, 
the happy heavy viewers in the (poor) countries with few TV channels might then be 
compared with the unhappy heavy viewers in the (affluent) countries with many TV channels. 
It is important to note, though, that any such effect needs to go beyond the individual 
characteristics (like income) controlled for in the estimation equations, determining the heavy 
viewers separately for each country sample. 
In our first robustness check, we aim at compiling country samples of individuals for whom 
the information on the number of TV channels is representative. We do this by excluding 
observations at the tails of the distribution of residual TV viewing time, taking into account 
information on market penetration with terrestrial, cable and satellite TV. The following 
procedure is applied. Households with only terrestrial TV usually have access to just a few 
channels, while the offer is larger for households with cable or satellite TV. If 70% or more of 
the households in a country only have terrestrial TV, the measure on the number of TV 
channels available is probably sufficiently accurate for these households. However, it is not 
accurate for the households with cable or satellite TV. In this case, the percentage of 
respondents with cable or satellite TV is excluded from the analysis (i.e., the respective 
percentage of respondents with the highest residual TV viewing time). Accordingly, if 70% or 
more have access to cable or satellite TV, we exclude the percentage with only terrestrial TV 
(i.e., the respective percentage of respondents with the lowest residual TV viewing time). 
The exclusion procedure is thus based on the assumption underlying the alternative 
hypothesis that the individual number of TV channels and individual (residual) TV viewing 
time are positively correlated within a country.  
Data on terrestrial cable and satellite diffusion are from IP Network and shown in Table A5 in 
the Appendix. The fraction of people who only have access to terrestrial TV in our data base 
is smallest in Luxembourg and the Netherlands (around 1%), and largest (in the early surveys) 
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in Brazil (89%), the Ukraine (93%) and Greece (99%). Table 14 presents the regression 
results after the samples have been adjusted. The number of country samples drops from 76 to 
73 as the specific data is not available for 3 countries.76 The number of observations drops 
from 127,949 to 88,424 due to the exclusion criteria described above.  
 
Table 14: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction: Country Samples 
Adjusted for the Diffusion of Terrestrial, Cable and Satellite TV 
Dependent variable: A B 
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Decile of residual TV viewing (5th decile=0) -0.006  -1.48 -0.006  -1.35 
log (number of TV channels, mean adjusted)   -0.097  -1.51 
Decile of residual TV viewing * log (number of 
TV channels) 
-0.022 ** -4.36 -0.022 ** -4.30 
Individual control variables Yes   Yes  
Control variables at country level Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Constant 8.388 ** 47.32 -2.408  -1.25 
Observations 88,424 88,424 
R-squared 0.26 0.22 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
 (2) Individual control variables are the same as in Table 13 and include income (deciles), age, age squared, gender, 
whether born in the country of residence or not, marital status, education, and employment status, as well as dummy 
variables indicating missing observations for income, age, gender, country of birth, marital status, education, and 
employment status. 
(3) Control variables at country level are the same as in regression B in Table 13 and include log GNI per capita 
(PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005), World Values Survey Wave 3 & 4 
(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), IP Network (several years), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank several years). 
 
The same specifications as in Table 13 are estimated. It is found that the results are robust to 
the adjustment of the samples. The estimated coefficient for the interaction term is even larger 
in absolute terms (0.22) than in Table 13. Figure 12 shows the marginal effects of additional 
TV channels on life satisfaction. They are large, negative and statistically significant at the 
                                                 
76 The 3 country samples excluded are Macedonia, the Czech Republic, and Mexico for WVS 3. The difference 
between the results in Table 1 and Table 2 is not mainly due to this difference in observations. 
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95% level for intermediate and high levels of residual TV viewing time. Thus, the findings for 
the full country samples cannot easily be explained by differences in the diffusion of different 
TV technologies. 
 
Figure 12: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction Adjusted for Terrestrial, Cable and 
Satellite Distribution 
a) Linear specification of residual TV viewing b) Specification based on categories of 
residual TV viewing 
  
 
Young adult viewers and female viewers 
The second robustness test looks at an alternative explanation of the partial correlations in 
terms of differences in media markets. In countries where people have access to more TV 
channels, TV markets tend to be less regulated and (annoying) commercial time might be 
higher. Some theoretical models of TV markets show a trade-off between diversity (i.e., 
number of channels) and the average quality of programs. In a population with heterogeneous 
preferences, some groups might therefore lose from an increased choice of programs (see, 
e.g., Liu et al. 2004; Anderson and Coate 2005; Liu et al. 2006). Furthermore, there might be 
social costs associated with increased TV viewing due to having more channels, even if the 
individual viewing choice is rational (see e.g. Putnam 2000; Corneo 2005). 
Many of these possible market differences will affect heavy and light viewers alike and do not 
undermine our empirical test which is based on an interaction hypothesis. However, some 
differences might mainly impact individuals with a high preference for TV viewing. To 
address this concern, we run our regressions for different subgroups of the population. 
It is well-documented that in highly competitive TV markets, with many channels available, 
the programs are tailored to viewer groups of particular interest to advertisers (see, e.g., 
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Hamilton 2004 for a comprehensive discussion). These are mainly young adult viewers (18 to 
34 years old) and female viewers (being the “main purchase responsibles” in a household). In 
contrast, in less competitive markets with fewer channels, and to a large extent government or 
license fee financed channels, programs possibly cater for broader viewer groups. The young 
adult viewers and female viewers should thus gain the most – or lose the least – when more 
channels are available. If the negative relationship between the number of TV channels and 
life satisfaction for heavy viewers is due to omitted market characteristics, rather than a lack 
of individual self-control, the relationship should be less pronounced or non-existent for these 
groups. 
 
Table 15: TV Consumption, Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction of Young Adult 
Viewers and Female Viewers 
Dependent variable: 
Life satisfaction 
Young adult viewers 
(18-34) 
Female viewers 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Decile of residual TV viewing (5th decile=0) -0.014 ** -3.18 -0.012 ** -3.27 
log (number of TV channels, mean adjusted) -0.096 (*) -1.69 -0.043  -0.65 
Decile of residual TV viewing * log (number of 
TV channels) 
-0.015 ** -3.55 -0.016 ** -3.83 
Individual control variables Yes   Yes  
Control variables at country level Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Constant 0.469  0.27 -3.320 (*) -1.70 
Observations 40,733 67,760 
R-squared 0.20 0.21 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates with standard errors adjusted for clustering at country level. 
(2) Individual control variables are the same as in Table 13 and include income (deciles), age, age squared, gender, 
whether born in the country of residence or not, marital status, education, and employment status, as well as dummy 
variables indicating missing observations for income, age, gender, country of birth, marital status, education, and 
employment status. 
(3) Control variables at country level are the same as in regression B in Table 13 and include log GNI per capita 
(PPP) and average TV viewing time. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005), World Values Survey Wave 3 & 4 
(European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), IP Network (several years), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank several years). 
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Table 15 presents the regression results for the specified age and gender groups. In 
comparison to the estimates for the whole population in Table 13, the size and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients hardly change when looking only at young adult viewers (first 
regression in Table 15) or female viewers (second regression in Table 15). If anything, the 
marginal effect of the number of channels on life satisfaction for heavy viewers tends to 
increase and becomes statistically significant at higher levels (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Number of TV Channels and Life Satisfaction of Young Adult Viewers and 
Female Viewers 
a) Young adult viewers b) Female viewers 
  
 
This finding runs counter to the alternative explanation in terms of rational TV consumers, 
that differential effects of additional TV channels benefit some heavy TV viewers while 
harming others. The groups most likely to benefit, young adult and female viewers, who 
spend a lot of time watching TV, actually report lower life satisfaction when they have access 
to more channels. The finding thus lends further support to the hypothesis that unpredictably 
heavy TV viewers face a problem of limited self-control when making their consumption 
decisions. 
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3.7. Concluding Remarks 
Rational choice is probably an appropriate characterization of a large fraction of observed 
behavior. However, TV consumption might pose a challenge that could be considered 
particularly relevant because TV is one of the most time-consuming activities of people in 
today’s world: in many countries, over their entire lives, people spend, on average, as many 
hours watching TV as they do working (Corneo 2005). Hardly anyone would deny that 
watching TV provides pleasure, at least some of the time, and that it is an important source of 
information. However, many people report that they would like to spend less time watching 
TV. Observed consumption behavior might thus be a weak indicator for the pleasure 
individuals derive from TV viewing.  
This part of the thesis therefore addresses the issue that long hours of TV viewing may 
indicate imperfect self-control, as well as misprediction of the long-term costs of TV 
consumption, reducing individuals’ utility. The empirical results show that long hours of TV 
viewing are associated with lower subjective well-being. This negative relationship is 
especially strong for people with high opportunity costs of time and for those having access to 
a large choice of TV channels. Hence, our research suggests that some people are not able to 
optimally trade off the benefits and the (future) costs associated with television consumption. 
Our analysis is an explanation of the amount of TV consumption rather than of marginal 
reactions due to changes in relative prices. Valuable insights can be gained from going even 
further in this direction. In fact, the understanding of how people allocate their time and why 
they allocate so much time to television consumption is of further relevance when one 
considers the important role television may have in the political process. The next part of the 
dissertation explores this issue and analyzes the impact of television on voters and politicians. 
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4. Television and the Behavior of Voters and Politicians 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Mass media play a unique role in transmitting information to voters and in shaping their 
political attitudes. The diffusion of free, non-partisan media during the last centuries is 
regarded as crucial for the development of functioning democracies. Gentzkow et al. (2006) 
relate “the Rise of the Forth Estate” in the US, i.e., the development of the non-partisan press 
in the 19th century, to the sharp decline of corruption in that era.  
The 20th century saw even more radical changes in the media landscape with the introduction 
and rapid diffusion of radio, television and the internet. In fact, radio and TV are the technical 
inventions of the 20th century with the highest diffusion rates (Bowden and Offer 1994). As 
has been shown in the previous chapters, today, television is by far the most important and 
time-consuming kind of media. Europeans spend on average over 3 hours a day watching TV 
and US Americans even about 5 hours (IP Network 2006).77 
Despite the prevalence television in the lives of people, little is known about causal effects of 
television consumption on the behavior of people in the political sphere. Exceptions are the 
few studies (Gentzkow 2006; Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2009) that convincingly show - 
negative and positive - effects of television on voter turnout. Prat and Strömberg (2005) 
analyze the effect of the introduction of private TV in Sweden on voter information, and 
Olken (2008) shows that better TV signal reception in Indonesian villages due to 
topographical differences is related to lower participation in local government activities but 
not to measures of village governance. Most other studies of the effects of media on the 
political process use data on newspapers or on general media freedom, rather than on 
television, as data on the former are more readily available. Furthermore, actual TV 
consumption or media consumption, in general, only receives scarce attention. The analysis of 
the effects of media consumption on behavior faces the problem that media consumption is 
                                                 
77 These figures not only relate to the information function of television, but also to its entertainment function. 
However, data from the European Social Survey also show the dominance of television when only concentrating 
on news consumption. More than 40% of respondents watch more then 1.5 hours news on TV daily, while only 
about 30% spend so much time on listening to the news on radio and only 20% on reading newspapers (see 
chapter 2.4.1). 
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endogenously chosen. Hence, people who are more interested in politics and who participate 
more in the political process are also expected to inform themselves better and to consume 
more news. Therefore, most studies use supposedly exogenous variation in media supply and 
directly analyze its effects on some outcome variable (see also the discussion in chapter 
2.2.3).  
To empirically address a possible causal relationship between television and behavior of 
voters and politicians, I use a similar procedure but also include TV consumption directly into 
the analysis. I compiled both cross-sectional and panel data sets on the diffusion of local 
television in Switzerland. This country is an ideal setting for an empirical analysis of the 
effects of TV consumption on the behavior of voters and politicians. Due to the country’s 
federal structure, important political decisions are made at state or community level. This, in 
combination with the presence of direct democratic institutions, places great importance on 
local political information and therefore on local media. Moreover, the supply of local 
television varies to a large extent over regions and over time. The empirical results show that 
voters, as well as politicians, systematically react to the presence of local television. Hence, 
television should be taken seriously as a separate force in the political process. 
Two major aspects of TV are highlighted in the empirical analysis. Local TV attracts different 
socio-economic groups than other media like newspapers and radio. People with low 
education are more likely to watch TV news when local TV is available. This effect is found 
in areas where local TV markets match well with jurisdictions. For people with higher 
education, news consumption does not differ with the availability of local TV. More 
importantly, people react to the consumption of local TV news by increasing their 
participation in federal elections. Again, this effect is much more pronounced for people with 
low education than for those with high education and limited to areas where local TV markets 
correspond to one jurisdiction or electoral district. When local TV markets span over several 
jurisdictions there is no statistically significant effect of the availability of local TV on news 
consumption and on voter participation. The presence of these differentiated effects lends 
support to the proclaimed direction of causality from TV to behavior. 
The second aspect that distinguishes TV from more traditional media is the transmission of 
information not only via words but also via moving pictures. Therefore, in comparison with 
information in newspapers and on radio, person-related information becomes more important 
than factual information. Hence, the role of individual politicians is increasing in comparison 
to the role played by parties and their political programs. The empirical results show that 
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parties - especially small ones with negligible chance of being elected into the Council of 
States (the small chamber of the federal parliament with two representatives from each full 
canton) - nominate more candidates when local TV is available. Again, this effect is stronger 
in regions with a good match between local TV markets and electoral districts and it is 
confirmed in cross-sectional as well as panel data. 
Hence, this part broadens the perspective taken in the previous parts of the thesis. We not only 
look at TV consumers but also analyze the effects TV can have on other actors, in this case 
politicians. Chapter 4.2 reviews the economic literature on media institutions and their effects 
on the behavior of voters and politicians. Chapter 4.3 discusses the differences between TV 
and other news media and presents the existing empirical literature. The local TV market in 
Switzerland is described in chapter 4.4, while chapter 4.5 presents the empirical analysis of 
local TV on voters and chapter 4.6 the empirical analysis of local TV on politicians. Chapter 
4.7 concludes. 
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4.2.  Media and Politics 
The ability of voters and interest groups to enforce their preferences in the political process 
and to effectively control government depends, among other institutional settings, on the 
information available to them, and on the cost of information respectively. Interest groups 
with concentrated benefits will be able to organize themselves and keep themselves informed, 
exerting pressure on politicians. In contrast, consumers or taxpayers with dispersed interests 
will have little individual incentives to inform themselves and will therefore not receive 
favorable policies (Olson 1965). Mass media may attenuate this bias, “since they provide 
politicians with a megaphone that reaches exactly the large, dispersed consumer groups” 
(Strömberg 2002, p. 97). Mass media decrease the information costs of large, unorganized 
interest groups.  
Politicians are therefore expected to react to the extent of media distribution and the amount 
and kind of media that voters consume. Politicians bias government policies in favor of 
informed voters. Strömberg (2004b) shows empirically that the diffusion of radio in the US 
led to an increase in government spending in counties with more radio access. Similarly, 
Bruns and Himmler (2008) provide evidence that government spending is higher in counties 
closer to media cities because reporting from these locations is less expensive. Yet, not all 
groups are equally important for media firms. News, especially that of TV channels which are 
almost exclusively financed through advertising, will be tailored to groups with characteristics 
valuable for advertisers (see e.g Hamilton 2004). Strömberg (2004a) analyses theoretically 
how increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of mass media leads to 
policies favorable to large groups and groups valuable to advertisers. Other authors analyze 
more generally the effects of free media on different political and economic outcomes. Private 
ownership of the media, press freedom and low concentration in the media market are 
associated, for example, with better government accountability (Besley and Prat 2006), less 
corruption (Brunetti and Weder 2003) and more political rights and better social outcomes 
(Djankov et al. 2003). This is due to voters consuming more news, being better informed 
about politics and being politically more active in countries with freer media (Leeson 2008). 
Yet the diffusion of new media is also subject to worries and criticism. Putnam (2000) relates 
the sharp decrease of social capital, civic engagement and political participation in the US to 
the diffusion of television (see also Gentzkow 2006). Sunstein (2001; 2007) fears that the 
internet and its possibility to filter information may have negative effects on extremism and 
the functioning of democracy. The discussions of Becker et al. (2007) or Trappel (2008), who 
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argue that media freedom is not the only aspect important in modern democracies, go in a 
similar direction. Other elements such media diversity, media accountability, and media’s 
support of deliberation are relevant as well.78 
In any case, not only the absence or presence, or the amount of, free media influence the 
political process, but also the organization of media markets and other institutional settings 
can affect the behavior of voters and politicians. Snyder and Strömberg (2008) show that a 
better match or congruence between media markets and congressional districts leads to voters 
knowing more about their representatives and to politicians being more responsive to voters’ 
needs. The geography of media markets also affects the political process in a further manner. 
The spread of national media leads to less local news being consumed and to lower local voter 
turnout among target groups. George and Waldfogel (2006; 2008) show that the expansion of 
the New York Times decreases local newspaper readership among college graduates targeted 
by the Times and leads to them being less likely to vote in local elections. Localism is not 
only affected by newspapers but also by television. The presence of local TV news in Spanish 
increases Hispanic voter turnout in the US by 5 to 10 percentage points, relative to non-
Hispanic voter turnout (Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel 2009). While the integration of media 
markets may lead to more choice and better preference satisfaction for consumers, it can also 
undermine local civic engagement. 
In sum, existing studies show that media play an important role in the political process and 
that the organization of media markets can shape the specific impact the media have on voters 
and politicians. The next section discusses the specific roles of different types of media and 
specifically addresses how TV differs from other kinds of media. 
                                                 
78 Another important aspect is, of course, the amount, causes, and consequences of media bias (see, e.g., 
Eichenberger and Serna 1996; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Baron 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; 
Reuter and Zitzewitz 2006; Gerber et al. 2009). 
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4.3. Is Television Different from Other Types of Media? 
Television features some obvious differences from other types of media, especially 
newspapers, due to technological reasons. Since the development of satellite technologies, TV 
has been able to broadcast events live from any corner of the world. This is not possible for 
newspapers.79 Another difference lies in the feature of TV news being limited by time while 
newspapers have limited space (and, typically, TV news are more limited). This leads to the 
inclusion by TV news of less and less detailed – and maybe more understandable – 
information. In contrast to newspaper readers, TV viewers cannot control the pace at which 
they receive and process information unless the broadcasts are recorded (Druckman 2005). 
Further important differences concern the significance of visual aspects. The need to combine 
words with (moving) pictures on TV may lead to a completely different news product. 
Personalization and emphasis on emotional aspects may be the result. 
While many authors just assume television is different and even ascribe changes in political 
campaigning over time to the expansion of TV, especially of private stations (see e.g. Bean 
and Mughan 1989, p. 1168, 1175; and the discussion in Schoenbach 1996, p. 92-93), there is 
little empirical evidence that television content really differs from other media content. Many 
studies that empirically analyze, for example, personalization and tone of political news look 
at trends over time in one type of media and do not compare television to other media (see 
e.g. Sigelman and Bullock 1991; Patterson 1993, p. 113-115; Wattenberg 1996; Wilke and 
Reinemann 2001). The few studies that do compare TV news to newspaper content present 
mixed results. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) show in a cross-section of Dutch media that 
TV news are more personalized than newspapers in the sense that they more often use a 
human interest frame, i.e., bring “a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an 
event, issue, or problem”. Yet differences between types of outlets are larger than between 
types of media. Druckman (2005) analyzes how local newspapers and local TV stations cover 
the 2000 Minnesota Senate campaign. While there are large differences in quantity of 
coverage (i.e., newspapers covered the senate campaign on 88% of the days coded while TV 
did so only on 34%) the differences in content style are rather small. Particularly, there are no 
differences in personalization between media types and only moderate differences in the use 
                                                 
79 However, radio has the same possibilities and with the increasing diffusion of internet this feature has become 
less of a comparative advantage of TV. 
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of issue frames (i.e., newspapers use an issue frame in 31% of analyzed cases and TV in 
21%).  
Even though these studies usually content analyze entire newspapers, they typically only 
examine TV news while disregarding other broadcast with political content. However, many 
TV stations feature regular discussion programs on political issues. Furthermore, TV debates 
between candidates have become an important aspect of election campaigns. This importance 
is also reflected in the usually extensive post-debate coverage, not only on TV, but also in 
newspapers (Reinemann and Wilke 2007). While candidates of course talk about political 
issues in a TV debate, the focus is on them as a person. It could therefore be argued that such 
TV formats represent the clear differences between TV and newspapers.80 Even if content 
analyses show no systematic differences between news on television and newspapers, TV 
probably focuses more on politicians than it does on policies, parties or other factual 
information. 
Consequentially, the impact that this different coverage of politics on TV has on politics, or 
more concretely, on the behavior of voters and politicians, can be analyzed. Prominent in 
communications research is the mediatization or mediation hypothesis (see, e.g., Blumler and 
Kavanagh 1999; Schulz 2004), which states that due to the rise of mass media, and especially 
TV, “the media have been moving to centre of the political process […] altering the behavior 
of candidates, the parties’ campaign organization and the behavior of the electorate” (Schulz 
et al. 2005, p. 56). Central themes in empirical studies in this research field are the 
professionalization and personalization of political campaigns and their effects on citizens. 
Two main types of empirical studies can be distinguished. Analogous to, or even in 
connection with, analyses of media content, a first type of study investigates changes over 
time. Again, results on personalization of voter decisions, for example, are mixed and rather 
than showing a consistent time trend voters’ use of criteria to evaluate parties and candidates 
seems to be context specific (see, e.g., Schulz et al. 2005). A second type of study focuses 
more on media consumption and compares newspaper readers to television viewers. TV 
viewers know less about politics than newspaper readers,81 base their voting decisions more 
                                                 
80 Of course, newspapers also print interviews with politicians. Yet, interviews usually do not use a large part of 
newspaper space and are typically included in the content analysis of newspapers. 
81 The same also applies when comparing viewers of public TV channels to viewers of private channels (Holtz-
Bacha and Norris 2001). 
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on criteria relating to the politician as a person as compared to her stand on political issues 
(e.g. Keeter 1987), their voter turnout is lower, and they are less interested in politics. It is 
however difficult to infer a causal effect of TV consumption on knowledge and behavior. 
Different types of people rely on political information from TV than from newspapers. 
Among other factors, TV viewers are less educated than newspaper readers, earn less and are 
less interested in politics (see, e.g., the discussion in Graber 2006, 183-184). 
It is therefore difficult to assess in which direction the causal relationships run. How would it 
be possible to ascertain whether, for example, people with less political knowledge watch 
more TV or if TV imparts less knowledge than newspapers do? One might have to analyze 
exogenous changes in television supply. Prat and Strömberg (2005) use exactly this approach 
in their analysis of private TV on voter information in Sweden. They show that the 
introduction of private TV in Sweden benefited the young and the less informed that 
previously used few other news sources (e.g. public television). After the introduction of 
private TV, this voter group began watching private TV news, obtained significantly higher 
knowledge and thus increased participation in politics. The analysis is based on panel data, 
i.e., the same people are surveyed before and after the introduction of the private channels, 
and allows for a causal interpretation of the results. It is also interesting to note that the results 
of Prat and Strömberg confirm previous cross-sectional results which found that better 
informed people are more likely to watch public TV, while worse informed groups are 
inclined to watch private TV. Yet, the interpretation is not, as in many cross-sectional studies 
cited above, that (commercial) television has a negative impact on citizens’ knowledge. On 
the contrary, less informed people who are not attracted by other media gain from private TV 
(see Prat and Strömberg 2005, p. 4). It is therefore suspected that many cross-sectional results 
comparing newspaper readers and TV viewers, for example, cannot be interpreted causal. 
Some other studies allow for causal inferences of TV on political participation. Gentzkow 
(2006) analyzes the introduction of television in the US that occurred in different regions at a 
different point of time due to exogenous, i.e., technical, reasons. His results are more 
pessimistic and show that TV reduced voter turnout considerably, due in large part to its 
negative impact on newspaper readership. Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009) use cross-
sectional as well as panel data, and their results are based on the comparison of different voter 
groups with different access to TV. They show that voter turnout of Hispanics in the US in 
areas with local TV news in Spanish compared to the voter turnout of Non-Hispanics is much 
higher than in areas without news in Spanish. Using cross-sectional data, Olken (2008) 
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analyzes exogenous differences in TV supply in Indonesian villages due to topographical 
reasons. He finds a negative impact of TV on attendance in town meetings. All these studies 
do, however, not include TV consumption in their analysis. 
Why do some studies find negative effects and other studies positive effects of TV on 
political participation? Of course, TV does not usually enter into a setting where citizens did 
not have prior access to any media or political information, and media markets vary 
considerably between countries and times. The impact of TV might therefore depend on the 
complex substitutive and complementary relationships between the different types of media 
and between media with a different degree of local content. Specifically, the spread of 
television in the first half of the last century led to entertainment becoming relatively cheaper 
than news and, because TV coverage was mainly national, to a crowding out of local news 
consumption. In contrast, today, where people in most developed nations have access to a vast 
choice of entertainment TV, an increase in (local) TV news supply might have a rather 
positive impact on civic engagement. Another reason for the differing results might be, as Prat 
and Strömberg (2005) show, that the effect of TV differs for different populations groups, 
especially as TV targets different population groups than newspapers, for example.  
Here, it is hypothesized that the less educated or previously ill informed profit from television 
presenting news in a simpler82 and more personalized way than traditional (print) media. 
Having a type of news media that better meets their needs may lead to them consuming more 
news and being better informed. Better information should decrease the probability of making 
a wrong voting decision and increase political participation. 
Second, it is hypothesized that due to the dominance of the moving picture television news 
carry more person, i.e., politician, related information than factual information on policies and 
party programs compared to newspapers and radio. Political parties react to the presence of 
TV by increasingly putting individual politicians in the center of their parliamentary election 
campaigns instead of party programs. More parties will nominate candidates for elections in 
which the candidates themselves and not the parties and their programs attract the most media 
attention. 
                                                 
82 An additional effect might come from the fact that news on local TV in Switzerland are presented in Swiss 
German dialect while news on national public TV and in Newspapers are in High German, which can be difficult 
to understand for some people, e.g. for those with low education. 
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The above hypotheses are tested using data on the presence of local TV news in Switzerland. 
Cross-sectional data are used and extended with panel data where possible. The empirical 
analysis distinguishes between TV channels serving only one canton, i.e., sub-national 
jurisdiction and electoral district for federal elections, (“cantonal stations”) and TV channels 
covering several cantons (“intercantonal stations”). The effects of local TV news on the 
behavior of voters and politicians are expected to be stronger when television news are 
targeted at one jurisdiction and political debates on TV present the candidates of one electoral 
district only. The next section describes the local TV market in Switzerland in more detail. 
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4.4. Local Television in Switzerland 
Television in Switzerland is heavily regulated. All Swiss programs need a concession from 
the BAKOM, the federal telecommunications and broadcasting authority.83 The Swiss 
television market is dominated by the public-broadcasting company SF Schweizer Fernsehen 
and its six license fee financed TV stations (two in German, two in Italian, two in French). 
However, most Swiss households also receive and watch many foreign channels, especially 
those from the surrounding countries, Germany, Austria, France and Italy (IP Network 2006). 
Domestic private television stations offering comprehensive programming only began 
developing during the mid 90s. The only two private national channels that started during the 
90s were (financially) unsuccessful and ceased operations after a few years. Today, only 
channel 3+, which started broadcasting in 2006, is still active. The local television market is, 
however, much more active than the national market. According to data from the BAKOM, in 
2006, 18 private local or regional TV stations offered comprehensive programming with daily 
news broadcasts and 9 more stations offered weekly programming. Fifty more providers were 
in possession of a concession but only offered videotext or sporadic shows, e.g. before local 
elections.  
Local TV stations are licensed to distribute their program in a clearly defined territory, 
sometimes comprising several communities and often one canton84 or (parts of) several 
cantons. They can only be received via cable.85 Terrestrial distribution or satellite distribution 
is usually not allowed.86 In their daily news and special broadcasts before elections, these TV 
stations focus on regional issues happening in their broadcasting area. TeleZüri, the channel 
that can be received in the whole canton of Zurich, states on its homepage that its daily news 
broadcast, the ZüriNews, covers up-to-date news stories focusing on the area of Zurich. 
Similarly, Tele Ostschweiz, a channel broadcasting in 4 cantons in the eastern part of 
Switzerland, writes on its homepage that it covers “the most important news from the cantons 
                                                 
83 As the data used in this chapter is for the period 1990-2007, this and the following information relates to the 
situation before April 01, 2007, when a new radio and television law with less strict concession requirements 
was enacted. 
84 Swiss cantons are the equivalent to US states. 
85 82% of Swiss households have access to cable TV (IP Network 2006). 
86 There exist two exceptions to this rule. The stations “Léman Bleu” and “TeleSüdostschweiz” are also 
transmitted terrestrially in the canton of Geneva and in the canton of Graubünden, respectively. 
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of Appenzell Innerhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, St.Gallen, and Thurgau”. These two 
examples reveal that local TV stations can be divided in two broad categories. “Cantonal 
stations” relate to one specific jurisdiction (canton), while “intercantonal stations” cover 
several jurisdictions (cantons). Each channel can been assigned to one or several cantons 
according to its area of distribution and its mission statement (i.e., which areas it mainly 
covers in its daily local news) and classified as “cantonal or “intercantonal”. TeleZüri, for 
example, aside from being available within the majority of the canton of Zurich, may be 
watched in some bordering communities of the cantons of Aargau, Glarus and Schwyz. Yet, it 
is only assigned as a cantonal station to the Canton of Zurich and not to the other cantons, as 
its main distribution area lies within the canton of Zurich and its news cover only the area of 
Zurich.  
In Switzerland, many political decisions, including tax issues, are made at cantonal level and 
cantons correspond to electoral districts for federal parliamentary elections. Voters in cantons 
with a cantonal TV channel will probably receive more information relevant for their political 
decisions trough local TV than voters in cantons with intercantonal TV.87 
Table 16 presents data on local TV in Swiss cantons for all federal election years since 1990. 
There exist no (official) statistics on the diffusion of local TV in Switzerland. The data have 
therefore been compiled using information from the BAKOM, the TV channels themselves 
and several newspaper archives. In 1994, TeleZüri was the first local TV station to start 
broadcasting daily up-to-date news programs.88 During the 1991 federal elections, voters were 
restricted to information from newspapers, radio and the national TV programs. In 2007, 
when the last federal elections took place, voters in 23 of 26 cantons were able to receive 
local television. Voters in 9 cantons had access to cantonal TV, and voters in 14 cantons had 
access to intercantonal TV.  
 
                                                 
87 This distinction between cantonal and intercantonal channels is similar to the one Snyder and Strömberg 
(2008) make in their analysis of newspaper readership on politicians’ behavior. They look at the congruence or 
match between media markets and congressional districts. They show that newspaper coverage of 
representatives is higher in areas with a better match between media markets and congressional districts and 
voters are therefore better informed. Similarly, Gentzkow (2006) shows that the negative effect of spread of 
television on voter turnout in the US is higher in TV markets fragmented into more congressional districts. 
88 Before that, several stations existed which, however, did not broadcast daily news. In my empirical analysis I 
consider only those programs that offer news at least Monday to Friday. 
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Table 16: Local Television in Switzerland 1991-2007 
Number of cantons 
receiving local TV 
Year 
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 
No local TV 26 23 13 3 3 
Cantonal TV 0 3 7 9 9 
Intercantonal TV 0 0 6 14 14 
Data Source: Own compilation based on information from BAKOM, TV stations, and several newspaper 
archives. 
 
However, as local TV channels can only be received through cable, diffusion is not uniform 
within cantons. Depending on the share of households connected to cable and the cable 
operator serving a community, diffusion varies considerably within cantons. Some 
communities do not have access to local TV at all, either because the cable operator does not 
distribute the channel or because some channels are only licensed to distribute their program 
within a specific part of a canton.  
For the year 2007, detailed data on the diffusion of local TV in Swiss communities have been 
compiled using information from SuissImage, the Swiss Authors' Rights Cooperative for 
Audiovisual Works.89 Table 17 presents data on the diffusion of local TV in 2007 for each of 
the 26 cantons separately. TV stations are again classified as either “cantonal” or 
“intercantonal”. In the cantons with cantonal TV the diffusion is lowest in the canton of Vaud 
where 35.5% of communities receive local TV and highest in the canton of Aargau where 
90.8% of communities receive local TV. Among the cantons with intercantonal TV, Basel 
Stadt has the highest diffusion rate with 100% of communities receiving local TV and the 
canton of Graubünden the lowest diffusion rate with only 20% of communities receiving it. In 
the three cantons, Fribourg, Jura and Solothurn, there is neither cantonal nor intercantonal TV 
available.90 
 
                                                 
89 Cable operators must report the number of their subscribers and the TV channels they distribute to SuissImage 
in order for SuissImage to calculate the tariffs for the use and distribution of protected audiovisual works. 
90 In some communities of these and other cantons, people receive local TV stations that focus their news 
programs on other cantons and regions. These communities are coded as not receiving any local TV news. 
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Table 17: Local Television in Swiss Cantons 2007 
Canton 
Share of communities 
No local TV Cantonal TV Intercantonal TV
AG 9% 91% 0% 
AI 17% 0.0% 83% 
AR 15% 0.0% 85% 
BE 33% 67% 0% 
BL 9% 0.0% 91% 
BS 0% 0% 100% 
FR 100% 0% 0% 
GE 58% 42% 0% 
GL 64% 0% 36% 
GR 80% 0% 20% 
JU 100% 0% 0% 
LU 19% 0% 81% 
NE 19% 81% 0% 
NW 0% 0% 100% 
OW 14% 0% 86% 
SG 8% 0% 92% 
SH 28% 72% 0% 
SO 100% 0% 0% 
SZ 56.7% 0.0% 43.3% 
TG 31.2% 0.0% 68.8% 
TI 30% 71% 0% 
UR 45% 0% 55% 
VD 64% 35% 0% 
VS 56% 44% 0% 
ZG 0% 0% 100% 
ZH 7.6% 92.4% 39.2% 
 Share of communities 
Switzerland 46% 40% 18% 
 Share of households 
Switzerland 21% 56% 28% 
Notes: Each TV channel is assigned to one or more cantons. Communities / 
households receiving TV from another canton are classified as receiving no local 
TV. 66 communities in the canton of Zurich receive cantonal as well as 
intercantonal TV. 
Data Source: Own compilation based on data from SuissImage. 
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4.5. The Effects of Local Television on Voters 
4.5.1. Data and Empirical Strategy 
The empirical analysis of voter behavior is based on the cross-sectional data on community 
level described above. Two different measures are used. First, I use dummy variables 
indicating if cantonal or intercantonal TV is distributed in a community. The reference group 
comprises respondents in communities without local TV news. The second measure 
additionally takes into account that the share of households having access to local TV stations 
via cable varies over communities. Data on local TV penetration is available for all 2721 
communities in 26 cantons. The data are merged with individual level data from Selects 2007. 
In Selects 2007, 4392 people were interviewed in October and November 2007 shortly after 
the federal parliamentary elections. The survey includes questions on media consumption, 
political participation and voting behavior, opinion formation and many socio-demographic 
variables. The combination of the Selects 2007 data with local TV data results in data 
availability for 4162 to 4230 individuals in 1135 communities and 25 cantons.91 
For the analysis of media consumption, the following baseline specification is used: 
 
NCi =β0 + β1 TVj + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
 
The news consumption NCi of individual i living in community j and canton c depends on the 
availability of local television TVj in community j, on individual characteristics Xi, as well as 
on canton-specific effects Dc. For the dependent variable, news consumption, respondents are 
asked on how many days a week they usually watch the news on TV, read the politics section 
in their newspaper and listen to the news on the radio. The survey reveals that TV is the most 
commonly used source of news with respondents watching, on average, TV news 4.7 days a 
                                                 
91 The total number of observations in Selects 2007 is 4392. 159 respondents could not unambiguously be 
assigned to a community and are therefore missing data on local TV. 8 more respondents are missing data on the 
consumption of TV news, 37 on newspaper and 18 on radio consumption. 3 Respondents did not answer the 
question on election participation. The sample is further reduced when including interaction effects due to 
missing education data for 35 respondents and when using the share of households receiving local TV due to this 
information not being available for 28 respondents. There are no observations included in the survey for the 
canton of Nidwalden. 
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week (standard deviation 2.5). TV is followed by radio (average 4.5 days a week, standard 
deviation 2.9) and newspapers (average 3.7 days a week, standard deviation 2.7). For each of 
the three media types, separate regressions are run. While the main interest is in TV news 
consumption, the two other media consumption activities are used for robustness checks (see 
below). The individual control variables used in the analysis are age, sex, education, 
household income, household size (square root), marital status, employment status, time of 
residency in the respective canton, participation in the last federal election in 2003, and 
interest in politics as measured on a scale from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested). 
Table 18 presents the descriptive statistics. 
 
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics Selects 2007 
 Mean/share Standard deviation 
Local TV   
In a community with cantonal TV 54.2%  
In a community with intercantonal TV 31.7%  
Politics   
Participation in federal elections 68.9%  
Participation in last federal elections 74.9%  
Political interest [1-4] 2.8 0.85 
Media consumption   
Days a week watching news on TV 4.7 2.5 
Days a week reading newspapers 3.7 2.7 
Days a week listening to news on radio 4.5 2.9 
Individual/household characteristics   
Male 44.6%  
Female 54.4%  
Age 51.9 17.7 
Household income (in 1000 CHF) 6.4 2.9 
Household size 2.4 1.3 
Marital status   
Married 52.8%  
Single 24.7%  
Divorced or separated 11.9%  
Widowed 10.5%  
Education   
No education / primary school 4.8%  
Compulsory education 7.2%  
Vocational education 41.4%  
Higher secondary school / voc. diploma 9.3%  
High school 5.8%  
High vocational education / college 17.8%  
University 13.7%  
 Table to be continued 
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Continuation of Table 18   
Employment status   
Working full-time 35.3%  
Working part-time 21.1%  
In training/formation 4.3%  
Working in family business 0.6%  
Working in household 8.1%  
Retired 25.8%  
Disabled 2.7%  
Unemployed 1.3%  
Doing other 1.0%  
Residency in canton   
Up to 1 year 1.1%  
1 to 3 years 2.1%  
3 to 5 years 2.3%  
5 to 10 years 5.7%  
More than 10 years 88.7%  
Data Source: Selects 2007 (Selb et al. 2008), and own compilation based on data from 
SuissImage. 
 
In the second specification it is taken into account that the intensity of local political 
coverage, and therefore the effects of local television on voter behavior, might depend on the 
match between TV markets and jurisdictions. Therefore, penetration of cantonal television 
CTVj and intercantonal television ITVj are included separately into the regression. The same 
control variables as in the first specification are used. 
 
NCi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
 
A third specification addresses the hypothesis that the effects of local TV on behavior might 
not be uniform over different population groups. Specifically, I test whether TV responds 
more to the needs of less educated people, and if less educated people consume more news 
when local TV is available. Again, I differentiate between cantonal and intercantonal TV and 
add interaction effects between both, cantonal and intercantonal TV and education to the 
estimation. The control variables are the same as in the previous specifications. The direct 
effect of education is included as well (in Xi). 
 
NCi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + β3 (CTVj*EDUCi) + β4(CTVj*EDUCi)+ γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
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Similar specifications are used for voter participation: 
 
PEi =β0 + β1 TVj + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
PEi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
PEi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + β3 (CTVj*EDUCi) + β4(CTVj*EDUCi)+ γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc + i 
 
For the dependent variable PEi the respondents were asked if they participated in the last 
federal elections. 68.9% of respondents gave an affirmative answer. This is more than the 
actual voter turnout of 48.3%. A correction for this over-sampling does not change the general 
results.  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are estimated for news consumption and probit 
regressions for election participation. Standard errors are clustered at the community level. As 
availability of and access to local TV news varies within cantons, canton dummies are 
included in the analysis. Therefore individuals within the same canton but in communities 
with different access to local TV are compared to each other. 
This approach avoids most problems present in normal cross-sectional analyses in which TV 
viewers are compared to non-viewers. It might nevertheless be possible that communities 
with more or less access to local TV differ in other respects from each other. For example, 
there is less diffusion of cable and therefore of local TV in small rural communities. I 
therefore control as well for communities being urban or rural, community size and other 
community characteristics (22 point scale by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office capturing 
many aspects such as population dynamics, economic structure or prosperity). These 
community characteristics are captured with the term COMCHj: 
 
NCi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + β3 (CTVj*EDUCi) + β4(CTVj*EDUCi) + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc  
+ γ3 COMCHj + i 
PEi =β0 + β1 CTVj + β2 ITVj + β3 (CTVj*EDUCi) + β4(CTVj*EDUCi) + γ1 Xi + γ2 Dc  
+ γ3 COMCHj + i 
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Despite many control variables, the variation of local TV within cantons could be endogenous 
to news consumption and political participation.92 Within-canton variation of access to local 
TV comes from two sources. First, the license of a TV station sometimes only covers certain 
parts of a canton and second, cable penetration varies between communities.93 
Regarding the first source of variation, it could be argued that TV stations only strive for a 
license in those parts of a canton where they expect people to attend to their programs and 
where people show sufficient interest and participation in politics. However, the argument has 
to be extended because here, it is hypothesized that local TV mainly affects the less educated. 
Advertising financed TV channels are interested in an audience with high purchasing power 
that generates high advertising revenues (see Hamilton 2004 for a comprehensive discussion 
of the argument). Therefore, a positive correlation between news consumption and political 
participation of the high earning and the high educated and local TV should be observed and 
not between news consumption and political participation of the less educated and local TV. 
Furthermore, different news consumption activities are usually shown to be positively 
correlated at the individual level, i.e., the politically interested consume on average more of 
all types of media than the politically indifferent. If local TV stations choose their distribution 
area based on the prospective audience, there should not only be a positive correlation 
between TV news consumption and local TV but also between other news consumption and 
local TV. I check this regressing not only TV news consumption but also newspaper and radio 
news consumption on local TV. Last, due to practical reasons, licenses often match with areas 
of cable operators. These areas follow economic reasons that are most likely not correlated 
with people’s political participation and interest in local news.94 
                                                 
92 Of course, the same question arises regarding the variation of local TV between cantons. Here, endogeneity is 
much more likely than in the case of variation within a canton. It is, however, not a problem in the empirical 
analysis as canton dummies are included in the regression and therefore within-canton variation is used for the 
identification of the effects. 
93 Using the dummy indicator for local TV, the second source of variation only matters for the distinction 
between communities that do have cable TV and communities do not have cable TV at all. Using the second 
indicator for local TV the share of households in a community that has access to cable TV is taken into account 
as well. 
94 In Switzerland, many communities had their own communal cable operator or community antenna, or small 
private cable operators served local areas. While some of them still exist today, many of these local providers 
merged in the nineties. 
    141
Regarding the second source of variation, it could be argued that households buy access to 
cable TV when they are interested in local politics and therefore want access to local TV. 
However, cable diffusion in Switzerland mainly took place before local TV stations came into 
operation. In 1994, before the first local TV channel started its regular operation, 2.2 million 
households had access to cable TV. By 2007, the number had only risen to 2.9 million 
households.95 Moreover, cable TV buys much more than only access to local TV. With cable 
TV, households receive 30 to 40 TV channels, mainly public and private channels from the 
neighboring countries, compared to only the handful of Swiss public stations with only 
terrestrial TV. It is therefore questionable if preferences for local TV would really drive cable 
subscriptions. 
In sum, endogeneity seems not to be a big issue when looking at within-canton variation of 
local TV. Furthermore, it should be noted that the analysis is also based on the differentiation 
between different education groups and the distinction between cantonal and intercantonal TV 
stations. This again strengthens a causal interpretation of the results. 
4.5.2. Results 
This section presents the empirical analysis of the effect of local TV news on voters. First, the 
effects of local TV on television news consumption as well as on other media consumption 
are analyzed. Second, the effects local TV has on voter participation are investigated. 
Table 19 presents the results on the effects of the presence of local TV on TV news 
consumption. Column (A) reveals that there is no statistically significant effect of the 
availability of local TV on respondents’ TV news consumption when not differentiating 
between the different types of TV stations and between education groups. When looking at 
cantonal and intercantonal channels separately (column (B)) the coefficient for cantonal TV is 
positive and the coefficient for intercantonal TV negative but both effects are still not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. However, when interacting the availability of 
cantonal and intercantonal TV with individuals’ education, cantonal TV has a statistically 
significant effect on TV news consumption (column (C)). People with low education watch 
more TV news when cantonal TV is available. As the interaction effect is statistically 
                                                 
95 In the same period the number of households increased as well. The share of households having access to 
cable TV therefore only increased slightly. Detailed numbers on households are only available for the years 1990 
(2.9 million households) and 2000 (3.2 million households). 
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significantly negative (p0.05), the marginal effect of TV becomes smaller the higher the 
education of the respondent. Interestingly, there is no statistically significant effect of 
intercantonal TV on news consumption, not even for people with low education. Only when 
local TV markets match well with jurisdictions do people use local TV as a regular 
information source. Including additional control variables at community level in column (D) 
does not change the general picture. The coefficients, however, become somewhat smaller in 
size and statistical significance. In column (E) the share of households having access to local 
TV is used instead of a dummy variable. Again, the general results stay the same.  
 
Table 19: Local TV and TV News Consumption 
Dependent variable: TV news 
consumption [0-7] 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Local TV (any kind) 0.079 
(0.58)    
 
Cantonal TV  0.151 (0.85) 
0.570* 
(2.37) 
0.479(*) 
(1.92) 
0.580* 
(2.22) 
Cantonal TV * education   -0.118* (-2.37) 
-0.117* 
(-2.35) 
-0.086(*)
(-1.70) 
Intercantonal TV  -0.147 (-0.99) 
0.097 
(0.45) 
0.148 
(0.67) 
0.101 
(0.44) 
Intercantonal TV * education   -0.076 (-1.40) 
-0.083 
(-1.51) 
-0.065 
(-1.17) 
Education yes yes -0.099* 
(-2.13) 
-0.098* 
(-2.07) 
-0.128**
(-2.82) 
Socio-demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Political interest and participation yes yes yes yes yes 
Community type and size no no no yes yes 
Canton-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
No. of observations 4,225 4,225 4,190 4,190 4,162 
R-squared  0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered at community level, t-values in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the number of days a week respondents watch TV news. In columns (A) to (D) local TV 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a cantonal or intercantonal channel is distributed in a community. In 
column (E) local TV is measured as the share of households in a community having access to a cantonal or 
intercantonal channel. Socio-demographic controls include sex, age, household income, marital status, 
employment status, household size, and for how many years respondents have been living in the canton. A 
dummy variable for the top income category and dummy variables indicating missing observations for political 
interest, participation in last elections, household income, marital status, employment status, years living in 
canton and, in regression (A) and (B), education are included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: Selects 2007 (Selb et al. 2008), Federal Statistical Office, and own compilation based on data 
from SuissImage. 
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Figure 14 graphically shows the marginal effect of cantonal TV on TV news consumption for 
all seven education categories of regression (C) to (E) and for a specification including all 
educations categories and its interaction with local TV separately (results not shown in Table 
19).96 
 
Figure 14: Marginal Effect of Cantonal TV on TV News Consumption by Level of Education 
 a) 
 
 b) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 See Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) for a discussion on the interpretation and presentation of interaction 
models. 
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 c) 
 
 d) 
 
Notes:  For specification and data sources of a) to c) see Table 12, regression (C) to (E). For d), 
education categories and their interaction with local TV have been included separately in the 
regression (regression results not shown in Table 12). The specification is otherwise equal to 
estimation (E) in Table 12. 
 
Depending on the exact specification, the marginal effect is positive and significant for 
education categories one to two or three, i.e., for people having vocational education / higher 
secondary schooling or less, and then drops below statistical significance for people with 
higher education. The marginal effect is sizeable. People with only primary school education 
watch on average half a day more the news when there is cantonal TV. Looking at the more 
flexible specification in Figure c), it becomes evident that cantonal TV increases the news 
consumption of people with compulsory and vocational education but not of people with only 
primary school or less. 
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Table 20 presents the results on how people adjust their newspaper and radio consumption to 
the availability of local TV news.  
 
Table 20: Local TV and Newspaper and Radio News Consumption 
Dependent variable: Newspaper news [0-7] Radio news [0-7] 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Cantonal TV 0.026 
(0.17) 
0.373 
(1.55) 
-0.138 
(-0.67) 
-0.117 
(-0.44) 
Cantonal TV * education  -0.092 (-1.58)  
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
Intercantonal TV 0.046 
(0.31) 
0.232 
(1.01) 
0.040 
(0.21) 
0.121 
(0.42) 
Intercantonal TV * education  -0.060 (-0.98)  
-0.025 
(-0.36) 
Education yes 0.208** 
(4.22) 
yes -0.016 
(-0.27) 
Socio-demographic controls yes yes yes yes 
Political interest and participation yes yes yes yes 
Community type and size yes yes yes yes 
Canton-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
No. of observations 4196 4161 4215 4180 
R-squared  0.33 0.33 0.07 0.06 
Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered at community level, t-values in brackets. The 
dependent variable is in columns (A) and (B) the number of days a week respondents read news in newspapers 
and in columns (C) and (D) the number of days a week respondents listen to the news on radio. Local TV is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if a cantonal or intercantonal channel is distributed in a community. Socio-
demographic controls include sex, age, employment status, marital status, household income, household size, 
and for how many years respondents have been living in the canton. A dummy variable for the top income 
category and dummy variables indicating missing observations for political interest, participation in last 
elections, household income, marital status, employment status, years living in canton and, in regression (A) 
and (B), education are included as well. Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: Selects 2007 (Selb et al. 2008), Federal Statistical Office, and own compilation based on data 
from SuissImage. 
 
No statistically significant effects are found when distinguishing between cantonal and 
intercantonal TV or when interacting local TV with education. Therefore, there is no evidence 
that TV channels choose their diffusion area due to people’s interest in local news, i.e., there 
is no evidence that local TV penetration is endogenous to news consumption. Furthermore, 
people seem not to substitute away from other news media when local TV is available. Rather 
they increase their total news consumption by consuming more TV news. 
Now, the question arises if this increased news consumption due to local TV further affects 
behavior. Better information should decrease the probability of making a wrong voting 
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decision, increase consumption benefits of voting, stimulate interest in politics and increase 
political participation (Matsusaka 1995; Leeson 2008). Hence, I analyze whether the presence 
or absence of local TV affects participation in federal elections. As cantons correspond to 
electoral districts, it is hypothesized that cantonal TV news in particular positively affects 
turnout. I again distinguish between different levels of education. Table 21 presents the results 
of the probit regressions. 
 
Table 21: Local TV and Voter Participation 
Dependent variable: participation in 
federal elections 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Coef. 
(z-value) 
Coef. 
(z-value) 
Coef. 
(z-value) 
Coef. 
(z-value) 
Coef. 
(z-value) 
Local TV (any kind) 0.063 
(0.74)    
 
Cantonal TV  0.150 (1.36) 
0.399**
(2.64) 
0.437** 
(2.85) 
0.418**
(2.60) 
Cantonal TV * education   -0.082* (-2.47) 
-0.085* 
(-2.56) 
-0.071(*)
(-1.94) 
Intercantonal TV  0.012 (0.11) 
0.088 
(0.61) 
0.090 
(0.60) 
-0.013 
(-0.08) 
Intercantonal TV * education   -0.028 (0-0.74) 
-0.035 
(-0.92) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
Education yes yes 0.111**
(3.54) 
0.116** 
(3.67) 
0.090**
(2.76) 
Socio-demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Political interest and participation yes yes yes yes yes 
Community type and size no no no yes yes 
Canton-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
No. of observations 4230 4230 4195 4195 4167 
Pseudo R-squared  0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Notes: Probit regressions with robust standard errors clustered at community level, z-values in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the participation in federal elections (National Council). In columns (A) to (D) local TV 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a cantonal or intercantonal channel is distributed in a community. In 
column (E) local TV is measured as the share of households in a community having access to a cantonal or 
intercantonal channel. Socio-demographic controls include sex, age, employment status, marital status, 
household income, household size, and for how many years respondents have been living in the canton. A 
dummy variable for the top income category and dummy variables indicating missing observations for political 
interest, participation in last elections, household income, marital status, employment status, years living in 
canton and, in regression (A) and (B), education are included as well. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: Selects 2007 (Selb et al. 2008), Federal Statistical Office, and own compilation based on data 
from SuissImage. 
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Columns (A) and (B) reveal that there is again no statistically significant effect of local TV on 
voter participation on average, neither when looking at local TV overall nor when 
distinguishing between cantonal and intercantonal television. Yet, when interacting the level 
of respondents’ education with the availability of cantonal and intercantonal TV coefficients 
become statistically significant (column C). Cantonal TV increases the probability of 
participating in elections for people with low levels of education, and the effect becomes 
smaller for higher levels of education.97 There is again no statistically significant effect of 
intercantonal TV on voting in federal elections. The coefficients remain stable when including 
controls at the community level (column D) and when using the share of households with 
access to local TV in a community instead of a dummy variable (column E). 
Figure 15 shows the marginal effects of cantonal TV on political participation for 
specifications (C) to (E).98 Depending on the exact specification, cantonal TV increases the 
probability of voting participation for persons with only primary school (education category 
0) by about 12 percentage points (p0.01). For people with secondary school or vocational 
education (education categories 2 and 3), the effect is with about 0.08 to 0.10 still sizeable 
and statistically significant at the 95% level. In education category 3 (higher secondary 
schooling), the effect has the size of about 0.05 and is in some specifications statistically 
significant at the 90% level. For respondents with higher education, the effect drops further 
and is not statistically significant at conventional levels anymore. Figure 15d) shows a more 
flexible specification where education categories and the interaction with cantonal and 
intercantonal TV have been added separately to the estimation. The general picture stays the 
same. There is a positive statistically significant effect of cantonal TV on voter participation 
for people in education categories 2 and 3 (vocational and higher secondary schooling) but 
not for people with lower or higher education. 
                                                 
97 As is shown by Norton et al. (2004), marginal interaction effects in non-linear models can vary by the value of 
the other variables included in the model. Running the inteff command in Stata proposed by the authors reveals 
that the interaction effect is negative for virtually all observations and statistically significant for most 
observations (except for some of the observations with very low and very high predicted probabilities). 
98 Marginal effects are calculated as the difference between the predicted probability of voting with cantonal TV 
and the predicted probability of voting without cantonal TV for an average individual without intercantonal TV. 
Hence, continuous control variables are at their mean and for categorical control variable the most frequent 
category is chosen. See the descriptive statistics in Table 18. The methodology is based on Brambor et al. (2006; 
2008). 
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Figure 15: Marginal Effect of Cantonal TV on Political Participation by Level of Education 
 a) 
 
 b) 
 
 c)  
 
  
 
    149
 d)  
 
Notes: For specification and data sources of a) to c) see Table 21, regression (C) to (E). For d), 
education categories and their interaction with local TV have been included separately in the 
regression (regression results not shown in table 6). The specification is otherwise equal to estimation 
(E) in Table 21. 
 
In sum, the empirical analysis reveals that people with low and especially with intermediate 
education consume more news and participate more in elections when they have access to a 
local TV station with a distribution area that matches well with sub-national jurisdictions. 
There is no such effect for people with higher education and in areas where local TV channels 
span over several jurisdictions. The effects are robust to different measures of local TV 
penetration and to different empirical specifications.  
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4.6. Local TV and Election Campaigns 
This chapter broadens the perspective taken so far and not only looks at the consumers but 
also at the (spillover) effects TV can generate on other actors. Not only voters but also 
politicians might react to the availability of different media and to different media market 
structures. The hypothesis that TV is more person-oriented than newspapers or radio and 
leads to changed incentives of politicians is examined by once again using data on Swiss 
federal elections. Federal elections take place every four years. Both chambers of parliament, 
the National Council consisting of 200 members (number of members are proportional to the 
population of the electoral districts), and the Council of States consisting of 46 members (two 
from each full canton and one from each of the six half cantons), are elected on the same day. 
Election campaigns of political parties therefore cover both elections simultaneously. Each of 
the 26 cantons forms an electoral district. Members of the National Council are elected by 
proportional representation and members of the Council of States by majority rule (except in 
the canton of Jura). Due to the different election rule and the much smaller number of 
candidates, Council of States candidates are much more present in the election campaigns. 
Most members of the Council of States belong to one of the four big parties represented in the 
federal government.99 In most cantons, members of small parties have a negligible chance of 
being elected. Usually, there are therefore only a few candidates competing for a seat in the 
Council of States. Yet, this seems to have changed during the last few years. In 2007, there 
were, for example, 12 official candidates for the two seats of the canton of Zurich compared 
to 7 candidates in 1991. Table 22 lists the average number of candidate in a canton for all 
election years since 1990, both in total and of small parties only. Small parties are defined as 
parties not represented in the federal government (independent candidates are not included). 
The total number of candidates increased from an average of 4.3 in 1991 to 5.3 in 2007 and 
the number of candidates from small parties from 1.0 to 1.4. However, the trend is not clearly 
linear. 
 
 
                                                 
99 These parties are the SP, CVP, FDP, and SVP. Since 1959, the Swiss Federal Council, which has seven 
members, has only consisted of members of these four parties. The Council of States usually includes none or 
very few members from other parties. In the period 1991-2007 there were on average two Councils of States 
members from other parties 
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Table 22: Candidates for Council of States Elections 1991-2007 
Average number of 
candidates in cantons 
Year 
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 
No. of candidates 4.3 4.4 4.9 4.6 5.3 
No. of candidates of 
small parties 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 
Data Source: Federal Statistical Office. 
 
The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (2007) attributes this change to local TV and writes that some 
small parties openly admit that their candidates run only to increase the party’s presence in 
the media. The above supposition is a nice example of how changes in the media environment 
change the behavior of politicians visibly, and it is empirically tested. In the following section 
the data and empirical strategy are presented in detail. 
4.6.1. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Politicians’ reactions to the availability of local TV and the increased TV news consumption 
by voters are empirically investigated using the following specifications: 
 
CSCc =β0 + β1 TVc + γ1 ELECc + γ2 Xc + c 
CSCc =β0 + β1 CTVc + β2 ITVc + γ1 ELECc + γ2 Xc + c 
 
The number of candidates for the council of states CSCc in canton c depends on the presence 
of local television TVc in canton c, as well as election specific control variables ELECc and 
other control variables Xc at the cantonal level. In the second specification it is again 
differentiated between cantonal (CTVc) and intercantonal (ITVc) TV stations. As in the 
previous section, two different indicators for the presence of TV are used: a dummy variable 
indicating if a local TV station is present in a canton or not and a variable accounting for the 
share of households that is able to receive local TV in a canton. Data on the number and the 
parties of candidates for the Council of States are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
Control variables include the number of free seats, i.e., how many incumbents run for re-
election, if any candidates are voted out, if candidates are elected at a citizens’ assembly or 
not, and variables for number of inhabitants and size of cantons, as well as for the local 
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economic situation (unemployment rate). The data source is also the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office. Ordinary least squares regressions are estimated. 
These specifications, however, have to be interpreted with caution. Cantons with cantonal TV 
differ also in other respects from cantons with intercantonal or no local TV. They are usually 
bigger and more urban etc. Although I control for such aspects, an omitted variable bias could 
occur nevertheless as the analysis can be done at the cantonal level only and canton dummies 
cannot be included within the regression as can be done when looking at the effects on voters. 
The study is therefore supplemented with a panel data analysis for the years 1991 to 2007.  
 
CSCcy =β0 + β1 CTVcy + β2 ITVcy + γ1 ELECcy + γ2 Dc + γ3 Dy + cy 
CSCcy =β0 + β1 CTVcy + β2 ITVcy + γ1 ELECcy + γ2 Dc + γ3 Dy + γ3 TTRENDc + cy 
 
Ordinary least squares fixed-effects estimators are applied controlling for time-invariant 
canton specific effects (Dc). Year dummies (Dy) are included as well to control for time-fixed 
effects that affect all cantons equally. A further specification also includes canton-specific 
time trends. 
4.6.2. Results 
Table 23 shows the results for a cross-section over 25 cantons for the year 2007.100 Column 
(A) shows that the average number of candidates from small parties with a negligible chance 
of being elected into the Council of States is higher when local TV is available in a canton. 
The effect is sizeable (1.6) and statistically significant at the 90% level. Column (B) takes a 
closer look at the effects of local TV and differentiates between TV stations covering only 
one canton and TV stations covering several cantons. The effects should be more pronounced 
for cantonal TV channels as candidates in these cantons get more attention from local TV. 
The empirical results support this hypothesis. It is revealed that only cantonal TV is 
statistically significantly associated with the number of candidates from small parties. The 
coefficient is considerable in size (2.8, p0.01). The effect is robust when using the share of 
households having access to local TV in a canton instead of a dummy variable (column (C)). 
                                                 
100 The canton of Jura is excluded from the analysis because it is the only canton with proportional 
representation. 
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Column (D) reveals that the coefficient is also statistically significant when looking at the 
total number of candidates.  
 
Table 23: Local TV and the Number of Candidates for State Council Elections 2007 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Local TV (any kind) 1.616(*) 
(1.72)  
  
Cantonal TV  2.814** (3.02) 
3.070** 
(2.90) 
4.565* 
(2.37) 
Intercantonal TV  0.914 (1.07) 
1.067 
(1.00) 
0.390 
(0.22) 
Non-incumbent seats -0.440 
(-0.91) 
-0.489 
(-1.17) 
-0.527 
(-1.22) 
-0.521 
(0.60) 
Citizens' assembly 0.240 
(0.18) 
0.021 
(0.02) 
0.323 
(0.28) 
-1.552 
(-0.66) 
Number of inhabitants (1000) (0.004)** 
(3.81) 
0.003** 
(3.20) 
0.003** 
(3.11) 
0.003 
(1.67) 
Size of canton -0.000 
(-0.14) 
-0.000 
(-0.73) 
-0.000 
(-0.53) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
Unemployment rate 0.548* 
(2.21) 
0.148 
(0.56) 
0.220 
(0.87) 
0.277 
(0.51) 
No. of observations 25 25 25 25 
R-squared  0.67 0.76 0.76 0.72 
Notes: OLS regressions, t-values in brackets. The dependent variable in columns (A) to (C) is the number of 
Council of States candidates from small parties not represented in the Federal Council (without independent
candidates) and in column (D) the number of all Council of States candidates. Local TV is in columns (A), (B) and
(D) a dummy variable indicating if cantonal or intercantonal TV is available in a canton and in column (C) the
share of households in a canton receiving cantonal or intercantonal TV. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: Federal statistical office and own compilation based on information from BAKOM, TV stations,
and several newspaper archives. 
 
The results stay robust using panel data for the period 1990-2007, although the coefficients 
become somewhat smaller. Table 24 presents the results. 
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Table 24: Local TV and the Number of Candidates for State Council Elections 1991-2007 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Coef. 
(t-value) 
Local TV (any kind) 0.539(*) 
(1.84)  
  
Cantonal TV  1.256** (3.73) 
0.871(*) 
(1.97) 
0.830 
(1.30) 
Intercantonal TV  0.079 (0.26) 
-0.095 
(-0.24) 
-0.782 
(-1.37) 
Free seats 0.300* 
(2.42) 
0.270* 
(2.32) 
0.153 
(1.22) 
0.951** 
(4.33) 
Vote-out -0.225 
(-0.37) 
-0.152 
(-0.53) 
-0.480 
(-1.43) 
-0.300 
(-0.55) 
Citizens' assembly 0.009 
(0.02) 
-0.363 
(-0.70) 
-0.333 
(-0.35) 
-0.294 
(-0.30) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Canton-specific time-trends No No Yes No 
No. of observations 125 125 125 125 
No. of groups 25 25 25 25 
Observations per group 5 5 5 5 
R-squared (within) 0.11 0.23 0.47 0.28 
Notes: Canton-fixed effects regressions (OLS), t-value in brackets. The dependent variable in columns (A) to 
(C) is the number of Council of States candidates from small parties not represented in the Federal Council 
(without independent candidates) and in column (D) the number of all Council of States candidates. 
Significance levels: ** p0.01, * 0.01<p0.05, (*) 0.05<p0.1. 
Data Sources: Federal statistical office and own compilation based on information from BAKOM, TV 
stations, and several newspaper archives. 
 
Column (A) in Table 24 shows that the introduction of local television leads on average to an 
increase of the number of candidates by 0.5 (p0.1). Column (B) reveals that the effect is due 
to cantonal TV only. When cantonal TV becomes available, the number of candidates from 
small parties increases by more than one. The coefficient is highly significant (p0.01). In 
contrast, the introduction of intercantonal TV does not affect the number of candidates at all. 
The effect stays robust when including canton-specific time trends into the analysis (column 
(C)). No corresponding effects are found when looking at the total number of candidates 
(column (D). In sum, running for the Council of States seems to increasingly serve 
promotional purposes when local TV comes into play. 
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4.7. Concluding Remarks 
Different types of media differ not only in their technology but also in the way they present 
information. Different target groups are addressed and catered to by different styles and 
content. Due to the dominance of the picture, TV news focus much more on persons than on 
facts as compared with newspapers and radio, and TV news present political information in a 
simpler manner. This chapter shows that TV consumption therefore has an important and 
systematic impact on the behavior of voters. The supposedly exogenous variation of local TV 
in Switzerland at the community level is used as an empirical tool to identify causal effects. In 
particular, voters with low education react to the presence of local TV by increasing their 
news consumption and their participation in elections. Furthermore, politicians and parties 
adjust to TV being person-oriented by increasingly focusing their election campaigns on 
individual politicians instead of party programs. They nominate candidates for the sole 
purpose of being present on TV even if they have no actual chance of winning the election. 
All effects are much more pronounced when TV markets match well with sub-national 
jurisdictions. The presence of these differentiated effects lends support to a causal 
interpretation of the effects of local TV on behavior. 
Now, the question arises if and how these behavioral changes further affect the political 
process and political outcomes. Not all voter and interest groups will profit in the same way 
from a changing media environment. TV mainly affects people with low education. Will 
television also benefit them in the sense that they will be better able to enforce their 
preferences in the political process? Further research should also address the effects of 
television consumption on political outcomes, like taxes and government spending. 
Second, the findings may have repercussions for the regulation of local TV markets. In 
Switzerland, a new radio and television law (RTVG) was enacted in 2007. While local TV 
stations do, in general, no longer require a license,101 a few licensed channels get public 
subsidies. However, only one station per pre-defined territory gets such a subsidy. These pre-
defined territories usually span over several cantons. The research presented here shows that 
TV stations covering only one canton produce particular meaningful information that is 
consumed by voters and leads them to increase their political participation. If local TV is to 
be subsidized efficiently, more attention should be paid to the match between TV markets and 
sub-national jurisdictions. 
                                                 
101 However, all TV stations must register with the BAKOM. 
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5. Conclusions 
This thesis presents an economic analysis of television consumption that goes beyond 
standard rational choice theory. Specifically, the thesis empirically studies the determinants of 
TV watching and its effects on subjective well-being and political participation. The results 
reveal beneficial as well as unfavorable impacts of TV consumption. Some individuals are 
induced by television’s immediate gratification at low immediate marginal costs to spend 
more time consuming it than they actually would prefer, and their utility is thus reduced. On 
the other hand, television consumption serves an important informational need, especially for 
people not attracted by more cognitively demanding media, such as newspapers. When local 
TV is available, people with low and intermediate education consume more news and increase 
participation in elections. The importance of television is furthermore established by looking 
at its effects on election campaigns: politicians react to the presence of television and more 
candidates run for Council of States elections in Switzerland when local TV is available. 
Hence, the different empirical applications that highlight very different aspects of the broad 
phenomena “television consumption” all point in the same direction: TV is relevant for 
individual behavior and well-being. 
The studies presented, as well as the media literature in general, face several challenges that 
are discussed in the following sections. While specific issues are considered in the respective 
chapters, I discuss critical issues and open questions, as well as implications for research and 
policy, on a more general level here. 
Causality issues 
All empirical applications deal with the problem of identifying causal effects on and of 
television consumption. Do unhappy people watch more TV than happy people, or does 
watching TV make people unhappy? Does some empirical relationship between TV 
consumption and political participation reflect that people with different preferences and 
different interests select different amounts and different sources of news? Or does TV have a 
causal impact on people’s political activities? Economists’ usually apply very stringent 
methodologies and have very high standards regarding data in order to properly identify one-
directional causal effects and to rule out alternative explanations. In the area of media 
research, this contrasts, at least to some extent, with research by scholars from other social 
sciences who are much less interested in causality or who make causal inferences based on 
lower methodological standards. 
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While the high standards of economists’ clearly represent a big advantage, especially if one 
would like to infer policy conclusions from empirical results, they also come at a cost. The 
standards render it difficult for a researcher to empirically analyze a relevant problem or an 
interesting research question if data availability and quality do not meet these standards. This 
thesis attempts to analyze interesting questions in a relevant field where the available data do 
not meet the highest standards but avoid naive conclusions drawn from basic empirical 
relationships. 
Ideally, one would prefer some kind of regionally differing exogenous variation of TV supply 
over time in connection with an individual level panel data set that includes the variables of 
interest as well as important control variables. Due to the lack of such a perfect setting, most 
empirical applications in this dissertation are based on cross-sectional data only. However, 
several differentiated hypotheses are tested in order to obtain a broad and detailed picture of 
the empirical relationship between TV consumption and the outcome variables, in this case 
primarily life satisfaction and political participation. In robustness analyses, I check the 
results with different specifications and try to rule out (some) alternative explanations. While 
all the results are consistent with the hypotheses, such an approach cannot exclude all 
alternative explanations, specifically, that a third uncontrolled factor drives the dependent as 
well as the independent variables. It could theoretically be possible that unhappy people with 
high materialistic values, with high opportunity costs of time or in countries with many TV 
channels resort to TV watching, while unhappy people with low materialistic values, with low 
opportunity costs of time or in countries with only a few TV channels do not. People with low 
education from communities with high cable penetration in cantons with cantonal TV (mostly 
urban cantons) could be different from people with low education from communities with 
high cable penetration in cantons with intercantonal TV (mostly rural cantons). Hence, the 
statistical relationship between local TV availability, TV consumption, political participation 
and education could be spurious. While it is rather difficult to conjecture such a story, results 
should nevertheless be interpreted with care, and especially, policy implications should be 
advocated cautiously. The latter point is also important because the exact causes of the 
observed statistical relationships or the mechanisms leading to them (even if they are causal) 
are no entirely clear. 
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 Explanation of results 
While the empirical results are consistent with the hypotheses established in the different 
parts of the thesis, the exact mechanisms underlying the empirical results have not been 
studied in detail. Because this issue is somewhat specific to the respective hypothesis, I 
discuss the problem separately for the two main empirical applications. 
In chapter 3, self-control problems and utility misprediction have been put forward as 
explanations for the negative effect of watching TV on life satisfaction and several additional 
hypotheses have been tested that are consistent with and support this interpretation. 
Nevertheless, some questions remain. First, the two explanations – self-control problems and 
utility misprediction – cannot be separated. The gravity of each explanation's importance is 
unclear, i.e., how much each explanation accounts for the negative relationship between TV 
consumption and subjective well-being. While some of the costs of watching TV have been 
identified as changed preferences and beliefs, and the empirical results show that they account 
for about half of the effect of TV viewing on life satisfaction, it is unclear why some people 
do not give such costs their sufficient due. Is it because such persons do not foresee the costs 
completely (or even not at all); or do they allot too much discount to such costs during the 
moment of decision making? Furthermore, it might well be possible that the two mechanisms 
are not independent and reinforce each other. 
It must also be noted that the specific preferences and beliefs studied in the empirical analysis 
naturally do not represent all possible channels through which TV watching might affect 
subjective well-being. The analyzed channels address some of the issues most prominently 
discussed in the media effects literature, but nevertheless they are just examples of possible 
effects. Hence, more research, especially more psychological foundation, would be needed in 
order to really comprehend and explain in detail the underlying causes and effects of TV 
watching that lead to lower life satisfaction. It would be especially interesting to understand 
why people do not seem to learn from their previous mistakes and change their behavior 
correspondingly, but rather seem instead to continually repeat the same mistakes. Such an 
understanding is especially important for policy conclusions, i.e., for advice on how to help 
people overcome their lack of willpower. This last point is also discussed below. 
In chapter 4, the reasons why local TV news leads some people to increase participation in 
elections have been even less explicitly examined. Several explanations are possible. First, 
people may learn from the media. Better knowledge enables them to make a better voting 
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decision, i.e., leads to a higher probability of actually choosing their preferred candidate. 
Therefore, the benefits of voting become higher, thus leading to an increased participation in 
the elections. The marginal effect of TV on political knowledge is especially high for people 
with ex ante little knowledge who are not targeted by other, cognitively more demanding 
media. In principle, this channel could be empirically tested. One might study, for example, 
whether people with local TV access are more aware, on average, of certain political issues or 
candidates. However, the type of knowledge needed by voters to make a reasonable decision 
is not quite clear. Voters may not require factual knowledge that can be captured in surveys 
(e.g. regarding a candidate's or a party's stand on certain political issues). Simple cues 
regarding ideology or personality of candidates can be sufficient for some voters. Hence, it is 
not surprising that literature concerning the effects of media consumption on political 
knowledge show very limited results, which has led some researchers to the (questionable) 
conclusion that the news media do not fulfill their function very well (see Norris 2000 for a 
comprehensive and critical discussion ). 
Second, it is possible that voters respond to mobilization efforts conveyed through TV. Again, 
this effect is supposedly strongest for the less educated who are subject to a lower ex ante 
participation rate. Third, regularly watching TV news can increase political awareness and 
interest and stimulate political discourse leading to a “virtuous circle”, where again media and 
information consumption is strengthened (see, again, Norris 2000). In this respect, the 
importance of a shared media platform, especially with regard to the effects on political 
discourse, is an interesting and relevant topic. When people all watch the same evening news, 
they have shared knowledge and focal points for discussion. If, on the other hand, selection 
and filtering of information according to ones interests and political attitudes is very easy, 
then political discourse may be impeded. This can be the “dark side” of media diversity and 
filtering options provided by, for example, the internet (see Sunstein 2007 and, for a similar 
argument, Prior 2005). 
Furthermore, local TV can also stimulate local identification of individuals and lead to higher 
local political participation. In this respect, and also on a more general level, the role of 
language in television reporting (e.g. whether presentation of local television news in the local 
dialect has any relevance) might also make for an interesting study. 
Another possible explanation for the empirical results is that the more personalized coverage 
of TV as compared to other media leads to a shift from policy issues to issues regarding 
politicians, i.e., more weight is placed on elections rather than on referendums and initiatives. 
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If one wants to reach policy conclusions, then one must examine whether such an effect is 
beneficial or rather detrimental for the functioning of direct democracy in Switzerland. 
Survey data 
A further source of concern is that all empirical applications are based on survey data. Many 
economists do not trust survey data because subjective experiences are not publicly 
observable and because survey data can therefore be biased in different ways (see, e.g., 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). However, such concerns and evaluation of potential biases 
must also reflect the intended use of the data. The quality of TV consumption measures is 
already discussed in chapter 2.3. Life satisfaction is shown to constitute a sufficiently valid 
and reliable proxy measure for experienced utility (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002b; 
Luechinger 2007). Nevertheless, some additional problems can stem from the fact that in 
some of the applications both dependent and independent variables originate from surveys. If 
some respondents similarly bias all their answers, for example due to some sort of social 
desirability, then the empirical results could systematically be biased. For example, some 
respondents might underreport their TV consumption because they feel that TV watching 
carries a stigma, while at the same time they overreport their life satisfaction because a high 
level of one’s happiness might be viewed as desirable. Although I have no evidence of such 
reporting behavior, these and other similar potential biases must be acknowledged. Other 
biases, for example due to strategic answering behavior, are rather unlikely because the 
surveys used cover many different topics and issues, and dependent and independent variables 
are only connected ex post by the researcher. 
Implications for economics 
Keeping the discussed open questions in mind, the research presented in this dissertation leads 
to some implications for economics. Two major points are highlighted here: the integration of 
the media into economic theory and the acceptance of measures of experienced utility. 
Even though imperfect information, information asymmetries and related problems have been 
taken seriously within economic theory since the 60s and 70s, the media have not yet been 
integrated, neither in standard market analyses nor in political economy or public choice 
theory. This neglect stands in large contrast to other social sciences and public opinion where 
the media are assumed to take an important role. While the decisiveness that this role plays is 
open to debate, many recent studies do convincingly show that the media matter for economic 
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as well as political markets. A systematic and serious integration of information provision of 
the media into economic theory seems therefore to be warranted and may lead to a better 
understanding of individual behavior in many areas of economic research. 
The field of economic happiness research has been growing in recent years. However, many 
economists still seem to be skeptical towards measures of experienced utility or subjective 
well-being. While some skepticism is warranted, it somehow stands in contrast to the (often) 
uncritical acceptance of the assumption underlying the revealed behavior approach. 
Systematic evidence in the field of economics and psychology shows that these assumptions 
are questionable under certain circumstances. Chapter 3 of this thesis adds another relevant 
case to this literature. Imperfect self-control and imperfect prediction of future costs lead 
people to watch more TV than which they consider optimal based on their own self-
evaluations. Limiting focus to revealed behavior or, in other words, to decision utility, leads, 
at least in this case, to an incomplete understanding of individuals’ behavior. Hence, measures 
of experienced utility, such as life satisfaction, complement the picture in important ways. 
Taking such measures seriously and recognizing their potential as well as their limits seems 
more fruitful than an unqualified rejection. 
Implications for media research 
Furthermore, social sciences media research can also profit from the insights of economists 
within this research field, such as the empirical results presented in this thesis. The main 
points are methodological: selection should be taken seriously and trying to identify causal 
relationship is important if one wants to reach conclusions for media policy. The research 
presented here and research by other economists (and some other social scientists) confirms 
the empirical findings of traditional media researchers but also leads to very different 
conclusions. While consumers of less demanding and less information rich media such as 
television are less informed and participate less in politics, television cannot be held 
responsible for this lack of participation. On the contrary, without TV, such voters would be 
even less informed. Hence, merely drawing conclusions and even imparting policy advice on 
the basis of simple empirical relationships is probably too simplistic in this area of research. 
Implications for policy 
Implications for policy are faced with the problem of the very diverse aspects of television. 
Broadly speaking, the thesis presents beneficial as well harmful effects of TV consumption. 
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Nevertheless, regulatory interventions in media markets, and especially TV markets, represent 
the rule rather than the exception. While such interventions can historically be ascribed to 
technical reasons, i.e., to limited transmission frequencies, such a justification no longer holds 
in the digital age. Hence political and economic reasons have replaced, to some extent, the 
technical ones. Public good aspects and positive externalities of information consumption 
with respect to the function of democracy may lead to lower information provisions than is 
efficient (Sunstein 2007). Furthermore, both two-sided markets and the lack of a marginal 
price payment by consumers lead to preference intensities not reflected within the market as 
well as to an underprovision of minority content (Sunstein 2000). 
Some justifications for regulatory intervention in the TV market also have a paternalistic 
element. Information provided by the media, in particular political information, is seen as a 
merit good (especially in the European context). The notion of a merit good rests on some 
normative assessment of what is seen as beneficial for consumers and society beyond 
consumer sovereignty (see, in general, Musgrave 2008; and, with regard to the media, Kiefer 
2003). Irrational overconsumption due to self-control problems can also be put into this 
context, and this aspect of television may be viewed as a demerit good. With regard to such 
decision anomalies, libertarian paternalism has been suggested as a solution (see, e.g., 
Camerer et al. 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Glaeser 2006). Such government intervention 
is paternalistic in the sense that the aim is to promote better individual decision making but is 
also libertarian in the sense that consumer sovereignty and freedom of choice is observed. 
Defaults regarding retirement savings plans represent the most prominent example of such 
intervention (see, e.g., Choi et al. 2003). In order to stimulate saving, employees should, by 
default, participate in a company retirement savings plan but also maintain the right to resign 
from the plan at no penalty. With regard to TV consumption, it is difficult to think of such a 
libertarian intervention beyond that of information provisions concerning the beneficial and 
harmful effects of TV consumption.  
In any case, it can be concluded from the presented research that if intervention in TV markets 
or media markets seems warranted, for example if local TV stations are to be subsidized as 
has recently been decided in Switzerland, more attention should be paid to market structures, 
and especially to the overlap between media and political markets. Other concrete policy 
advice is difficult due to the diverse impact of TV consumption and because the mechanisms 
that might explain the empirical results have not been investigated in detail. 
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Prospects for future research 
The research presented in this thesis answers some questions but also leaves many others 
unaddressed. Parallel to the two empirical applications in chapter 3 and 4 of the thesis, two 
main avenues for further research are proposed here. 
As discussed above, gaining insight into the exact mechanisms capable of explaining the 
empirical results would be compelling and relevant. An investigation into the individual's 
inability to learn and develop strategies for overcoming lack of willpower as regards 
television would be of great interest.102 In this respect, further exploration of the role of 
technology would also be meaningful. For example, the presented evidence indicates that the 
number of TV channels are relevant for self-control problems. The introduction of 
technologies such as digital TV further increases the offerings. However, other changes also 
occur at the same time as a result of these new technologies. Two aspects are of special 
relevance. First, any program may be viewed on demand at any time. Second, pay-per-view 
schemes become increasingly available for film and television series. The first aspect, 
independence from a specific time slot, may lead to a reduction in both the opportunity costs 
of time and the severity of self-control problems but might also lead to an increase in 
temptation based upon constant availability of interesting TV offerings, as opposed to 
availability that is limited to prime time hours. The second aspect, pay-per-view television, 
increases immediate marginal cost and can lead to a reduction of self-control problems.  
Regarding the role of the media in the political process, the mixture of both news and 
entertainment, i.e. "soft news", is a source of concern. The crowding out of hard news might 
lead to both less political knowledge and political cynicism. However, this verdict seems 
ambiguous when referring to political economic theories of rational ignorance that emphasize 
the lack of individual voter benefit derived from political information. Downs (1957a) already 
recognized that voters might learn about politics “by accident” through entertainment 
consumption. In other words, soft news decreases the information costs of citizens (see, e.g., 
Baum 2002; and, for a critique, Prior 2003). Furthermore, as information is considered to be 
an experience good whose value consumers only recognize after they have acquired it, soft 
news consumption might stimulate interest in a certain issue and boost the acquisition of 
                                                 
102 For general discussions of this issue and on how (market) incentives may (and may not) transform decision 
anomalies and support learning see, e.g., Eichenberger (1992); Frey and Eichenberger (1994); List (2003); 
Slembeck and Tyran (2004). 
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related hard news (see, e.g., Baum 2005; Young and Tisinger 2006). Hence, understanding 
the role and effects of soft news seems relevant, also when considering the current distress of 
many “hard” newspapers and the rise of the internet and free newspapers with less dense 
informational content and more soft news. 
On a more general level, the economic analysis of television consumption undertaken in this 
thesis attempts to show that the analysis of people’s time use is at least as worthwhile as the 
analysis of their use of money, the traditional focus of economic applications. Time can even 
be considered the ultimate scarce resource. Hopefully, the reader has been convinced that an 
attempt at understanding the causes and consequences of people’s allocation of this scarce 
resource to TV consumption is interesting and relevant. 
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Table A3: Summary Statistics of Respondents with Different Time Opportunity Costs 
Mean values/percentages  Flexibility of working hours as distinction criteria 
Employment status / 
profession as distinction 
criteria 
 Whole population
Group with 
high 
opportunity 
costs of time
Group with 
low 
opportunity 
costs of time
Group with 
high 
opportunity 
costs of time 
Group with 
low 
opportunity 
costs of time
Life satisfaction 6.94 7.47 6.95 7.26 6.54 
TV consumption      
No TV at all 3.13% 3.08% 2.77% 3.80% 2.77% 
Less than 0.5 hour TV 5.54% 6.86% 6.19% 8.62% 2.69% 
0.5 to 1.5 hours TV 28.73% 38.23% 32.87% 40.41% 18.07% 
More than 1.5 to 2.5 hours 
TV 
29.44% 31.81% 32.50% 28.25% 27.16% 
More than 2.5 hours TV 33.16% 20.02% 25.66% 18.92% 49.31% 
Indiv./household characteristics      
Working hours 34.15 39.98 39.49 42.16 36.09 
Household income (EUR, 
PPP) 
1765.02 2912.78 2114.57 2619.23 1192.21 
Age 46.25 40.91 39.43 43.28 63.69 
Female  53.28% 41.63% 44.83% 37.14% 50.55% 
Male 46.58% 58.30% 55.08% 62.75% 49.32% 
Foreigner 4.20% 4.20% 5.71% 3.91% 2.83% 
Citizen of country 95.72% 95.69% 94.18% 96.04% 97.08% 
Children living at home 40.06% 49.39% 49.28% 52.75% 21.50% 
Marital status      
Married, with partner 53.25% 58.10% 56.29% 63.48% 52.09% 
Married, without partner 0.36% 0.40% 0.43% 0.43% 0.46% 
Separated, with partner 0.31% 0.40% 0.31% 0.43% 0.22% 
Separated, without partner 1.24% 1.24% 1.33% 1.39% 1.00% 
Divorced, with partner 1.58% 2.21% 1.86% 2.10% 1.22% 
Divorced, without partner 5.30% 5.71% 5.68% 5.07% 6.11% 
Widowed, with partner 0.38% 0.13% 0.09% 0.11% 0.81% 
Widowed, without partner 8.94% 1.46% 1.52% 1.70% 24.38% 
Single, with partner 5.75% 10.16% 8.56% 7.44% 1.65% 
Single, without partner 22.44% 19.83% 23.43% 17.42% 11.71% 
Education      
Not completed primary 
education 
4.24% 0.52% 1.21% 1.07% 8.56% 
Primary or first stage of 
basic education 
14.66% 5.01% 8.73% 6.92% 23.60% 
Lower secondary or second 
stage of basic education 
20.17% 15.25% 20.73% 10.50% 20.53% 
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Continuation of Table A3      
Upper secondary education 31.96% 33.21% 36.01% 22.87% 26.46% 
Post secondary, non-tertiary 
education 
5.88% 7.57% 6.55% 7.22% 4.18% 
First stage of tertiary 
education 
13.46% 22.61% 14.17% 31.39% 8.12% 
Second stage of tertiary 
education 
4.42% 8.89% 4.53% 14.45% 2.59% 
Employment status      
Paid work, employed 40.59% 100.00% 100.00% 54.54% 0.00% 
Paid work, self-employed 7.55% 0.00% 0.00% 45.46% 0.00% 
Unemployed, looking for a 
job 
3.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12.45% 
Unemployed, not looking 
for a job 
1.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.24% 
Education 9.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Permanently sick or disabled 2.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Retired 21.66% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 81.31% 
Community or military 
service 
0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Housework, looking after 
children 
11.49% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Area of living      
Big city 19.38% 17.36% 19.55% 21.06% 18.84% 
Suburbs 13.01% 18.34% 13.05% 14.76% 11.91% 
Town, small city 29.96% 28.32% 31.57% 27.45% 31.14% 
Country village 30.92% 29.13% 29.89% 28.14% 31.77% 
Farm, home in countryside 6.40% 6.49% 5.52% 8.39% 6.04% 
Number of observations 89,208 6,793 7,042 12,696 21,013 
Data sources: European Social Survey (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005),World Development Indicators (World Bank 
several years). 
 
Table A4: Descriptive Statistics ESS 1 & 2 and WVS 3 & 4 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median MinimumMaximum 
Number of 
observations 
TV viewing (hours) 1.98 1.06 1.75 0.00 3.50 127,949 
Residual TV viewing (hours) 0.00 0.94 -0.02 -3.41 3.21 127,949 
Life satisfaction 6.71 2.39 7.00 1.00 10.00 127,949 
TV channels 10.33 12.55 4.50 1.00 62.00 76 
Data sources: European Social Survey Wave 1 & 2 (Jowell et al. 2003; 2005), World Values Survey 
Wave 3 & 4 (European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association 2006), IP Network 
(several years). 
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Table A5: Diffusion of Terrestrial, Cable, and Satellite TV 
Country Survey 
No. of TV channels 
for 70% of 
population 
Only terrestrial 
TV 
Cable or satellite 
TV 
Austria ESS 1 14 13% 87% 
Austria ESS 2 24 15% 85% 
Belgium ESS 1 32.5 3% 97% 
Belgium ESS 2 30 3% 97% 
Brazil WVS 3 3 89% 11% 
Bulgaria WVS 3 2 55% 45% 
Belarus WVS 3 3 83% 17% 
Croatia WVS 3 3 62% 38% 
Czech Republic ESS 1 4 71% 29% 
Czech Republic ESS 2 4 75% 25% 
Czech Republic WVS 3 4   
Denmark ESS 1 5.5 17% 83% 
Denmark ESS 2 4 19% 81% 
Estonia ESS 2 3 49% 52% 
Estonia WVS 3 4 80% 20% 
Finland ESS 1 4 44% 56% 
Finland ESS 2 4 28% 72% 
Finland WVS 3 4 56% 44% 
France ESS 1 7 67% 33% 
France ESS 2 7 61% 39% 
Germany ESS 1 25 7% 93% 
Germany ESS 2 30 3% 97% 
Germany WVS 3 36 12% 88% 
Greece ESS 1 10 99% 1% 
Greece ESS 2 9 99% 1% 
Hungary ESS 1 3 37% 63% 
Hungary ESS 2 3 34% 66% 
Hungary WVS 3 3 20% 80% 
Iceland ESS 2 4 87% 13% 
India WVS 3 1 77% 23% 
Ireland ESS 1 6 40% 60% 
Ireland ESS 2 6 35% 65% 
Italy ESS 1 9 83% 17% 
Japan WVS 3 7 78% 22% 
Latvia WVS 3 3 69% 31% 
Lithuania WVS 3 4 78% 22% 
Luxembourg ESS 1 40 2% 98% 
Luxembourg ESS 2 40 1% 100% 
Mexico WVS 3 4   
Netherlands ESS 1 29 1% 100% 
Netherlands ESS 2 26 1% 100% 
Norway ESS 1 4 31% 69% 
Norway ESS 2 4 28% 73% 
Norway WVS 3 4 44% 56% 
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Continuation of Table A5  
Poland ESS 1 5 42% 58% 
Poland ESS 2 6 47% 53% 
Poland WVS 3 3 51% 49% 
Portugal ESS 1 4 57% 43% 
Portugal ESS 2 4 50% 51% 
Romania WVS 3 1 46% 54% 
Russia WVS 3 7 83% 17% 
Slovakia ESS 2 4 52% 48% 
Slovakia WVS 3 3 20% 80% 
Slovenia ESS 1 3 35% 65% 
Slovenia ESS 2 5 33% 67% 
Slovenia WVS 3 5 51% 49% 
South Africa WVS 3 4 80% 20% 
South Africa WVS 4 4 78% 22% 
Spain ESS 1 5 78% 22% 
Spain ESS 2 5 72% 29% 
Spain WVS 3 5 92% 8% 
Spain WVS 4 5 61% 39% 
Sweden ESS 1 3 28% 72% 
Sweden ESS 2 3 24% 77% 
Sweden WVS 3 3 37% 63% 
Switzerland ESS 1 39 5% 95% 
Switzerland ESS 2 41 6% 95% 
Switzerland WVS 3 31 23% 77% 
Turkey ESS 2 15 68% 32% 
Ukraine ESS 2 10 58% 42% 
Ukraine WVS 3 3 93% 7% 
Macedonia WVS 3 7   
Great Britain ESS 1 5 53% 47% 
Great Britain ESS 2 5 36% 64% 
United States WVS 3 62 27% 73% 
Venezuela WVS 3 4 86% 14% 
Data Source: IP Network (several years). 
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